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Introductory Notes
The main ambition of the book you are about to read is to sketch the existential 
aesthetics that explore the situatedness1 of the individual towards a single 
player digital game with avatar2. The book focuses on games falling within 
the category of independent or art games, and builds upon an assumption 
drawn from existentialism; where the individual facing the world is the central 
philosophical concern. In this theoretical horizon, a situation can become 
meaningful only from the point of view of the particular being.
A computer game can be interpreted as part of the everyday world that exists 
in a specific way (Sageng, et al., 2012; Leino, 2009), namely, as a digital 
artefact that is designed and interacted with, sold and reviewed, compared 
to others and discussed. A game is then an artefact that — while becoming 
a part of multiple discourses — contributes to the world. 
Within the existential aesthetics of digital games, the relation of the author 
to the artefact appears as especially interesting. The originator of the digital 
artefact is then a first person, who situates the digital artefact within the world; 
from her perspective, the emerging creation starts to exist in the discourses 
of game creation. Therefore, in the first part of the book, I will focus on game 
designers’ situatedness towards their own creative work, the artefact, and how 
it is reflected in particular discourses.
In turn, the second part of the book introduces the perspective of the player, 
who exercises an opportunity to experience a threefold situatedness. I explore 
the titular perspectives that designate points of view precisely defined by the 
composition of the gameworld, and are co-shaped and concretised by the 
player participating in the in-game situation as a self-avatar. Analogically 
to the existential concept of being in the world, the proposed model 
features circularity of being and understanding. It is inextricably bound 
with the concept of situated being, where an individual discovers the world 
1 The notion of situatedness is widely discussed in the second part of the book, especially in Chapter 
2.1 and 2.2.
2 Independently of the first or third person points of view, i.e. if the avatar can be seen by the player, 
or is limited to a situated gaze, agency, and outlined as a character.
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simultaneously with her situatedness towards it. In consequence, the world 
can neither be considered from the “neutral” or “objective” point of view, 
nor can the individual be comprehended as abstracted from the world3. 
As a result, I consider a game as a gameworld that provides the player with 
a fresh and unique existential situatedness.
One of the major objectives for the existential aesthetics of computer games 
is then providing a theoretical framework for an understanding of the 
concrete, individual experiences of the game as interpreted from the first-
person perspective (Cf. Leino, 2009, Vella 2013, 2014, 2016). The basic 
questions to answer are then: who am I in the gameworld? How am 
I situated within it? How is the meaning of this world established, and what 
is its aesthetical dimension?
The existential interpretation of the game is based on an assumption that 
a gameworld can be understood as an existential and aesthetic environment. 
While playing, the player makes attempts to understand her own perceptual 
situatedness within this gameworld and towards the avatar. This situatedness 
needs to be experienced in order to establish a ground for reflection. 
In consequence, it will enable one to distinguish characteristics of this 
in-game situatedness from the situatedness towards the everyday world, 
and towards artefacts considered from the point of view of the objectifying 
aesthetics; which does not, however, concur with the external perspective 
of the gameworld (Cf. Chapter 2.1). The meaning of the gameworld therefore 
emerges from the point of view of the individual within a gameworld.
The player’s situation is complex, as it combines her situatedness in the 
everyday world towards the artefact; and in a gameworld, towards the avatar. 
Primarily, she concretises and synthesises her experiences with the gameworld, 
which are considered to be her environment and text, i.e. from both 
the internal and external perspectives. However, I argue that this complexity 
does not provide sufficient background for deduction from the situation 
within the gameworld about features of the artefact as abstracted from 
situatedness of the player.
3 For the existential concept of understanding, cf. Heidegger, 2001, 36-37. For the concept 
of situated knowledge, cf. Haraway, 1988.
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The third part of the book — while building on theoretical arrangements 
made in the previous parts — is concentrated on existential, textual and 
contextual close playing of chosen digital games. In consequence, emphasis 
shifts from theoretical frameworks to a practical interpretation of games 
undertaken from an existential perspective.
Categories used by existential philosophers seem to be apt for describing 
the gameplay experience and reflecting upon its aesthetic. However, 
the application of this philosophical model needs to be understood 
in the light of strong or weak interpretation of games rather than knowledge. 
In consequence, the classical philosophical notions also used by existentialists 
need modification and extending, as well as rejuvenation — that is often 
connected with stripping the dramatic and ethical overtones from them. 
At stake is their operational/functional usefulness that makes them efficient 
tools for the interpretation of computer games4.
 Let me move on to illustrating the core parts of the book in more detail.
***
The first part of the book is devoted to an analysis of the making of digital 
artefacts from the perspective of the discourses, and the understanding 
of design processes emerging from practices of authors claiming creative 
independence of their work (Garda, Grabarczyk 2016). In the outlined 
framework, the artefact is defined as related to the author’s existential project. 
This unique bond emerges in the course of a design process, and is co-shaped 
by critical and creative references to conventions as they are reinterpreted 
in the process of creation.
What, then, is the major motivation of the creators of authorial digital games 
as expressed in the paratexts they create? In what terms do they describe their 
own situatedness towards created artefacts5?
4 Even existentialism itself when applied to games is referred to as ludoexistentialism (Möring 2016) 
or existential ludology (Leino and Möring 2015a, 2015b).
5 I do not make reference to notions of authorial intent fallacy (Wimsatt and Beardsley 1946, Barthes 
1978, Farrell 2017) nor designer fallacy (Leino 2010, 2012, Ihde 2008), because I do not claim that 
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While asking such questions, one can hesitate; are the creators’ comments 
on their own activities reflections, or rather a subtle form of marketing? 
Are they independent or based on prevailing trends?
In order to avoid meditations over intentional fallacies, influences and 
dependencies, imitativeness and primacy, I have decided to focus on the 
discourses of digital game design. I believe that these discourses gradually 
surface from individual creative practice in the process of reinterpretation 
of the existing cultural environment, and mirror how the author reflects 
over her own situatedness towards her activity, and the world she is situated 
in. However, their tractable presence is not dependent on real motivations 
or preferences of particular game creators, but relies on the interpretation 
of cultural texts authored by them — games, interviews, papers and 
manifestos, as well as theoretical works. My goal, however, is not 
to provide a comprehensive overview, but a sketch of three perspectives; the 
most significant of which features the connection between the author and 
the designed artefact. Each of them defines the character of an emerging 
artefact in a different manner. I would like to point out that the discussed 
discourses are unconventional approaches, when compared to the dominant 
discourse in game design which highlights the importance of specialised 
teamwork and replicable results (Cf. Rogers 2010; Salen and Zimmerman 
2003; Zimmerman 2003, amongst others).
The criterion for distinguishing the particular discourse is then the answer 
to the following questions: what is the creator doing; what do her activities 
give shape to?
At this point, I would like to mention the discourse popular amongst 
the practitioners that places the goal of the design process not in the artefact, 
but in qualities of the players’ experience, e.g. fun (Cf. Calleja 2011, 51–
52; Koster 2004) or learning (Gee 2003, 2008). I will not discuss it in the 
following pages as they do not feature the author, but rather emphasise 
the final impact the artefact is expected to have on the player. On the other 
one can “read the meaning” or “guess the correct interpretation” of the particular artefact from 
the authors’ paratexts. I will explore authorial discourses addressing their own creative practices, 
not the influence they could possibly have on players. 
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hand, in the discourses presented in the first part of the book, the artefact 
is considered to be the text; an expression of the vision, the argument, 
or the crafted object; i.e. the concrete proposition of making meaningful 
the world projected by the text. In consequence, its intended shape and 
meaning cannot be omitted while discussing the situatedness of the author.
The artefact is then a border; on one hand it is described by the discourse 
of game design, and the game designers’ situatedness towards their own work; 
while on the other, it is defined by the player’s experiences with it. However, 
I will not take stance on the linkage between the two poles of the authorial 
existential project, intentions and activities, connections – or lack of them – 
between the prospected and actual shape of the artefact as seen by the author, 
and the influence of the artefact on the players.
The discourses I will outline are connected by considering the result of the 
creative process as an artefact. I will not, however, pay attention to the know-
how hints, i.e. technical knowledge of the game creators. On the contrary, 
I will concentrate on reflecting on how the design goals are set, and what they 
mean for the creators — do they want to express themselves, create a work 
of art, or critically comment on the contemporary world?
In order to isolate the discussed discourses, I will analyse the manifestos 
of designers who create in a similar manner, comments of the practitioners, 
as well as theorists of game design. As long as I question whether these 
perspectives are mutually exclusive, the distinction will enable me to focus 
on the interesting differences between them, and reflect over the role 
of the discursive horizon of the creation of games.
In the coming three chapters, I will outline three selected discourses of design. 
Despite it not being enough to exhaust the subject, I believe that the selection 
sufficiently shows how differently the role of the artefact is modelled in the 
distinct approaches; how the position of the designer towards the artefact is 
perceived; and what the priorities and consequences of such an approach are.
Throughout the first discourse — that of the digital artisans — the making 
of games is a handicraft, a form of manual labour that interweaves the artefact 
with the existential project of the creator; as it serves self-expression, or even 
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the transformation of the author’s self. 
The second perspective — of the guardians of the vision -— the activity 
of authoring digital games is understood as analogical to the romantic 
approach towards artistic creation. It is the discourse of poiesis, where the key 
role is played by the creation of the artefact convergent with the authorial 
proposition of making meaningful the world projected by the artefact..
In the third discourse, making a game is considered to be a form of critical 
activism. The discourse of the digital orators positions the procedural 
argumentation as the clue of their creative endeavours; they create simulations 
in order to critically comment on reality.
***
The goal of the second part of the book is to elaborate on the three-
levelled situatedness of the player towards the game, and propose concepts 
of a gameplay situation and an aesthetic situation that co-create the internal 
perspective experienced by the player, as differentiated from the external 
perspective, which complements the aesthetic understanding of the game. 
I will make an attempt to characterise the multidimensional character 
of the player’s involvement in the game. 
From the perspective internal to the gameworld, the first level of involvement 
is experienced as the gameplay situation. It is established by the interplay 
of the player’s situatedness, and agency within the gameworld. From the in-
game perspective, it can be described as a result of the cooperation between 
the self-avatar and the gameworld, or a realisation of the existential project 
of a self-avatar.
The crucial notion of the self-avatar needs to be introduced here. I use 
the compound as it clearly expresses that the player’s perspective and 
situatedness within the gameworld cannot be experienced as separate from 
the avatar. The relation between the two elements can occur as both 
transparent and natural, or as strange and awkward. In both cases, the self-
avatar is an emergent being situated within the gameworld; consisting of the 
player’s existence and intentional acts, as well as the features of the avatar. 
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I believe that it is not only the ‘I’ of the player who perceives the avatar 
to be her glove (Dovey, Kennedy 2011), puppet (Westecott 2003), cursor 
(Fullerton 2008), character (Murray 1997), telepresence (Klevjer 2012), 
or even the Other (Vella 2014). I will argue that the self-avatar can be also 
be discussed in terms of the impersonation of in-game the They, because 
the player acts in the gameworld within the perceptual, spatiotemporal and 
causal framework defined by capabilities of the avatar. In other words, within 
this gameworld “proximally, it is not ‘I’, in the sense of my own Self, that ‘am’, 
but rather the Others, whose way is that of the ‘they’” that shape meaning 
of my in-game situatedness (Heidegger 2001, 167 [129]).
The second level of the player’s involvement in the gameworld is an 
aesthetic situation that reveals dualism within the relation of the self-avatar 
to themselves. It is defined as a special type of reflective situation established 
by the appropriacy of the gameworld and the self-avatar, when they can 
consider themselves reflectively as a subject within the gameworld; and 
as a specific kind of aesthetic object that is concretized (Ingarden 1981, 175), 
due to their own intentional acts that reflectively embrace their situatedness 
within the gameworld. 
Of equal importance is the third level of involvement with the computer 
game, which reveals coexistence and interplay between the gameworld and 
the game approached as text. The position experienced as the self-avatar 
from within the gameworld is perceived as a construction of the protagonist 
distanced from the player’s subjectivity while approached from the external 
point of view. In consequence, when the player approaches the game from 
the external perspective, the avatar becomes its meaningful and personal part. 
I will highlight the philosophical dimension of the threefold scheme 
outlined above, and name it involved aesthetics, as it is based on experiences 
of the being situated within the gameworld, and highlights the importance 
of the interplay between the internal and the external perspective. The internal 
perspective is based on experiencing the situatedness of the pre-reflective and 
reflective being-in-the-gameworld (Cf. Sartre, 1978, 74; Vella 2015, 55); 
while the external perspective is a situation of reflection over a text of a game, 
where the avatar is the central point recognised by the player while playing 
a game. 
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In the first chapter, I will concentrate on the difference between the approach 
of objectifying the game while considering the text from the external 
perspective, and ascribing the features recognised while playing the game 
to the artefact; and the existential, phenomenological approach that 
is based on the internal perspective - the first-hand experience of subjective 
situatedness within the gameworld.
The two consecutive chapters elaborate on the internal perspective, and develop 
an assumption of dual perspective within the gameworld, as it is experienced 
from the point of view of the gameplay situation and the aesthetic situation. 
In both cases, the object of research is the situatedness of the self within 
the gameworld.
The fourth and fifth chapters concentrate on the conditions of experience 
within the gameplay situation as seen from the point of view of the existentially-
approached aesthetic situation. I will argue that as long as the player approaches 
the game from the external perspective, they can freely interpret it, and accept 
or reject the situatedness offered to them; but when the individual experiences 
an adventure (Sartre 2007, 36–37) as self-avatar within the gameworld; 
i.e. from the internal perspective; she acts in bad faith (See: Sartre 1978, 
44–45, 47–70, 628; Leino 2012a) and/or in the spirit of seriousness (Sartre 
1978, 39, 580, 626–27, 633). The argument will be supported by an analysis 
of The Beginner’s Guide (Everything Unlimited Ltd. and Wreden 2015), 
The Vanishing of Ethan Carter (The Astronauts 2014), The Path (Tale of Tales 
2009), and Dear Esther (The Chinese Room 2012).
***
Computer games create unique opportunities to experience philosophical 
problems through active participation. In this part of the book, I will argue 
that their most interesting moments occur due to the interplay between 
multiple perspectives, opened by the complexity of the player’s situatedness 
towards the game, the avatar, and the gameworld. 
The situations described in the second part of the book develop collaterally 
and influence each other. I believe that these, sometimes conflicting points 
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of view, are what shape a more comprehensive understanding of the particular 
game.
I will hereby concentrate on close playing and building a philosophical 
interpretation of chosen games. Each of these games features an avatar, and 
falls within the category of independent or art games, but is quite different 
in many respects. In this approach, the game is not considered to be material 
for analysis; on the contrary, playing is considered to be a method of 
philosophical inquiry revealing the existential condition, as well as exposing 
an aesthetic dimension of the game.
The self-avatar — as looked through rather than looking at — acts as specific 
lenses which enable the player to participate in the gameplay situation. When 
considered from the point of view of the aesthetic situation, the self-avatar 
is reflectively perceived as a structure of the in-game — the They. While 
the player considers the game from the external point of view, the avatar 
is referred to as a character, or as a well-known personal object.
Problems and questions lived through from the in-game perspective gain 
individuality as they are personally experienced. The interplay of agency 
of the self-avatar positioned within the gameworld - along with her aesthetic 
reflection - open the field for perspectivism, as it encourages the self-avatar 
to exercise multiple points of view; while the external situation, supported 
by the player’s game literacy, provides her with the necessary interpretative 
tools.
I will focus on games that make problematic - and consequently more explicit 
– the passages between these perspectives. 
The first chapter of the third part of the book highlights an effect of reflective 
repetition within the gameworld of The Stanley Parable (Galactic Cafe and 
Wreden 2013). Suggesting that the self-avatar participates in multiple games, 
the game itself is concentrated on the problematisation of the player’s position 
within the gameworld, making the gameness of the experience explicit. 
The second chapter focuses on the close playing of games featuring 
the dissonance emerging between a subjective position of the self-avatar, 
Perspectives of the Avatar10
and the possibilities offered by the gameworld. I argue that some features 
of the aesthetics of the absurd are traceable in non-absurd gameworlds. 
The third and final chapter contains the close reading of Sunset (Tale 
of Tales 2015), and concentrates on the moments of passages, when the player 
distances herself from the in-game the They, and perceives the character from 
the external perspective.
Part 1. Discourses of Design
1.1. The Digital Tapestry. The Artisan and her Craft1
“All ideas of this kind are founded upon two mistaken suppositions: the first, that one man’s 
thoughts can be, or ought to be, executed by another man’s hands; the second, that manual 
labor is a degradation, when it is governed by intellect” (Ruskin 1911, 2:169)
— roared John Ruskin in The Stones of Venice. As the enemy of degradation 
of craft, industrialisation, and work specialisation, he argued that 
the originator of any form of creation is the person most predisposed 
to producing an artefact he intends.
In the course of describing the Heideggerian concept of craft of thinking – 
Maria Kostyszak asks in a similar vein:
“What is specific to the craft under scrutiny? Primarily, the relation of appropriateness, 
reciprocity between this what is thought about, and this what is thinking. [...] We are capable 
of doing only what we are keen on, and what fosters us, and we foster it”2.
Some echoes of beliefs in this intimate appropriacy of design and development 
can be found in statements of game makers; both in professional authors 
of indie and experimental games (Ruffino 2015; Swirsky and Pajot 2012; Barr 
2016; Gualeni 2013), and in amateurs descending from Do-It-Yourself (DIY) 
and The Makers movements (Anthropy 2012; Anthropy 2013; Anderson 
2012; Dougherty 2012).
In the following pages, I will discuss concerns central to the discourse 
of the digital artisans, and accent its cohesion despite differing opinions 
among its exponents. I will use the notion of digital artisans to address 
individuals involved in game production who position their own game-
making activity in categories of artisanry and craft. However, the leitmotif 
of the present chapter, as well as of the two following it, is an attempt to outline 
the discourse of digital artisans, not to research any specific sociocultural 
group. Within this dicourse, the creation of computer games is understood 
1 An earlier version of this chapter was published in Polish (Kania 2016).
2 (Kostyszak, 2010, 78). Quotation translated by author. See also Kostyszak, 1997.
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as a craft or satisfying work (Westecott 2012; Bratich 2010; Guevara-Villalobos 
2011; Ruffino 2013). It is performed solo or in a small team. Specialisation — 
which is common in industrial production — is severely limited or even absent 
in the practice of digital artisanry. In consequence, the authors take control 
and responsibility for the whole process of making the artefact; from the first 
sketches to the eventual market release. This feature makes their discourse 
very different from the one dominant in game industry, which features highly 
specialised production methods (Cf. Rogers 2010; Salen and Zimmerman 
2003).
Within the discourse of the digital artisans, the making of computer games 
is understood and evaluated by reference to handicraft. Despite the digital 
nature of the works it addresses, this approach bears a striking resemblance 
to the approach presented by members of The Arts and Crafts Movement, 
funded by Walter Crane and Charles Robert Ashbee (Ashbee 1901). As will 
be discussed later on, the craft is here differentiated both from industry and 
game industry; as well as from specialised activities of game development and 
design (Resp. Morris 2011; Ruskin 1911; Anthropy 2012). 
The motives unifying the discussed discourse are a strong conviction 
of the great value of digital artisanry; of a special bond that connects the author 
and her artefact; and of a threat posed by the emerging artefact3. Therefore, 
this approach to making digital games could find its mythical origin in the tale 
of Arachne — a great weaver transmogrified into a spider.
The contemporary Arachne — the weaver of digital matter — is inextricably 
bound to her creation. She believes that she weaves herself into her game, 
or that she transforms herself by making it. Due to her artistry and engagement, 
which constitute the uniqueness of the creative process, the artefact become 
a personal item. Despite its potentially infinite digital reproductibility (Cf. 
Baudrillard 1995, Benjamin 2010) it remains meaningful, inimitable, and 
created on one’s own (Bachelard 1996, 124). The tapestry, as it expresses 
the perspective of Arachne, exposes the author. As a result of the philosophical 
exploration of the order she is subjected to, it becomes a material form of 
3 I discuss the presented approaches in order to provide an overview of a general discourse. Therefore, 
I will not isolate the perspectives of separate groups, environments, nor the particular artisans.
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the critical statement.
Restoring the Value of Artisanry
Although it is hard to imagine this today, up to the middle of the nineteenth 
century everything was made by hand. When mass production expanded, 
craftwork was subsequently devalued. In many areas of life, artisanry seemed 
to become obsolete. Almost effortlessly produced items were easily replaceable. 
Therefore, traditional manufacturing — as well as repairing and tweaking 
old devices — started to demand a reason other than necessity. Therefore, 
the need for a new perspective has been raised; the need for a discourse which 
would make artisanry necessary again, but in a different way.
In the age of industrialisation, the British Arts and Crafts Movement emerged 
as an answer to this need. Inspired by the ideas of Ruskin and Morris, 
the movement was formed to protect craftsmanship and craftsmen (Ruskin 
1911; Ruskin 2004; Morris 1888). While manifesting the nostalgia 
for the pre-industrial world, “[I]t grew out of a concern for the effects 
of industrialisation: on design, on traditional skills and on the lives 
of ordinary people” (Victoria and Albert Museum 2011). Among postulates 
of the Arts and Crafts Movement was fostering mastery in craftsmanship; 
as well as maintaining and spreading the conviction that handmade items 
distributed in smaller scale, for e.g. tapestries manufactured by Morris — 
as opposed to mass-produced ones — possess the unique inherent value.
The fundamentals of the discourse of digital artisans consist of similar 
needs and concerns. It expresses the strong belief in the value of digital 
items created outside the mainstream of the game industry, as well as trust 
in their distinctness, and a peculiar fragility, which results in the need for 
adequate care. While contrasting the optimised process of game production 
with making games, the discourse is concentrated on the act of creation 
of the artefact as a whole; the code, audiovisuals, and narrative considered 
to be equally important parts of it; marked with the specific approach, 
a metaphorical fingerprint of its author; which underlines the conviction that 
“the act of making puts a small piece of you in the object” (Hatch 2013). 
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Creative Joy
The presented way of thinking about craftsmanship can be tracked in 
the statements of the digital artisans connected with the DIY and The 
Makers movements. Dale Dougherty is the founder of MAKE magazine, and 
initiator of the Maker Faire (Dougherty 2012, 11) - the biggest DIY festival. 
He proposes a justification for a special value associated with the processual 
dimension of creation: it is accompanied by a specific kind of joy.
This special feeling is aroused by the widely understood concept of working 
with matter. Therefore, the motivation of digital artisans is not a result they 
aim to achieve, but skilful execution of their creative activities. It represents 
an understanding of craft as play; in the sense of an activity undertakaen 
for its own sake rather than for an extrinsic purpose or final production. 
Dougherty asserts that;
“[W]hile people today may not treasure this ability out of the same sense of necessity as they 
once did, they are finding their lives enriched by creating something new and learning new 
skills” (Dougherty 2012, 11).
Independently from the proficiency of the craftsman, the process is oriented 
in playful and spontaneous experimenting with the material, “the excitement 
of making things” (Dougherty 2012, 11). Making and exploration of 
the matter are primarily considered to be sources of pleasure, realisation 
of personal passion, as well as the key to understanding the secrets of the 
formed material. 
Therefore, besides the value of the unique creative process, the joy of making 
and the pleasure of work are all traits of the discourse of the digital artisans.
The Master of Imperfection
In the discussed discourse, two values co-occur: the first is the joy of spontaneous, 
personal creative practice as discussed above (Cf. Buckle 2017, Extra Credits 
2017, theguywiththelemon 2017); while the second is the pursuit of excellent 
results (Cf. Swirsky and Pajot 2012). At first, it seems that the two values are 
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directed at opposing directions; the former aids improvisation and unplanned 
experiments which can be enjoyed independently of the technical level 
of the artisan, while the latter features the arduous cultivation of professional 
skills of the digital artisan.
In order to disentangle this apparent paradox, I will elaborate on the issue 
of mastery. According to The Arts and Crafts Movement manifestos, 
the excellence of execution is the measure of its value, while the joy, which 
accompanies the process of creation, is important as far as it is reflected 
in the artefact. However, here excellence is not synonymous with perfection of 
finish, which can be found in works of highly-trained journeymen which anyhow 
lack panache. The sign of excellence is rather the pursuit for great quality that 
is accompanied by consistency of design with its execution. 
This understanding of the excellence is also reflected in formulations 
of the digital artisans. The search for quality — accompanied by acceptance 
of the imperfection of games — is accented by Michaël Samyn from 
Tale of Tales. When reminiscing about their work on The Path (Tale of Tales 
2009), he wrote in his blog:
“Personally we don’t mind some things being broken in our games. For us, it adds to their 
charm and even their believability as synthetic beings and locations. But it was never our goal. 
We would prefer things to be perfect” (Samyn 2015).
As Jesper Juul points out, the ostensible imperfection of digital artefacts 
created by independent authors is often supported by the high professional 
skills acquired during their practice within the game industry, or during 
the long training motivated by the personal aspiration. He also uses the paradox 
of the excellence in imperfection to characterise what he calls “the Independent 
Style” (Juul 2014) represented by authors of narrowly understood indie games 
who had celebrated their glory in 2011-20124. The style is characterised 
4 For definitions and discussions about relations between independent and indie games cf. Garda 
and Grabarczyk 2017, Simon 2013, Zimmerman 2002, amongst others. Here, my general point 
of interest are authors of games that was “creative independence” by Garda and Grabarczyk (2017), 
including indie authors representing certain social, cultural and artistic formation, as long as their work 
is creatively independent.
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by apparent simplicity and retro stylisation, which often requires substantial 
skills and is argued to evoke nostalgia for a past which never existed (Juul 
2014).
In the opening minutes of a documentary on the community of professional 
indie authors entitled “Indie game: the Movie” (Swirsky and Pajot 2012) Phil 
Fish, the author of FEZ (2012), describes his games as artefacts valuable due 
to their imperfection. He explains, that “[T]hings that are personal... have 
flaws. They have vulnerabilities” (Swirsky and Pajot 2012). His words echo 
Ruskin’s formulation from The Stones of Venice (Ruskin 1911, 2:169–70), as he 
states that “it seems a fantastic paradox, but it is nevertheless a most important 
truth, that no architecture can be truly noble which is not imperfect” (Ruskin 
1911, 2:170). 
In the documentary mentioned above, Fish elaborates on his struggle with 
matter, on learning game development, on many attempts and remakes 
of graphics of FEZ. He made many attempts to refine the same elements 
of the game; reiterated, improved, and revised ad infinitum; because 
in his opinion, the previous versions always rendered much worse than 
the most current rendition (Swirsky and Pajot 2012). This fond approach 
to personally created artefact is then accompanied with a strong pursuit for 
perfection. This extremist approach is closer to the idea of the master shaped 
by the Arts and Crafts Movement, than to hobbyists satisfied by the tiniest 
successes. According to Ruskin, such a master would claim: “we have not 
reached the perfection we can imagine, and cannot rest in the condition 
we have attained” (Ruskin 1911, 2:181). Does it mean that the discourse 
of the digital artisans depreciates, just like non-professional artefacts which 
are not masterpieces?
Sharing with the Authentic Maker
In the artefacts created by the novice digital artisans, imperfection, amateurism, 
and simplicity do not, naturally, concur to the distinctness of personal style. 
However, the value of these works — apart from the creative joy of their 
creators — lays in their expressive and auto-expressive dimension. As Ruskin 
argues; “to banish imperfection is to destroy expression, to check exertion, 
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to paralyse vitality” (Ruskin 1911, 2:172). He underlines that imperfection 
characterises not only masterpieces, but is also valuable as a feature of works 
of less advanced craftsmen. While for the professional indie authors, making 
games “becomes a place where developers can demonstrate their technical skills 
and their perfected craft” (Juul 2014), the more democratic representants 
of the digital artisans “emphasize[s] participation and personality rather than 
skill” (Juul 2014).
Vibrancy, spontaneity, and participation in the creative community are 
central values within the discourse of the digital artisans. According to Emma 
Westecott, the non-professional authors of playable artefact “address[es] the 
democratization of craft more generally as a personal praxis” (Westecott 2012, 
81). In consequence, they value the process, commonness, engagement, and 
free access to all tools necessary for their amateur experiments. Moreover, 
the manifesto of The Makers includes a commandment, which dictates that 
as a Maker “[Y]ou cannot make and not share” (Hatch 2013, 1). 
In comparison with the stance of professional indie authors, the accent 
is then displaced to cooperation and expression adjusted to the level of skills 
of the artisans, dissemination of tools and knowledge, as well as sharing 
results of work.
The discourse of the digital artisans — both hobbyists and masters — 
is then connected by the need of the developing skills of craftsmen; personal 
efforts put in the work on artefacts; and by the appreciation of joy stemming 
from the “experience of day-to-day engagement with technology” (Westecott 
2012, 80), as Westecott puts it. Furthermore, the discourse is also joined 
by the attitude to the industry.
The Workshop after the Second Revolution
The industry changed significantly between the age of the industrial 
revolution — when it was criticised by the Arts and Crafts Movement — and 
the contemporaneity of the digital artisans. For advocates of craftsmanship 
of the nineteenth century, the spheres of manual work and industry were 
at opposite poles. At the time, the industry was identified by the replication 
of conventional solutions and power structures restricting creativity. 
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On the other hand, the core discourse of the digital artisans is established by 
statements made by members of The Makers movement, which is also called 
“The New Industrial Revolution” (Cf. Anderson 2012; Aliverti, et al. 2015; 
Johnston 2015). 
The second Revolution was undertaken in order to connect the areas polarised 
by the first one; i.e. to restore the value of personal engagement of the creator 
to the technologically crafted items. The digital artisans, who create computer 
games, are using high-tech tools and mass-produced components. Moreover, 
if they succeed, they establish businesses and start their own production.
In this case, the opposition between the industry and artisanry is revealed in 
slightly different areas. Primarily, the word industry refers to methods of work, 
financial systems, and schemes of distribution of the particular artefacts. 
The digital artisan is minimising specialisation, in exchange for control and 
responsibility for the whole process of making the artefact. In the most extreme 
cases, the game is made and released by only one person. Lindsay Grace 
calls it “truly independent development” (Grace, 2009) or “independent 
independent” (Grace 2009). The digital artisans are not discredited, neither 
by using well-known, conventional technological solutions in order to create 
new artefacts, nor by massive distribution of their works. Moreover, the latter 
is often perceived as one of the most visible factors of success. 
Nevertheless, the digital artisans talk about their work in a very similar 
manner as their non-digital precursors did. They contrast the uniqueness 
of the creative process of the games handcrafted in digital matter, with mass 
production of process and results of the game industry. As Jesper Juul points 
out, among the independent authors, the “commercialism of both big budget 
and casual games is met by a counter-image of small, cheaply developed, 
more personal and experimental games” (Juul 2014).
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Uniquely Bound 
John Ruskin argued that:
“…one man’s thoughts can never be expressed by another: and the difference between the spirit 
of touch of the man who is inventing, and of the man who is obeying directions, is often all 
the difference between a great and a common work of art” (Ruskin 1911, 2:169).
A similar — but often less radical — understanding of making games 
is present in the discourse of the digital artisans. The uniqueness of the playable 
artefact is here determined by the process of creation, which establishes 
a relationship between the author and her creation founded by sole, manual 
work. In other words, nobody else is situated towards the particular artefact 
as its author is (Borges 1999). The discourse is hence not only binding 
the status of the artefact and the creative process, but also the figure of the 
creator and her attitude towards the performed activities. Therefore, I will 
once more refer to the character of the proud weaver from Greek mythology; 
her story will enable me to expose two understandings of the meaning 
of work over the artefact, in the perspective of the contemporary digital artisans; 
namely, as a struggle for self-expression, or a struggle for self-transformation.
Expression of the Self
“A video game is the most effective way I can express myself ” (Swirsky and 
Pajot 2012), says Tommy — the co-author of Super Meat Boy. Conviction 
of the importance of auto-expressive potential of the digital craft can be found 
also in utterances of Anna Anthropy (Anthropy 2012; Anthropy 2013), Tale 
of Tales (Samyn 2015; Harvey and Samyn 2006) and Phil Fish (Swirsky and 
Pajot 2012), among others5. It is also discernible in theoretical texts by Jack 
Bratich, who writes about “immaterial labour” (Bratich 2010, 304), and Emma 
Westecott who argues that “every artifact made by human hand expresses 
the values of its maker” (Westecott 2012, 83). In consequence, it reveals 
the existential situatedness of its author, and communicates her perspective.
5 I will not elaborate on the auto-therapeutical role ascribed to games by authors of games; 
such as Minority Studios 2012, Numinous Games 2016, amongst others.
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The myth of Arachne also seems to highlight the importance of self-expression. 
The weaver strives to enclose in the tapestry her own point of view, and 
the way she experiences the world. Nancy K. Miller uses this moment 
of the myth to create her own “arachnologies” (Cf. Miller 1986). Her concept 
clashes with Barthes’ on the death of the author, and his disappearance from 
the text (Barthes 1978). According to Miller, the author does not disappear 
in the textual fabric she weaves; rather, she interweaves herself and her story 
with the text. Both in arachnologies and in the discourse of the digital artisans, 
the author is defined by the text. The maker is defined by the artefact, just like 
the shape of the tapestry determines the fate of Arachne.
However, self-expression in the form of the game is not a romantic sign 
of the author’s visionary individuality (Cf. Chapter 2.1). The voice of the 
digital artisan is rather critical, hard-hitting, or self-referential, as it concerns 
her own situation within the world. This feature is the next common point 
of the discussed discourse with Ruskin’s ideas, as he strongly accented 
the connection between aesthetics and ethics. In consequence, his social ideas 
were mirrored in the way he thought of the arts and artisanry.
Additionally, Westecott not only claims that it is a general rule that 
the artefact always depicts values; but also points out which values are 
generated in the process of game-making. According to her, the; 
“…potential values of DIY game making include a sense of agency, identity, involvement, 
and affect on behalf of the makers and the communities they generate” (Westecott 2012, 86).
The notion of craft in her approach is narrowed down and assigned 
to the sphere of women’s work (Westecott 2012, 78–80; Westecott, Epstein, 
and Leitch 2013). The digital craft is here intended to be a medium for 
feminist, critical creation. It is also connected with the self-expression 
of individuals acting outside the cultural mainstream, who use shared tools 
to signalise their problems while being “the sole creators” (Westecott 2012, 
82).
The best known examples of using games as a medium for expressing personal 
experiences are artefacts made by Anna Anthropy, and her commentary for 
Dys4ia (Anthropy 2012b) and Mighty Jill Off (Anthropy 2008). Longing for 
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self-expression is the major motivation behind her creative projects. Moreover, 
Anthropy points at the concrete lack she perceives in the world. As a result, 
the absence of games linked to the topic of transsexuality became the key 
motivation of her work:
“I have to strain to find any game […] that resembles my own experience […] And almost 
none of these games are about me, or anyone like me” (Anthropy 2012).
While getting closer to the issue of self-transformation by manual labour, 
I would like to single out the game Dys4ia (Anthropy 2012b). It is described 
as an attempt to communicate an experience of sex change, in a form 
of playable artefact. Interestingly, Anthropy seems to overlook the self-
transformative potential of the work in digital matter. In consequence, 
she comprehends the game as a medium of expression and presentation 
of her experiences, rather than a tool enabling to look reflectively — from 
the point of view of a different person or environment — at where her own 
transformation takes place.
The Transformation
The thread of self-transformation6 will also be accompanied by the mythical 
weaver, as its main assumption is that of inseparability, and the mutual 
influences of intellectual and manual work. While reckoning on the state 
of the world she lives in, Arachne changed her situatedness towards it. From 
a master of weaving, she transforms into a critic of the existing order. 
This is the only feature of the discourse of the digital artisans, which I was 
not able to find in the understanding of artisanry inherited from The Arts and 
Crafts Movement. The concepts of interdependence of the creative processes 
of the artefact, and the transformation of subjectivity of the artisan are 
formulated by Peter Dormer in his book titled The Culture of Craft. He claims 
that artisanry “is inevitably an activity of self-exploration in the sense that 
6 I would like to underline that while reflecting over the self-transformative potential of making 
of computer games, I do not mean their influence on the players. By discussing the discourse 
of the digital artisans, I elaborate on the relation between the artefacts and their creators.
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one learns about oneself through searching for excellence in work” (Dormer 
1997, 219).
The most radical stance is presented by Phil Fish, while describing his attitude 
to his authorial game, FEZ: 
“And it’s not just a game. I’m so closely attached to it. It’s me. It’s my Ego, my perception of 
myselfis at risk. This is my identity: FEZ. I’m guy making FEZ” (Swirsky and Pajot 2012).
Nevertheless, more balanced self-transformative perspectives can be found 
in the work of other game authors (McGonigal 2011) and scholars; with 
an interesting theoretical interpretation of the transformative and cognitive 
role of the manual work presented by Stefano Gualeni. He calls authors 
of games crafters (Gualeni 2015, xiv, 1-2), and underlines the importance 
of the “auto-gnostic aspect of how human beings extend and objectify 
themselves, their ideas, and their desires in technical artifacts” (Gualeni 2015, 
73). 
Gualeni argues that the critical and philosophical potential of virtual 
worlds, including computer games, is enclosed in their power to challenge 
the worldviews of people by providing them with different phenomenologies. 
Making games, however, also has power as a personal — and potentially self-
transformative — practice of the author. Gualeni asks in his book:
“Is the creation of a literary piece or a philosophical treatise, thus, as changing an experience 
for the writer as it is for the reader? And, […] are the designers of virtual worlds and simulated 
experiences going through a process of self-transformation while engaged in the process 
of designing their technologies and technological content?” (Gualeni 2015, 75).
He then answers these questions affirmatively, and proposes the interpretation 
of making playable artefacts in terms of the Foucaltian “technologies of the 
self ” (Foucault 1988). This technologies are practices “that assist[s] individuals 
in objectifying and transforming themselves and their relationship to the 
world” (Gualeni 2015, xv). Therefore, according to Gualeni; “any technological 
design also contributes to shaping the subjectivity of its designers” (Gualeni 
2015, xvi).
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I believe that the self-transformative process taking place when the game 
is created can also be discussed in terms of existential philosophy. The 
emerging artefact becomes a part of the author’s existential project, as the 
creative work influences her perspective on her own activity, and her self 
as creator of the meaningful item.
While comparing the self-expressive and the self-transformative stances 
in the discourse of the digital artisans, the questions of authorship and 
of underlying concepts of subjectivity become theoretically interesting, 
as the two views of subjectivity appear to be contradictory. In the self-
transformative formula, the author becomes “dynamised”; she is subjected 
to the transformative power of her own activity. The subjectivity is then 
approached in a manner similar to that of the existential philosophers, where 
the projective nature of the human being results in an assertion that it can 
be, or rather must be, shaped by its own activities. Oppositely, in the self-
expressive formula, the role of the artisan is rather defined by the constant 
elements of her situatedness; i.e. her position in the social order, towards 
which she tries to take a stance. The creative endeavour is also an expression 
of her “self ”; the authentic utterance. In consequence, the self-expressive 
stance assumes the authorial subjectivity to be a constant landscape that 
can be expressed by creating computer games. Nevertheless, in both cases 
the creative perspective is outlined by the need for personal expression in the 
vein of DIY, and the process of building the relationship between the maker 
and the authored game, rather than the sole form of the artefact.
Criticism
Conceiving the making of games in categories of the digital artisanry renders 
every single artefact unique due to the unrepeatable creative process that 
led to its inception. However, the digital nature of the artefact “in the age 
of digital reproduction” (Davis 1995, cf. Benjamin 2010) makes this 
uniqueness problematic. On one hand, the creative process and its result are 
unrepeatable when considered to be parts of the author’s existential project, 
while on the other hand, playable artefacts function rather in the allographic 
than autographic regime (Genette 1997). As long as there is no such thing 
as a unique physical artefact, and a material trace of the artisan, works 
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of digital artisanry are unique only in the weaker sense; similarly to a work 
of literature or music, i.e. analogically to the situation when “we do not recite 
(or print) a poem in general, but rather this particular poem […and…] this 
state of affairs obtains in all the allographic arts” (Genette 1997, 16).
The second problem is the value of replicable mastery, which can easily 
replace the value of novelty in the discourse of the digital artisans. As long 
as the author is able to express herself within the existing framework of tools 
she has mastered; and still experience the creative joy when reconfiguring, 
readjusting, and polishing well-known solutions; there is no need for major 
innovations or far-reaching experiments with the digital material.
***
The discourse of the digital artisans originates from the British tradition 
of thinking about crafts and manual labour that emerged in the nineteenth 
century. Its separateness from the mainstream discourse of the digital games 
industry is expressed in the belief of the value of uniqueness and creative joy. 
While distinguishing between the artisanal work in the digital matter and 
the mainstream industry, it appraises the intimacy of both the author and 
the game, as the artefact is interwoven in its creator’s existential endeavour. 
It also accents the value of mastery, and the importance of democratic 
access to tools encouraging amateurs to experiment. Within the discourse 
of the digital artisans, games are considered to be a form of self-expression, 
a means of self-determination, or even tools of self-transformation for 
the artisan struggling with digital matter.
 1.2. The Playable Poetry. The Guardians of the Vision
“They do not speak, neither do they keep silent; it is something different” 
(Sartre 1988, 29).
“Poets […] own, they are, what they become first in naming”
(Bloom 1973, 64).
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, the poet and theorist of romantic creation, believed 
that the manner of operation and power of the imagination are individual 
cases. As far as everyone is given a germ of imagination, only the chosen ones 
are able to use its possibilities according to their own will. They are the ones 
who can make their own experiences of the world not only meaningful, but 
also artistically formed. 
The scope of the romantic imagination is even more pervasive than the power 
of the intellect, judgement or memory. As Mary Warnock points out:
“Imagination has to do more. It must try to create one thing (one thought or one form) 
out of the many different elements of experience; and this entails extracting the essence 
of the differing phenomena of experience” (Warnock 1978, 92; cf. Coleridge 1997, 175).
The essence of the imaginative experience can be named the authorial 
vision, which synthesises its heterogeneity. The imagination is then capable 
of ennobling the wholeness of the created artefact, as well as encapsulating its 
meaning in one symbol, emblem, or item.
The thread of the romantic imagination can be traced in utterances of game 
creators. It constitutes the key part of the discourse of the authors, who 
I will call the guardians of the vision. Within this perspective, the imagination 
is a power of extracting and clarifying the authorial, synthesising vision, 
as well as enclosing it in the digital analogon (Sartre 2004, 188–89). 
The imagination is the faculty that gives rise to the vision that emerges from 
the wholeness, as well as from every single element of the playable artefact. 
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Following the Vision
Coleridge argued that the imagination is able to work in all aspects of life, 
as it shapes the way human beings experience the world. According to his 
theory, the imagination is capable of “joining the picture and the idea, 
the concrete with abstract, emotions and power of judgement, spontaneity 
and reason” (Kowalczykowa 1975, 69). In other words, as Agata Bielik-
Robson puts it, the romantic imagination is a power of “the inventive 
reception, creative power of vision, which connects the fortunate harmony 
of collection and subjective epiphany, data and addenda”1. 
However, how can one connect the power of the creative imagination with 
the actual work of art? And, analogically, how can the vision be translated 
into the playable artefact, and how can meaning be enclosed in the digital 
matter? 
Gaston Bachelard; while explaining his poetics of reverie, and differentiating 
it from the poetics of poetry; warned that the realisation of the vision into 
the poem happens to be very long:
“In contrast to a dream a reverie cannot be recounted. To be communicated, it must be written, 
written with emotion and taste, being relived all the more strongly because it is being written 
down” (Bachelard 1971).
Sartre’s formulations are also consistent with this understanding of the 
relation between vision and poetry. He writes that the latter — just 
the same as painting or sculpture — depends on images and sounds rather than 
on the meaning of words. It tunes the consciousness into the imaginative 
mode, turns it into irreality, and averts it from the world. In the poem, 
the word hence becomes a thing:
“The interrogation has become a thing as the anguish of Tintoretto became a yellow sky. 
It is no longer a meaning, but a substance” (Sartre 1988, 33).
1  Bielik-Robson 2010, 136. Quotation translated by author.
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In consequence, the discourse of the guardians of the vision privileges 
a particular kind of playable artefact; the poetic or lyric type, as opposed 
to epic or prose-like ones. This distinction echoes the Sartrean dichotomy, 
as expressed in What is Literature? (1988):
“It is true that the prose-writer and the poet both write. But there is nothing in common 
between these two acts of writing except the movement of the hand which traces the letters. 
Otherwise, their universes are incommunicable, and what is good for one is not good for 
the other” (Sartre 1988, 34).
Analogically, the playable poetry can be considered a single but powerful 
imagining, enclosed in the form of a digital artefact that gradually unfolds 
aspects of the vision.
Analogon: The Nature of the Artefact
In order to describe the material of the creative process, Sartre uses the notion 
of analogon (Sartre 2004, 188–89)2.
The term was coined in order to distinguish between the imaginary, intentional 
way of being of the artwork, which is irreality (Sartre 2004, 188), and its 
pre-digital material basis; the analogon enabling other people to perceive 
the artwork. In order to clarify the difference between the analogon and 
the image, Sartre gives an example of the painting that is spotlighted 
by the lamp located on the wall, next to the frame:
“…it is the canvas that is illuminated and not the object of aesthetic appreciation. In fact 
the painter did not realize a mental image at all, but simply constituted a material analogon 
such that anyone can grasp that image if only they gaze at the analogon. But the image thus 
provided with an external analogon remains an image. There is no realization of the imaginary, 
nor should one talk of its objectification” (Sartre 2004, 189). 
2 Ingarden uses the term objective existential foundation, i.e. the material that constitutes the perceivable 
manifestation of the artwork, but is not its component; as opposed to the subjective existential foundation, 
i.e. creative activity of the artist (Cf. Ingarden 1981, 185–86).
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I will argue that the difference between the precious authorial vision, that 
exists beyond the compass of reality, and its digital analogon, can be tracked 
in the discourse of the guardians of the vision.. In consequence, the activity 
of the guardian of the vision consists of directing the team constructing 
the analogon — the computer game with all its components — in order 
to make it as truthful to the vision as possible, to give it the power to evoke 
a certain imaginary synthesis; a meaningful world encapsulated in the artefact.
The Synthesis
While emphasising their belief in the creative power of the imagination and 
individuality of the author, the utterances of the Tale of Tales; that is, Auria 
Harvey and Michaël Samyn; inscribe themselves into the romantic and poetic 
discourse of the guardians of the vision. According to them, the crucial task 
of the designer is the creation of a consistent — albeit general — vision 
of the whole game. This is the vision that determines the place of the heart of 
the playable artefact; its “core activity” prepared for the player (Samyn 2008). 
For example, in The Graveyard, the core activity is a walk through the cemetery 
(Tale of Tales 2008). The gameworld is in black and white, and this lack 
of colour adds the charm of the old movie or photography to the game. 
(Tale of Tales 2008. Screenshot taken by the author)
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The slow stroll amongst graves is the only activity, as the designers do not 
supply the player with any other tasks. Its goal is reaching the bench standing 
next to the chapel. Walking is evidently a hard task for the old avatar:
“You move her around but she walks very slowly. The camera is fixed to the avatar. No rotating, 
no zooming (re-enforcing the feeling of limited motion of an old body)” (Samyn 2008).
The simplicity and context of this core activity makes this experience 
remarkable. As Samyn writes in the post-mortem of the game:
“This simple activity is made meaningful by defining the avatar and the environment. A deer 
in a forest. An old lady in a graveyard. Both immediately imply meaning” (Samyn 2008).
The meaning implied by the game is ascribed to the presence of the authorial 
vision, which synthesises multiple elements into one wholeness; while 
the goal of the design process is, according to the guardians of the vision, 
a creation of the total experience;
“All elements serve the realisation of the piece as a whole. […] It’s not about the individual 
elements but about the total effect of the environment. The sum of its parts” (Harvey and 
Samyn 2006).
This total experience is sought by extending the core activity only with 
necessary elements — with nothing that could sway the player from 
the unifying vision. Analogically to the human being; who makes her existence 
meaningful in the course of her life by making her existential project concise; 
the guardian of the vision attempts to make the artefact present the world 
as focused on a single perception of her invention.
Chasing the Emblem
Fumito Ueda outlines the perspective which is the most explicitly authorial 
and concentrated of visions (Team Ico 2001; Team Ico 2005; Team Ico 2016). 
The common feature of discourses of romanticism and Ueda’s — as well 
as Tale of Tales’ — is attaching the great significance to the determination 
in following the authorial vision.
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According to Ueda, the vision can be expressed in one image called 
the “crucial visual emblem” (Ueda and Kaido 2004). This emblem is a point 
of reference for the entire designed artefact. For example, the game ICO (Team 
Ico 2001), was accompanied by the emblem expressing the universal theme 
of ‘boy meets girl’. The leitmotif was illustrated by the portrait of two running 
teenagers holding hands, and constitutes a crucial part of the gameplay. Ueda 
claims that during the course of creating the game, “the original concept 
remains almost unchanged” (Ueda and Kaido 2004). 
 (Cover art of Ico drawn by Ueda. Source: http://teamico.wikia.com/wiki/Ico)
Furthermore, Ueda’s approach to the process of transition from the vision 
to the final artefact is worth mentioning. He explains that the creation consists 
of choosing from many excessive elements created by the team. This strategy 
resembles the anecdote concerning Michelangelo Buonarroti, who sensed 
a figure of David enclosed in the block of marble. The Renaissance artist 
wrote in his letter to Benedetto Varchi that “[T]he sculptor arrives at his end 
by taking away what is superfluous” (Duppa and De Quincy 1872). His role 
was to chip off the redundant fragments of stone:
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“When he started, Michelangelo had almost mystic belief that the figure he carved already 
existed fully formed within the block of stone […]. By studying the raw marble, examining 
the patter, he could sense where the figure stand. Then layer by layer, blower by blower, after 
four year of hard labor, he liberated from this rocky prison his creation - the magnificent statue 
of David” (Anonymous 2017). 
Therefore, the team working on Ueda’s game prepares a digital “block 
of marble”, and the guardian of the vision subtracts the unwanted chunks. 
A very high quality of work and the unique consistency of the artefact, which 
results in its “epic minimalism”, is then obtained at the cost of its volume 
(Stuart 2015).
The method of creation described above is called “design by subtraction” 
(Kohler 2013; Stuart 2015; Ueda and Kaido 2004). The technique 
is intended to limit both functionality and the audiovisual effects used 
in the artefact, which could result in distracting the player’s concentration 
on emotions evoked by the influence of the emblem that inspired the artefact. 
“Trimming away much of what had come to define action videogames 
in an effort to create something more artistically cohesive” (Kohler 2013), 
Ueda claims. What remains in power at the end of the subtractive process 
are these moments of the artefact, which depict the authorial vision in the 
most condensed way. Therefore, instead of making the gameworld represent 
the everyday world; which is absurd and contains a surplus of possibilities that 
can never be fully realised (Camus 1991); it offers a concrete composition 
with clear aesthetic form. Contrary to presenting technical fireworks, 
the artefact is characterised by consistency and a perfect finish.
The aim of the guardians of the vision is then to enclose in the artefact 
the archetypical experience — an emblem or activity. The French philosopher 
of science and phenomenologist of imagination, Gaston Bachelard, called this 
crucial element of the authorial vision “the flash of an image” or “the heart 
of the image” (Bachelard 1971, 153; Bachelard 1994, 111). He wrote that 
it is “an object which, all by itself, represents the world. The imagined detail 
is a sharp point which penetrates the dreamer; it excites in him a concrete 
meditation” (Bachelard 1971, 153). 
I believe that in the poetics created by Bachelard; and equally in the discourse 
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of the guardians of the vision; following one picture, gesture, or idea that 
is intended to shape the gameworld becomes the central point and leitmotif 
of the whole project, which shapes the bond of the author and the artefact. 
From this point of view, the artefact is the form of playable poetry; and 
the creative act results in the object, which embodies the vision.
Who is the Poet?
The discourse of the guardians of the vision gives the author of the game 
the role of architect or director, conducting the team of performers. Brenda 
Brathwaite writes that,
“To see the game designer as an artist is then to see them as the Auteur in the tradition of film 
— the person who conceives of and oversees a team’s execution of a vision” (‘Game Designer 
as Artist’ 2008).
The guardian of the vision is then keeping watch over the group executing her 
plans. However — in contrast with the digital artisan, who values her solo 
creation — she is not engaging directly with every aspect of the artefact.
The belief in the individual character of every imagination is the consecutive 
point, which connects the discussed discourse with the point of view 
represented by the romantic poets. For both of them, individualism is the key 
value. As Maurice Bowra points out: 
“This belief in the imagination was part of the contemporary belief in the individual self. 
The poets were conscious of a wonderful capacity to create imaginary worlds, and they could 
not believe that this was idle or false. On the contrary, they thought that to curb it was 
to deny something vitally necessary to their whole being. They thought that it was just this 
which made them poets, and that in their exercise of it they could do far better than other 
poets who sacrificed it to caution and common sense” (Bowra 1961, 1–2).
The guardian of the vision is an unquestionable leader of her team due to the 
combination of the role of the director with the need for strong individuality. 
Tale of Tales declare; in their Realtime Art Manifesto; that game designers must 
be dictators who are able to single-mindedly pursue their goals (Harvey and 
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Samyn 2006). They advise a prospective guardian of the vision as follows: 
“Your work needs to come from a singular vision and be driven by a personal 
passion” (Harvey and Samyn 2006). The wise dictators let the other team 
members execute their part of the job. However, the director’s sole assignment 
is the choice of the collaborators, as well as decisions pertaining to the final 
shape of the artefact.
The Form
Despite their strong individualities, authors of playable artefacts are not 
creating in a cultural vacuum. Their imagination — just as the imagination 
of poets, painters, or mystics — is situated, and in consequence, fulfilled 
with images that constitute the tradition they belong to. It means that the 
Christian mystic will not have visions riddled with the Buddhist symbolism 
(Cf. Scholem 1996). Analogically, the guardian of the vision works with 
a certain range of conventions, narrative solutions, audio-visual preferences, 
and variety of mechanics of the game. However, the creative part of the 
job is to misimagine them; i.e. to add the individual twist without breaking 
conventions (Cf. Bloom 1973; Kania 2014, 131).
According to Bachelard, the intrinsic element of the process of poetic 
imagining is the intention of describing the vision. Therefore, the poetic 
vision is already imagined in words; it is neither put into words, nor represented 
by them. The vision of the author of the playable artefact will then include the 
functionality of the artefact - not only its emotional or visual components. 
How then does the discourse of the guardians of the vision present the way the 
individual imagining can be translated into the field of games; which is highly 
conventional, and divided into genres? The stances of Ueda and Tale of Tales 
differ at this point.
Clinamen
From the observations of Ueda, one can deduce that the new vision 
of the artefact is not emerging from the non-being. On the other hand, 
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it is an innovation which alters the conventions of the particular genre, 
or an illustrious variation on already-known motives. The optimal formula 
for the game is then “the slightest of twists from the standard format” (Ueda 
and Kaido 2004).
These “slightest of twists” are nothing else than clinamen, as used by Harold 
Bloom to describe the creative swerve from tradition. The term has its roots 
in the determinism of Leucippus and Democritus (Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 
1983, § 539, 541, 545, 580); and evolved in Epicurus and Lucretius (Laertius 
2011, X, 134; Lucretius 2012). However, for the ancient philosophers, 
clinamen was the incidental inflection of the course of its falling, which 
was the cause of all changes in the universe, while Bloom concentrated 
on the romantic understanding of the term which was proposed by Coleridge 
(Coleridge 1839, 142). This form of clinamen refers to the individuality 
and particularity of the human being (Bloom 2003, 200). Bloom himself 
proposed clinamen as the first sign of the creative personality, which causes 
the swerve from the traditional imagery, and leads — in a couple of hard steps 
— to the shaping of the independent, strong poet (Bloom 1973).
In this context, artistic creation is based on excellent literacy, which enables the 
creator to perform the “slightest of twists”, clinamen or misimagining that will 
refer to existing conventions and, in consequence, will remain understandable 
for the perceivers. However, due to its originality, this creation will mark 
the tradition with its uniqueness.
The Artistic Revolution
Harvey and Samyn do not share Ueda’s views on tradition. Tale of Tales opts 
for experimentation with real-time 3D game technology in order to break 
free from conventions. Despite addressing their creations to the players and 
calling them games — alternatively notgames3 — they value a radical break 
from genres, and solutions preserved by the commercial game industry. While 
echoing manifestos of the avant-gardes of the twentieth century, Tale of Tales 
3  Referred as ‘not games’ or ‘notgames’, as in the “make love, notgames” motto used in (Harvey and 
Samyn 2010).
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criticises contemporary commercial games for conservatism; and modern 
and contemporary art for being “ironical, cynical, self-referential, afraid 
of beauty, afraid of meaning”, etc. (Harvey and Samyn 2006). In their own 
manifesto, they proclaim the new art should break with the past and abandon 
conventions and genres, exactly like the surrealists and the futurists did before 
— paradoxically — by continuing the tradition of artistic manifestos initiated 
by the Romantics (Breton 1969; Marinetti 1973; Wordsworth 1969; Kania 
2011). 
In their later formulations, the Tale of Tales resign their revolutionary tone 
for the sake of agitating, for the recovery of aesthetic values, and means 
of expression specific to the pre-modernist arts. They proclaim: “Let’s Make 
Art with Games” (Harvey and Samyn 2010). They describe their new 
approach in The Beautiful Art Program: “This program concerns the use 
of videogame technology for artistic creation” (Harvey and Samyn 2013). 
Harvey and Samyn postulate the creation of playable artefacts, envisioning 
“the breadth of human existence captured in interactive art” (Harvey and 
Samyn 2013). However, they do not resign from the strong authorial vision 
leading the whole process of creation of the game, and point out that “video-
games created by passionate people intent on exploring the potential of this 
new medium” (Harvey and Samyn 2013). Within the presented perspective, 
the ideal goal would therefore be the creation of playable art.
The main issue of the discourse of the guardians of the vision is that the creative 
process takes place mainly in the head of the imaginative individual; and, 
in consequence, is out of touch with the down-to-earth teamwork that creates 
the digital block of marble discussed above. This feature of the discourse 
gives the impression that the development on the digital artefact is not 
as important as its design.
***
The discourse of the guardians of the vision; while following the romantic 
understanding of creation; highlights the authorial imagination as a source 
of vision that leads to the creation of playable artefacts. The artefact itself 
is considered to be the incarnation, or analogon of the vision of the meaningful, 
aesthetically shaped world. Within the discussed discourse, the key factor 
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is also individuality — or even individualism — of creators, whose goal is the 
modification of the existing tradition (Ueda), or even its creative negation 
(Tale of Tales). 
The discourse I attempted to outline above is concentrated on the realisation 
of the authorial vision, in the form of an artistically coherent and synthetic 
wholeness executed by the team selected by the visionary. The guardian of the 
vision undertakes the task of exploration of her vision, and attempts to crave 
its ideal form in the digital matter. 
Therefore, within the discourse of the guardians of the vision, a game 
is described by the triad of relation with the visionary, the player, and existing 
games that create the canon; i.e. the source of inspiration or the germ of the 
revolution. The artefact is then a vehicle for the vision enclosed in the digital 
medium.
1.3. The Procedural Arguments. The Digital Orators
In the following pages, I will provide an overview of the well-known and 
widely discussed discourse of procedural rhetorics. Within this discourse, 
the originative activity of the creators of computer games is perceived as “the 
new type of persuasive and expressive practice” (Bogost 2007, 2). 
The discourse of the digital orators diverges from the ones previously discussed 
by highlighting the potential for ideological influence possessed by computer 
games. In consequence, it focuses on the repeatable impact that the computer 
game is expected to have on the player, rather than underlining the importance 
and uniqueness of the relation between the artefact and its creator.
I am going to compare and contrast it with the approaches presented 
in the two previous chapters. They considered the making of computer games 
to be a creative practice, which can be aptly described in terms borrowed from 
discourses of arts or artisanry. In contrast, the procedural rhetorics focuses 
on the difference between the existing forms of argumentation, in order 
to present procedurality as a persuasive feature exclusive to digital games. 
On Procedural Authorship
The idea of procedural authorship was introduced by Janet Murray. She coined 
it in her most famous book, Hamlet on the Holodeck, in order to distinguish 
the creative endeavours of players within the gameworlds from the efforts 
undertaken by authors responsible for a whole environment. She explains 
that:
“Procedural authorship means writing the rules by which the texts appear as well as writing 
the texts themselves. It means writing the rules for the interactor’s involvement, that is, 
the conditions under which things will happen in response to the participant’s actions. 
It means establishing the properties of the objects and potential objects in the virtual world and 
the formulas for how they will relate to one another. […] In electronic narrative the procedural 
author is like a choreographer who supplies the rhythms, the context, and the set of steps that 
will be performed.” (Murray 1997, 152–53).
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Two of Murray’s followers, who became the major theorists of procedural 
rhetorics — also known as the simulation rhetoric — are Ian Bogost and 
Gonzalo Frasca (Bogost 2007; Bogost 2008; Frasca 2003). By developing 
Murray’s idea, they authored the discourse placing authors of digital games 
closer to programmers than to artists or artisans (Bogost 2007, 4). 
However, while highlighting the role of algorithms, behaviours of the 
system, and rules governing digital representations, they pointed out 
at different creative area; namely, on argumentation. The procedural author 
is not only (re-)presenting by designing rules of interactions and sequences 
of artefact’s responses to the player’s behaviour. Bogost claims that the meaning 
— which for Murray was emerging from the text presented in the rhythm 
of programmed procedure — is hidden in the sole procedure. “Procedural 
rhetoric is a general name for the practice of authoring arguments through 
processes”, he writes (Bogost 2007, 28). In order to underline this fact, while 
examining the procedural rhetorics, I will name the authors the digital orators. 
The Persuasive Prose
The digital orator is authoring procedures in order to represent “how real and 
imagined systems work” (Bogost 2007, vii); and observe, “how the designer’s 
agenda can slip into the game’s inner laws”, which is the medium of the 
ideology preached by their author (Frasca 2003, 233). Therefore, within 
the discourse of the digital orators, the game’s inner laws — its rules, dependents, 
and functions connecting elements of the system — are responsible for its 
persuasive power (Bogost 2007, 29). The playable artefact is then considered 
to be a compound of the procedural representation, i.e. the system; and 
the persuasive argumentation, i.e. the process. When approached connectedly, 
they make the persuasive system. 
As long as for the guardians of the vision the key element of the designed 
artefact was its relation to authorial vision and its emotional dimension; and 
for the digital artisans the most important was the personal involvement 
in the created computer game; for the digital orators the playable artefact 
is primarily the argument, deriving its power from the systemic representation 
(Bogost 2007, vii), or simulation (Frasca 2003, 224).
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I would like to highlight the parallel between the discussed discourse, and 
Sartre’s understanding of prose. While tracking the differences between prose 
and poetry, Sartre points out that:
“The art of prose is employed in discourse; its substance is by nature significative — that 
is, the words are first of all not objects but designations for objects. It is not first of all a matter 
of knowing whether they please or displease in themselves; it is a matter of knowing whether 
they correctly indicate a certain thing or a certain notion” (Sartre 1988, 35). 
The aesthetic function of this kind of utterance is secondary; as long as it is 
able to clearly represent and make the reading compelling, as well as appeal 
to the perceiver in order to make them aware of certain problems. Analogically, 
the persuasive power of the simulation is activated by the digital orator’s 
modelling skills, as: “games are just a particular way of structuring simulation, 
just like narrative is a form of structuring representation” (Frasca 2003, 224).
The main goal is, hence, the representation of one process by the other process, 
in logical and abstract form of system of interdependencies. However, Bogost 
does not focus on the theme or scope of the persuasive power of games, 
but on their sole ability to present argumentation as a working procedure. 
He accents the digital orator’s ability to represent the process, and to model 
the extent of choices available to the player:
“…choices are selectively included and excluded in a procedural representation to produce 
a desired expressive end” (Bogost 2007, 45).
Due to the modelling, artefacts are able to “make claims about how things 
work” (Bogost 2007, 29), as they are “deliberate expressions of particular 
perspectives” (Bogost 2008, 119). Therefore, they present a certain worldview, 
and their function is to dispel myths and debunk beliefs, as seen from 
the point of view of their creators. In this dimension, the discourse of the 
digital orators is in closer proximity to the discourse of the artisans’ way 
of thought as depicted in chapter 1.1.
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Are Games Arguments?
“Procedural rhetorics do mount propositions: 
each unit operation in a procedural representation is a claim about 
how part of the system it represents does, should, or could function”
(Bogost 2007, 36).
Within the discussed discourse, the activity of game creators is concentrated 
on highlighting real problems, and on criticism that is intended to change 
the existing state of matters. By making an issue explicit, the artefact 
is designed in order to force the player to take a stance towards the problems 
it represents; to wilfully and consciously hold her foregoing point of view, 
or to change her perspective.
The practitioners acting within the discourse of the digital orators are 
molleindustria: the authors of “satirical business simulations”, “meditations 
on labor and alienation”, and “playable theories” (Pedercini n.d.). 
As Paolo Pedercini, the founder of molleindustria, said in an interview:
“If you are not saying anything against the dominant system of values, chances are that you are 
making an artifact that reinforces such ideology” (Anonymous 2014). 
The same words could be ascribed to Sartre, who in 1948 claimed that 
the writer — the proser or the publicist — can never remain neutral:
“To speak is to act; anything which one names is already no longer quite the same; it has 
lost its innocence. If you name the behaviour of an individual, you reveal it to him; he sees 
himself. […] After that, how can you expect him to act in the same way? Either he will persist 
in his behaviour out of obstinacy and with full knowledge of what he is doing, or he will give 
it up. Thus, by speaking, I reveal the situation by my very intention of changing it; I reveal it 
to myself and to others in order to change it. I strike at its very heart, I transfix it, and I display 
it in full view; at present I dispose of it; with every word I utter, I involve myself a little more 
in the world, and by the same token I emerge from it a little more, since I go beyond it towards 
the future” (Sartre 1988, 36–37).
Mounting arguments by creating computer games — just like writing prose 
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as Sartre sees it — is primarily a field of activism; a field of social criticism, 
manifestos, and, naturally, of persuasion. 
Pedercini excessively criticises the condition of the digital games industry, 
and proposes to consider games created by digital orators to be “homeopathic 
remedies to the idiocy of mainstream entertainment” (Pedercini n.d.). 
However, by stating this strong and ujustified argument, istead of revealing 
issues that should be addressed, he appears to create a false dichotomy in the 
current media landscape in order to establish a purpose for digital arguments. 
In more considerate words, he explains that;
“…games and simulations can simplify and mirror certain aspects of real world systems while 
maintaining their dynamic properties. By […] making games we can promote this kind 
of literacy” (Pedercini 2013).
In his anarchistic manifesto, he declares the willingness to destroy the 
dominant discourse of the video games industry by the practice of:
“… [u]nderstanding and subverting the deepest videogame mechanics without resorting 
to dull antagonistic translations or artsy self-referential divertissement” (Pedercini 2003).
The playable artefact is for him a tool of criticism, which starts with 
the observation of certain processes; continues through its representation 
in procedural digital form; and ends in persuasive modelling of the extent 
of users’ interactions with the final game. Therefore, the discourse features 
the:
“…channeling [of ] the sacrosanct horror for the current mainstream video games toward 
a constructive and deconstructive process. Foster a debate involving the galaxies of media-
activism, software and net art, regular gamers and their fiercest detractors. Create a space 
in which theoretical and practical critique march hand in hand” (Pedercini 2003).
Paraphrasing words of Sartre — in the discourse of the digital rhetors, artefacts 
are appeals “in the course of an undertaking, either of me acting upon 
others, or the others upon me” (Sartre 1988, 35), while the act of designing 
the procedure undertaken by the digital orator makes use of this new medium 
of arguments participating in the “utilitarian language” (Sartre 1988, 29).
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The Critical Voices
As long as the discourse of the procedural rhetorics is one of the most 
recognisable amongst the creators of digital games, the approach of the digital 
orators is often a subject of criticism. However, not because of its activist, 
involved perspective on the creator’s endeavours, but because of the radical 
assumption that the one clear, authorially defined message can be inscribed 
into the sole algorithmic procedure that underlies the functioning of the game 
- which, in consequence, does not require any interpretative effort. According 
to Miguel Sicart; 
“The assumption behind mainstream proceduralism is that the meaning of games 
is contained exclusively in the formal system of the game” (Sicart 2011).
Such a strongly set thesis makes procedural rhetorics the subject of criticism. 
This line of counter argumentation is enforced by the fact that in his book 
Bogost mainly interprets artefacts designed for explicitly stated purposes; 
e.g. in order to express a critical point of view of politics; to advertise 
or educate. In this type of playable artefacts, the audiovisuals are perceived 
as meaningful before the persuasive process begins, and before the player 
actually has a chance to recognise her situatedness within the gameworld.
Aarseth argues against proceduralism by claiming that the procedure itself 
cannot be a medium of meaning, as it can simulate anything when it is devoid 
of the audiovisual and narrative layers. He points out that two playable artefacts 
working in an identical procedure can be intended to “represent”conflicting, 
or even opposite arguments (Aarseth 2015).
Therefore, the discourse of the digital orators can be received with the same 
enthusiasm by the anticapitalistic molleindustria, and by the creators of 
advergames. Their assumptions remain similar, while the goal of argumentation 
is directed the opposite way. 
The extreme stance is hard to defend; however, it makes the digital rhetorics 
widely present. I therefore think that the discourse of the digital orators 
as a perspective of authors of digital games, enables to highlight the formal, 
logical and technical side of creation. However, I also believe that the integrity 
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of the playable artefact is what constitutes its meaning; independently of the 
differences between discourses.
Conclusions
The discourses of the digital artisans, the guardians of vision, and the digital 
orators; while approaching the artefact from the external perspective; present 
very different takes on the situatedness of creators of digital games. Moreover, 
they significantly change in perceiving the meaning of the created works. 
Within the first discourse, playable artefacts are handmade, personal items; 
within the second they become analogons of their authors’ visions; while 
within the third they are digital arguments.
In order to condense the first part of the book, in the following table I have 
delineated the key elements which define the distinctiveness of the presented 
discourses:
The discourse of design:
Elements  
of situatedness  
of the author:
The Digital Artisans
The Guardians  
of the Vision
The Digital Orators
Focal point
personal experience  
of the author in the 
process of making  
the game
the ideal vision 
preceding its 
analogon
the influence  
of the persuasive 
representation
Authorial field everything, artisanry vision and direction programming, argumentation
Author’s major 
function
the artisan;  
one-man band
the artist; director; 
visionary
the activist; 
programmer
Playable artefact
unique, handmade, 
personal object; 
self-expression is valued
work of art;  
communicates vision; 
emotional realism  
is a value
persuasive system  
of representation; 
conviction is a value
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The discourse of design:
Elements of 
situatedness of the 
author:
The Digital Artisans
The Guardians  
of the Vision
The Digital Orators
Goal
exploration and 
self-expression 
through handcraft
vision,  
emotional realism
representation  
of procedure
Area of exploration features  of the digital matter
aspects of the vision; 
translation into  
the analogon
persuasion through 
representation  
of processes
Limitations
undervaluation  
of novelty;  
questionable status 
of uniqueness  
of the artefact
undervaluation  
of development process;  
privileging a particular 
kind of playable artefacts
undervaluation  
of non-procedural forms 
of argumentation; 
conviction that message 
can be simply inscribed 
into procedure
The focal point of each discourse is what makes it recognisable. For the digital 
artisans, the central question is the integrity of their quest, as they concentrate 
on action, not on representation; while for the other two discourses, the focal 
point is the conceptual integrity of the author’s project, vision or argument. 
Therefore, this kind of consistency is determined by the point of reference 
external to the process itself.
The second rule of differentiation is the recognition of the author’s 
situatedness, and what is her role in the process of creating the game. In the 
discourse of the digital artisans, the author considers herself to be a one-man 
band; joyfully carving her personal, expressive object from the digital matter. 
For the guardians of the vision, the author’s role is directing her skilful team, 
and controlling the congruence of the shape of the artefact with her intentions. 
While in the discourse of the digital orators, the author is expected to create 
a plausible procedure, the aptness of the argument is primarily dependent 
on its representation in the functions of the game.
The above juxtaposition constitutes the basis to sketching a comparison 
of scope of the authorial autonomy within the outlined discourses. The digital 
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artisan recognises herself as the most independent author; albeit her role 
is connected with the sphere traditionally referred to as the everyday, shared, 
and private; while the other two discourses are connected with the public 
sphere. The romantic visionary perceives herself as separated from the world, 
but able to share her original creation and make it understandable; while 
highly skilled orators are ascribed a capability to rationally and argumentatively 
shape the public sphere. 
The next point to collate is the scope of the creative process ascribed 
to the author within the discussed discourses. For the guardians of the vision, 
it is the process of direction of imaginary performance, and creation of the 
emotionally compelling analogon; while with regard to the digital artisan, 
it is a set of experiments and exploration of the digital matter, as well 
as a form of self-reflection based on creative activity. On the other hand, for 
the digital orators, it stems from the analysis of the problem and the system 
which governs the state of things, and its critical translation into the authored 
program.
In addition, the connection between the artefact and its external context 
is perceived disparately within all three discourses. For the digital orators, 
the most important is reference to the represented process and is oriented 
on its consequences, i.e. on mimesis, as defined by Aristotle, who argues for 
imitating characters, not appearances (Aristotle 2008). For the guardians 
of the vision, the reference system is the imagination of the author and her 
envisioned intentional object; while for the digital artisan, what is most 
significant is the process of creation: in its social, critical — but above all else 
— self-expressive dimension. 
What connects the discourses discussed in the first part of the book is that they 
expose the perspective of the author, reveal the game designer’s situatedness 
towards their own work, and make it a crucial part of the meaning of the 
artefact within the creative situation. 
The reflective turn enables them to delineate why it is important to make 
digital games from the perspective of their authors, and how the creators 
reflect over their own activity. Therefore, as Sartre puts it; 
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“Reflection [...] is a type of being in which the for-itself is in order to be to itself what it is. 
Reflection is not then a capricious upsurge into the pure indifference of being, but it arises in 
the perspective of a for” (Sartre, 1978, 160).
It is hence the perspective of a for which defines the artefacts as worthy 
of creative endeavours, and makes them a substantial part of their authors’ 
existential projects. 
In consequence, the playable artefact, just like any other object, can never 
be approached just as itself, as abstracted from the particular situatedness 
it co-creates. What connects the research concerning perspectives of the author 
of digital artefact with the study of perspectives of the player, is an attempt 
to embrace how the artefact is defined by its unique bond with the individual; 
the author’s or the player’s existential project. As long as the artefact is always 
considered in relation to the individual, and approached as created, perceived, 
played (Leino 2009), or understood, I think that questions regarding 
the identity or non-identity of the object lose their critical power. What 
is explored here is situatedness of the individual towards the phenomenon 
she approaches.
Part 2. Perspectives of the Avatar
2.1. Questing the Player’s Perspectives1
Delving into perspective of a for will take a different direction in the following 
pages; as the area of exploration is here determined by the perspective 
of the player, and her situatedness towards the single player digital game with 
avatar. 
I will start by discussing the methodological problem of the research 
perspective that occurs in studies on game aesthetics, while elaborating 
on the difference between the aesthetics focused on the playable artefact 
from the external perspective, and which does not refer to the internal point 
of view; i.e. an objectifying aesthetics; and contrasting it with an involved 
aesthetics that is based on the internal perspective and its interplay with 
the external point of view. As long as the former presents its method, object, 
and results as independent from the position of the researcher, the latter 
exposes the importance of making explicit the subjective situatedness towards 
the artefact, which cannot be considered as abstracted from the situation.
From the perspective of the involved aesthetics, the researcher approaching 
the game with avatar gets acquainted with the artefact while adopting 
the position of an agent; i.e., a self-avatar primarily situated within the 
gameworld; and then distancing from it. Therefore, the claim for objectivism 
- as well as conclusions about the abstract nature of the artefact - is based 
on the subjective position of the self-avatar established by, and experienced 
within, the particular gameworld. I will therefore argue that the objectifying 
aesthetics diminish the salience of the fact that it relies on the gameplay 
situation, while making claims about the artefact. 
In consequence, I will outline an intermediary perspective based on reflection 
over the existential situatedness within the gameworld. Within the presented 
perspective, before the researcher can draw conclusions from the external 
point of view, she learns to act within the conditions of experience provided 
by the gameplay situation of the particular game, in order to interpret it from 
1 An earlier version of this chapter was published in Polish (Kania 2017a).
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the point of view of the in-game aesthetic situation2.
Existential Situatedness and Features of an Artefact
From the point of view of existential phenomenology and aesthetics, 
the research area does not concern experiences of the others, even if we are 
able to empirically observe and record them. Moreover, multiplication — 
intersubjectivity or the replicability of these experiences within the research 
group — does not validate any hypothetical existential experiment. As a result 
of this, the most important question can be formulated as follows: who am 
I, and what defines my research area when I start to philosophically examine 
a computer game? 
The presented point of view is anchored in an existence — “For-itself3, 
or Dasein (Heidegger 2001, 27 [7]) — defined as “an entity which, in its 
very Being, comports itself understandingly towards that Being. […] 
Furthermore, Dasein is an entity which in each case I myself am” (Heidegger 
2001, 78 [52-53]). This is a perspective of experiencing, comprehending, and 
understanding that is characterised by its ability to be reflectively perceived 
“from inside” as “I”. Consequently, my understanding of being a player 
is anchored in my own existence. 
The second important element of the existential perspective is a world; that 
is, the omnipresent “reference system” for the existence. The world is then also 
always perceived form inside (Heidegger 2001, 81–82 [55–56]; Sartre 1978, 
3–4). It means that the being-in-the-world cannot transcend her subjective 
situatedness, and look at her “objective” condition within this world. 
I am the being-in-the-world; therefore my agency is framed by this world and 
my situatedness within it (Sartre 1978, 31).
In my everyday world, one of the objects I can reflect upon is a game 
2  I will elaborate on the aesthetic situation in the next chapters, while in the present pages I will limit 
it to the necessary explanation.
3  “The being of for-itself is defined […] as being what it is not and not being what it is”, see: Sartre 
1978, lxv
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approached from the external perspective. From this point of view, the game 
is considered — similarly to the perspective described in the first part of this 
book — to be an object existing in the world in a particular way, related 
to its author or perceiver, interpreted within discourses and co-shaping them; 
it is the artefact - “the game, as it exists in the world” (Leino 2012b, 58).
What can I infer from the artefact’s position within the world, the position 
amongst other similar cultural objects? How can I do it?
According to Olli Tapio Leino, the playable artefact is a technological object, 
where “materiality and process are weaved together so tight that from the 
player’s perspective they are inseparable” (Leino 2012a). In order to learn 
something about the playable artefact, I need to “use” it; that is, to check its 
specific “in-order-to” or “manipulability” [Handlichkeit]” (Heidegger 2001, 
98 [69]). Heidegger defines this form of usability as a “kind of concern which 
manipulates things and puts them to use” (Heidegger 2001, 95 [67]).
I believe that the approach of objectifying the aesthetic of computer games is 
convergent with Heidegger’s theoretic approach to tools. It does not separate 
the internal perspective, but points at the player’s engagement observed from 
the external point of view in order to build their knowledge about the artefact 
upon it. According to Heidegger:
“The hammering does not simply have knowledge about the hammer’s character as equipment, 
[…] the less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the 
more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered 
as that which it is-as equipment. The hammering itself uncovers the specific ‘manipulability’ 
[Handlichkeit] of the hammer. The kind of Being which equipment possesses-in which it 
manifests itself in its own right we call ‘readiness-to-hand’ [Zuhandenheit]” (Heidegger 2001, 
98 [69]).
Considering this approach of external objectification, the artefact is 
ready-to-hand, and its manipulability discovered in the process of using 
it constitutes a basis for claims about the artefact itself. As an artefact, it 
can be ascribed certain features; e.g. it needs a certain technological input - 
it is a piece of software, and a cultural text, amongst others. 
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Espen Aarseth points out that an investigation of the artefact could process 
in the same way as research of another aesthetic object like film, music, 
or visual arts, “but with the added challenge of gameplay” (Aarseth 2007, 
131). This player-researcher, Aarseth writes: 
“…considers her own playing experience as a valid basis for doing theory, and is interested 
in the game as a cultural, expressive object. The fact that she is studying an object that at the 
time of study is a process partly instigated by her, and not necessarily shared by any other 
player, is seldom a topic for discussion, but bracketed by experience of play” (Aarseth 2007, 
131).
Aarseth emphasises upon the processual dimension of the game and 
the player’s input, as well as the uniqueness of her experience with the artefact. 
This perspective can be supported by Leino’s definition of a playable artefact, 
which is considered to be an element of “a subset of all technological artifact 
based on their ability to evaluate the user’s choices” (Leino 2012a)4. 
However, I think that the position of the researcher approaching the game 
from the angle of the objectifying aesthetics is based on the situatedness 
learned from the internal perspective and within circumstances created 
by the gameworld that, in turn, is considered to be a source of knowledge 
about the artefact as functioning in an external cultural context. Therefore, 
while approaching the artefact from this point of view, conclusions are drawn 
from the player’s experiences, situatedness, and agency within the gameworld; 
i.e. from playing the game and participating in a gameplay situation; and 
ascribed to the game as an object existing within the world. 
Therefore, the argumentation presented above merges two points of view 
which I would like to distinguish in order to highlight the player’s perspective; 
the external perspective that enables the player to mark this particular “subset 
of all technological artefacts” (Leino 2012a); and the internal one, that 
enables them to observe the process of evaluation of their choices, inasmuch 
as they are consequential within the gameworld. In a nutshell, I believe that 
4 Leino develops the concept of “studying the game as played”, as opposed to “studying a game 
by playing it” in order to differentiate between the concrete artefact conditioning the players’ 
experiences, and game as transmedial/ideal object (Leino 2009; Leino 2010, 125, 146-151).
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the playable artefact can be studied not only as a process influenced 
by the player, but also as the process through which the player’s situatedness 
is shaped. 
The Gameplay Issue
Aarseth claims that the artefact offers the player a position of the “implied 
player” defined as “a function of the game, a slot in a game machine that 
can be filled by any rational, critical, informed person” (Aarseth 2007, 
131). Therefore, he translates into the area of digital games the thesis stated 
by Gadamer in Truth and Method; “all playing is a being-played. The attraction 
of a game, the fascination it exerts, consists precisely in the fact that the game 
masters the players” (Gadamer 2004, 106).
The position of the implied player is then determined by the form of the 
artefact; hence, it is a default stance the player is proposed to take. However, 
as shown by Aarseth’s (2007) and Leino’s (2009) studies - “transgressive 
playing” (Aarseth 2007, 132) or “playing with the game” (Leino 2009, 11) - 
the position of the implied player does not render impossible other behaviours 
towards the artefact. 
While asking a question about the player’s situatedness towards the game, 
I should then concentrate on the gameplay in the first place. From the 
externally objectified point of view, the gameplay can generally be defined 
as performance undertaken in search of a proper “manipulability” positively 
evaluated by the artefact. According to Aarseth and Calleja, “not all interactions 
with the objects we call games (or objects within these) result in game-like 
activities” (Aarseth and Calleja 2015). Moreover, as Leino pointed out (Leino 
2012a), because of glitches and bugs within an artefact, as well as strategies 
of playing unforeseen by its designers (Cf. Aarseth 2007), an even smaller 
fraction of actions performed by the player can be called “a gameplay”.
Furthermore, when the researcher shifts her perspective from the artefact 
to her own performance, the problem of identity of the studied area arises. 
It was pointed out by Leino who argues that “the objects of study are different 
from the two perspectives: it is not necessarily the ‘same game’ one is studying 
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from two angles” (Leino 2009, 6). He proposes to connect the two by 
“the materiality” of the artefact; i.e. these aspects of the game “being played 
which do not originate in the player and which are shared by all players and 
playings of the same game, thus transcending all particular playings” (Leino 
2009, 7).
Nevertheless, the intersubjectivity of the experience does not necessarily 
make its object more convincing and more “real”, as it remains a sum of the 
individuals’ experiences. Therefore, I will try to outline the different solution 
from the phenomenological point of view. Instead of looking for justification 
external to the individual experience, I will take a closer look at the conditions 
of this experience, in order to make explicit the player’s situatedness as 
a self-avatar within the gameworld.
Introducing the Involved Aesthetics
While approaching the involved aesthetics as distinct from the objectifying 
aesthetics, I seek conditions of experience as they are shaped within the 
gameplay situation; i.e. when the self-avatar is pre-reflectively experienced 
as the self within the gameworld. From the in-game perspective, I can describe 
these experiences as a result of the cooperation between the self-avatar and 
the gameworld; that is, as a gameplay situation. While answering questions 
concerning what I experience, how I experience it, and how motivated 
I am while playing, I can lead an existential analysis of the gameplay situation 
that takes place when the gameworld is experienced from the internal 
perspective. I would like to underline that claims grounded in this perspective 
do not concern the objective nature of the examined object. On the 
contrary, the playable artefact is here considered to be an intentional object; 
i.e. concretization (Ingarden 1981, 175); while the gameplay is interpreted 
in terms of the adventure experienced as a self-avatar within the gameworld 
(Sartre 2007, 36–38). Therefore, the researcher does not perform “reverse 
engineering” (Leino 2012a); that would try to understand construction 
of the objective artefact from the experience of playing with it; but is limited 
to a description of their aesthetic experience co-shaped by their own activity.
The perspective of research involved into the gameplay situation is then 
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co-created by activity of the self-avatar and her situatedness within 
the researched field. I think that this particular perspective enables the 
researcher to understand the experiential dimension of the gameplay situation, 
and provides her with tools that enable her to distinguish it from transgressive 
play; which is what seems to be missing from the objectifying aesthetics. 
Moreover, the involved aesthetics provides the player with the experiential 
perspective that enables her to reflect over herself within a game, as well 
as over her own situatedness within the gameworld; i.e. “the product of both 
facticity and the For-itself ’s way of accepting and acting upon its facticity” 
(Sartre 1978, 633). A close look at this position provides a basis for existential 
analysis of the gameplay led from an insider’s point of view, which considers 
the gameplay situation as such.
The Avatar’s Perspective: ludic subject, self-avatar,  
and the personal object
But who is the subject acting “within” a game, that I called “a self-avatar”? 
Who is the participant of the “gameplay situation” that experiences it through 
the alleged position of the implied player? Who is experiencing the gameworld 
as an inhabited world; as a world they live in? 
These questions concern a world that establishes the gameplay situation for 
the self-avatar; the stance she cannot exit as long as she wants to play.
Daniel Vella proposes calling the perspective outlined by the relation between 
the avatar and the player within the gameworld “ludic subjectivity”, and 
defines it as follows:
“…an entity that belongs to the gameworld, and is thus in a position to perceive the gameworld 
from an internal perspective, while the implied player is the standpoint the game establishes 
for the player as an individual outside the gameworld, engaging with the game as an artefact” 
(Vella 2015, 24). 
Therefore, while considering the in-game situation, instead of talking about 
an implied player as an alleged function of an artefact, we could focus 
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on the ludic subject to seek the way the in-game existence can be experienced, 
framed and described. 
I would like to point out that while experiencing the game as a ludic subject, 
one is able to set their own goals within the gameworld to some degree, 
varying from game to game. Therefore, as long as outlining the subjective 
position seems to be necessary, it is not sufficient to distinguish the gameplay 
situation from other forms of interaction with the gameworld. However, 
adopting the position of the ludic subject is a precondition for experiencing 
and fulfilling any goals within the gameworld — also those experienced 
as a gameplay; because “the ludic subject is essentially – and prior to the 
opening up of any objectifying distance – experienced as “I” while engaging 
with the gameworld” (Vella 2014b, 16 ). 
Hitherto, one more important element of the jigsaw is still missing. 
Vella points out that:
“…the player simultaneously plays out her experiential and existential being-in-the-
gameworld and perceives it from a point of view outside the game, from which her own 
being-in-the-gameworld is seen as an intrinsic part of the game’s textual and aesthetic unfolding” 
(Vella 2015, 55 ). 
However, I think that my own being-in-the-gameworld can be reflectively 
understood from inside. It can be approached from the point of view of the 
aesthetic situation, as a form of auto-reflection over the self-avatar as being 
in the gameplay situation. In light of this, I have decided to cease using 
the term “ludic subject” despite its pertinence, as I would like to single out 
additional features, which stems from this reflective turn of the situated 
subjectivity I call self-avatar to themselves. The self-avatar is understood here 
as an emergent being, consisting of the player’s existence, her intentional acts, 
and features of the avatar. In consequence, the existential situation I outlined 
in the first paragraphs is doubled within the gameworld (Möring 2013, 119). 
The departure point for outlining the gameplay situation therefore entails 
a consideration of the conditions for experience and performance of the 
self-avatar, instead of the features and functions of the artefact. 
By using the term the self-avatar I would like to underline that as long 
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as it remains inside the gameworld, the selfhood cannot be exchanged for 
experiencing or observing this position as the other (Vella 2014). In view 
of this, I define the self-avatar as a subjective position that enables cognition 
of the particular gameworld from the point of view of the gameplay situation. 
It is analogical to the ludic subject as long as it is a figure that is intended 
to capture how the subjective position shapes the cognition of the player 
in terms of existential philosophy. However, as I will argue in the next chapter, 
it can be auto-reflectively recognised as an aesthetic form in light of the 
in-game aesthetic situation. From the point of view of the external position — 
built upon the involved one, which makes it different from the objectifying 
aesthetics — the self-avatar can be recognised as an aesthetic object that can 
be interpreted within a wider cultural context. All three perspectives 
interrelate; hence they can shape experience within each of them, as well 
as of each other.
On Involved Aesthetics and Objectifying Aesthetics
In order for it to be understood, the experience within the game needs 
to be reinterpreted from the points of view outlined by different types 
of situatedness. I believe that the analogical difference was mapped by Paul 
de Man in his discussion of the bias between rhetoric as practice of the acts 
of persuasion, and rhetoric as a system of tropes that can be recognised only 
as a set of these acts (Man 1979, 130–31). He makes the aporetic observation; 
the act can take place exclusively within the system, however, acts are 
a foundation of the system. Therefore, the system conceals its own source; 
i.e. the fact that it projects and persuades for its own presence and validity 
instead of making a constatation of them. In consequence, the presence and 
pertinence of the system of tropes — and analogically, the objective artefact 
independent of the player’s situated engagement — turns out to be the 
camouflage for the performative acts of establishing it. This paradox makes 
the artefact dubiously independent from both the acts performed within 
the gameworld, and its existence as a culturally engaged text as it participates 
in multiple discourses. Therefore, the two sides — the internal and 
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the external perspective — need to be considered as mutually dependent5.
In light of this, the key to outlining the philosophical importance of the 
distinction between the involved aesthetics and the objectifying aesthetics 
entails the exposition of the passage from the experience of throwness into 
the gameworld, to the interpretation of the game from the external perspective. 
How are the two positions connected with each other from the point of view 
of the involved aesthetics?
As the external perspective relates to the interpretation of the game as text, 
it is anyway given to the player in her particular reading. By considering 
subjectivity, this form of external perspective formulate claims on concretization 
(Ingarden 1981, 175) objectified as an imaginative wholeness, and has 
the potential to reveal the position of the interpreter towards the game. 
In other words, a game perceived from the external point of view is approached 
as a text subjected to reinterpretations performed by particular players. 
The game hence becomes understandable as the player’s own finished 
adventure; a memory that includes her own subjective impact on 
the gameworld. 
* * *
While looking from the internal point of view, the self-avatar experiences 
a gameplay situation and co-creates the game. When she reflects over her 
own position, she can undertake the existential and aesthetical analysis 
of the gameplay situation from the perspective of the in-game aesthetic 
situation. In turn, from the external point of view of the involved aesthetics, 
the game is considered to be a completed concretization that can be subjected 
to reinterpretations, and this way related to other existing texts.
The perception of the objectifying aesthetics concentrates on features 
ascribed to artefacts, while diminishing the importance of the situatedness 
of the researcher; although the main issue within the involved aesthetics 
is the need to fill the gap between the experience inside the gameworld, and 
5 Cf. the discussion about the distinction between the game as object and the game as process 
(Cf. Leino 2009; Leino 2012; Vella 2015).
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its understanding as a text approached from the external perspective. 
The in-game situatedness is revealed in the interplay of the in-game 
perspectives,  consisting of the gameplay situation and the aesthetic situation; 
and the external point of view that enables the player to refer to her cultural 
literacy. However, the transition between them encounters Paul de Man’s 
aporia of rhetorics as a system of tropes and rhetoric as persuasion; hence, 
it needs to be clearly stated that the passage leading from inside the gameworld 
will not establish the artefact as the object that can be examined in isolation.
2.2. The Gameplay Situation and the Aesthetic Situation
“Man continually carries with him a pre-judicative comprehension of his essence, 
but due to this very fact he is separated from it by a nothingness”
(J.-P. Sartre 1978, 35).
“The aesthetic experience constitutes a specific — aesthetic — object, 
which cannot be equated with anything real”
(Ingarden 1970, 3:97).
In order to characterise the two types of situatedness that shape relations 
between the self-avatar and the gameworld, I will subsequently focus on the 
internal point of view, and follow a thread of digital game research linked 
to the involved perspective.
I argue that in order to consider the gameworld as open for interpretation 
from the in-game perspective, the two experiential positions of the self-avatar 
need to be closely examined. For this purpose, I will elaborate on a gameplay 
situation and an aesthetic situation, which have been roughly sketched out 
in the previous chapter. 
The two in-game subjective positions emerge collaterally, and often condition 
each other as lived in and as being beyond the particular situation. I would 
like to underline that in both the crucial element is the self-avatar perceived 
as situated within the gameworld. 
The gameworld can be defined as the existential, spatiotemporal environment 
of the in-game life as experienced from the perspective of the gameplay 
situation; while from the perspective of the aesthetic situation, the gameworld 
is the anticipated wholeness of the intentional object that the self-avatar 
expects to concretize by co-shaping the gameplay situation.
In a gameplay situation; which I will define by recontextualising the Sartrean 
notion of the situation; the self-avatar is pre-reflectively experienced as the 
self within the gameworld. I argue that the gameplay situation constitutes 
a framework for an inauthentic mode of existence, where the limitations 
of the self-avatar are experienced as the They, and perceived as a part of the 
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self-avatar (Cf. Heidegger 2001, 220 [175-176]).
In an aesthetic situation — inspired by Roman Ingarden’s term, which I will 
discuss and redefine later in the text — the experiential structure provided 
by the self-avatar is reflectively considered to be a crucial element of the acts 
of concretization of the gameworld, as it provides a subjective standpoint for 
perceiving it. However, this structure itself is not abandoned when it is reflected 
upon. Oppositely, the object of this aesthetic situation is not the artefact 
as grasped from the external point of view, but the aestheticized gameworld; 
the world that is already thought as perceived from the perspective of the 
self-avatar. In consequence, the aesthetic situation can be characterised 
as an attempt to grasp the gameplay situation and to reinterpret it.
The main purpose of this perspective is including, exposing and (re)uniting 
the issue of the subjective stance within a gameworld; and pointing out the 
aesthetic situation that is primarily established as internal to the aesthetic 
object by reflection over the gameworld as it is perceived by the self-avatar. 
Therefore, in this chapter I am not interested in the game as an object that 
is manipulated and interacted with, or read and understood from the external 
perspective; but in the aesthetic object that is established by, through and 
for the self-avatar, which at the same time is a central part of the established 
concretization. In consequence, the self-avatar, as a part of this concretization, 
is co-shaped by herself.
The Gameplay Situation
According to Sartre, an individual is nothingness. They emerge as being 
amongst other beings, and are always tied to the world they are thrown into. 
“Our being is immediately ‘in situation’; that is, it arises in enterprises and knows itself first in 
so far as it is reflected in those enterprises. We discover ourselves then in a world peopled with 
demands, in the heart of projects ‘in the course of realization’” (J.-P. Sartre 1978, 39).
Situation — the first notion I would like to introduce — is then understood 
in Being and Nothingness as a system of synchronic and diachronic, cognitive, 
and spatiotemporal relations between an individual and a world as it is perceived 
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from the particular perspective. Moreover, this is the situation which makes 
an individual the particular person. In turn, it is the individual’s engagement 
that turns the set of unrelated objects into the world which acquires meaning 
for the person pursuing her own existential project. Therefore, the existential 
situation covers the condition of subjectivity, its attitude toward this world, 
and its major feature; i.e. a “position apprehended by the For-itself which 
is in situation” (J.-P. Sartre 1978, 548), and which makes it unique.
An individual’s situation changes as they undertake and modify their 
existential projects in response to their own situatedness. Characteristics 
of the situation provided by Sartre in Being and Nothingness can be encapsulated 
in the following remarks:
1) The situation is outlined by relations between the self and objects within 
a world; namely, their usefulness or uselessness for the undertaken project.
2) The situation can be experienced as purposeful from an internal perspective 
with relation to its goal. 
3) “The situation is the organized totality of the being-there, interpreted and 
lived in and through being beyond” (J.-P. Sartre 1978, 549).
4) The situation is concrete, unique, and personal.
5) The situation is neither purely subjective nor objective, but a relation 
between the two.
6) An individual is able to change their situation from inside; however, 
they are unable not to be in any situation, because the situatedness is what 
determines meaning of encountered objects, which changes accordingly 
(Cf. J.-P. Sartre 1978, 549–53).
The Sartrean characteristics of the situation are focused on the observation 
that it is the factor changing significantly due to shifts of the subjective point 
of view, approach, existential project, or even the mood of the individual. 
For example, the situation of two persons working in laboratory in search for 
a new cancer treatment; one scientist is interested in an examined substance 
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because it potentially has ground-breaking properties, while the second 
is interested in patents and business opportunities connected with this 
discovery.
Analogically to the Sartrean description of the existential situation, I propose 
to define the gameplay situation as a system of interdependencies between 
a gameworld, a self-avatar, and a perceptual position of the self-avatar towards 
the gameworld, as they are perceived from the point of view of the self-avatar. 
The first difference between the existential situation and the gameplay 
situation is then the status of an individual, which in the gameplay situation 
is strictly connected with the avatar. In consequence, the player’s situation 
is determined by a self-avatar she gradually actualises, i.e. the avatar 
experienced as self, and its position within the gameworld.
When the self-avatar enters a gameplay situation of a single-player computer 
game, she approaches the game as a world1; she emerges as being, amongst 
other beings, only while related to the world she is thrown into. She learns 
and leads the existential project of in-game life. It makes the gameworld 
meaningful to her on an existential — as well as aesthetic — level. Therefore, 
the gameplay situation establishes the conditions of experience that provides 
the player with a preconceived understanding of the actions they need 
to perform in order to play the game; namely, a form of existential falling 
they have agreed upon when entering the gameplay situation. The self-avatar 
is experienced through non-reflective cogito, when “the circuit of selfness 
is non-thetic and consequently the identification of what I am remains 
non-thematic, this ‘being-in-itself ’ of myself which the world refers to as me 
is necessarily hidden from my knowledge” (J.-P. Sartre 1978, 595).
1 I will compare and highlight the differences between an understanding of the world in our everyday 
experience, and a gameworld in Chapter 2.4.
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Falling into the They and thrownness
Is it possible to abandon the gameplay situation while playing the game 
then? I believe that even if the player tries to abandon the subjective 
position provided by the gameplay situation in order to establish her own 
personal existential projects and goals within the gameworld, her position 
is still built with regard to the gameplay situation and the existential project 
of the self-avatar.
For instance, in the hidden object puzzle adventure genre, the player 
is repeatedly reminded of the project she is expected to realise by sparkling 
areas within the rooms she explores, pop-ups providing hints about her 
goals, or even exact instructions on the next step she should perform in given 
circumstances. 
Even if she does not follow any of these hints, the world continuously offers 
her friendly reminders of duties resulting from the position she is supposed 
to occupy. Therefore, the self-avatar does not abandon the gameplay situation, 
but acts in defiance of it; as long as the general theme of the gameplay situation 
is playing this particular game. 
The process of meaning-making within the gameplay situation is then 
undertaken from the point of view of the self-avatar. In consequence, both 
the information available to the self-avatar and activities she is capable 
of are expected to be understandable, justified, and meaningful through the 
events taking place in the gameworld, or the avatar’s position towards them. 
Due to its rigidity, I argue that from the existential point of view, the subjective 
position offered by the gameplay situation is a proposition of what Heidegger 
referred to as “falling into the ‘they’”. Falling, as defined by Heidegger, 
is a mode of being when the subjectivity:
“…is proximally and for the most part alongside the ‘world’ of its concern. This ‘absorption 
in . . .’ […] has mostly the character of Being-lost in the publicness of the ‘they’. Dasein has, 
in the first instance, fallen away [abgefallen] from itself as an authentic potentiality for Being 
its Self, and has fallen into the ‘world’” (Heidegger 2001, 220 [175]).
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The self-avatar would then be the player’s self, merged with the already-given 
perspective of the avatar she is expected to internalise. As long as this falling 
of the self-avatar is unavoidable, the existential diagnosis loses its ethical 
overtones, and becomes a feature of the being-in-the-gameworld, as perceived 
from the point of view of the self-avatar2.
In consequence, the gameplay situation is based on the first-person experience 
of an unavoidable, willing, but not necessarily conscious “falling into 
the ‘they’”; the experience of being guided by the situatedness and treated 
as an object within the world. I believe that this particular perspective 
of the self-avatar, which the player adopts in the gameplay situation, 
is what enables it to be distinguished from other forms of interaction with 
the gameworld. 
The Existential Meaning
The understanding of the gameplay situation as a concrete totality 
of being-in-the-gameworld establishes its existential meaning, as it is 
pre-reflectively comprehended and experienced by the self-avatar. In many 
models, this internal understanding is contrasted directly with reading 
the game as a text from the external perspective; e.g. heuristics, as opposed 
to hermeneutics, as it “does not make the process of playing its object but 
it is the process of playing a game” (Möring 2013, 305); or ludic hermeneutics 
as opposed to text hermeneutics (Karhulahti 2012a; Karhulahti 2012b). 
However, these propositions do not consider subjective situatedness as a major 
determinant of understanding the game. Moreover, the distinction I propose 
is threefold, as pointed out in the previous chapter. Therefore, the existential 
understanding of the game from the perspective of the gameplay situation 
can be grasped from the perspective of the in-game aesthetic situation that 
will shortly be sketched out.
Moreover, the existential meaning is not connected with representation, 
as in Gadamer’s famous formulation, where he contrasts play as practice with 
2  The same situation takes place with the phenomena of bad faith and spirit of seriousness, 
as discussed in Chapter 2.4.
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play as representation (Cf. Gadamer 2004, 108; Möring 2013, 161; Galloway 
2006, 104). The existential meaning is not based on representation, but 
on a subjective experience of meaningful action experienced as a suspension 
of freedom (Cf. Chapter 2.5). The source of this meaning are inauthentic 
modes of being, which provide the self-avatar with the conviction that all her 
endeavours within the gameworld are justified (Cf. Chapter 2.4).
Being in and Being beyond
“The very application of the formula ‘that is’ to man 
causes all that is designated, to have-been”
(J.-P. Sartre 1978, 35). 
Sartre points out that “it is impossible to consider a situation from the outside; 
it is fixed in a form in itself” (J.-P. Sartre 1978, 548). However, he also notes 
that “the situation is the organized totality of the being-there, interpreted 
and lived in and through being beyond” (J.-P. Sartre 1978, 549). Therefore, 
the phenomenal condition of the particular gameplay situation needs 
to be known by the player from being in, in order to be recognised as a point 
of departure for self-reflection, as considered to be a form of being beyond. 
In light of this, I believe that the gameplay situation outlines the position 
of the self-avatar that constitutes a subjective stance reflected upon in the 
aesthetic situation. 
The wider understanding of the gameplay situation — or, as Sartre pointed 
out, of any situation — can be embraced in a movement of transition between 
being in and being beyond. Therefore, as the gameplay situation makes 
the player participate in the game from the perspective of the self-avatar, 
which is determined by the in-game the They, they do not have any possibility 
to escape from it; but while they start to reflectively comprehend their 
subjective position as the self-avatar within a gameworld, they enter 
an aesthetic situation to embrace the gameplay from the position of being 
beyond.
I will elaborate on the moment of interplay between the gameplay situation 
and the aesthetic situation in the next chapter, whereas now I would like 
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to indicate that it can be understood in terms of the pre-reflective consciousness 
of the subject in the gameplay situation, and reflective consciousness oriented 
towards the pre-reflective one:
“In the act of reflecting I pass judgement on the consciousness reflected-on; I am ashamed 
of it, I am proud of it, I will it, I deny it, etc. The immediate consciousness which I have 
of perceiving does not permit me either to judge or to will or to be ashamed. It does not know 
my perception, does not posit it; all that there is of intention in my actual consciousness 
is directed toward the outside, toward the world. In turn, this spontaneous consciousness 
of my perception is constitutive of my perceptive consciousness. In other words, every 
positional consciousness of an object is at the same time a non-positional consciousness 
of itself ” (J.-P. Sartre 1978, liii).
Making the gameplay situation an object of the aesthetic situation shifts the 
direction of the self-avatar’s cognition, and reveals restrictions and possibilities 
originating from her situatedness. In other words, while acting within 
the gameplay situation; 
“…at each instant we are thrust into the world and engaged there. This means that we act 
before positing our possibilities and that these possibilities which are disclosed as realized 
or in process of being realized refer to meanings which necessitate special acts in order 
to be put into question” (J.-P. Sartre 1978, 37). 
The act of putting into question the meaning of my actions as the 
self-avatar, while still being situated within the gameworld, is what I would 
like to present as the main characteristics of what I call the in-game aesthetic 
situation, reflectively grasping the way in which the self-avatar’s experience 
of the gameworld is shaped by existential defence mechanisms3, which 
in turn are considered to be an aesthetic form of experience of the gameworld.
3 Discussed in chapter 2.4.
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Involving the Aesthetic Situation
While working on the phenomenology of literature, Roman Ingarden 
coined and defined the term aesthetic situation in order to outline the object 
of study of aesthetics (1981, 173-180)4. By definition, the aesthetic situation 
considers the subjective and objective elements that plays a role in the process 
of creation and perception of the work of art. Ingarden argues that the term 
“situation” enables him to:
“…avoid talking about this purely subjective or objective moments as if they were two 
separate research areas, when they were just two aspects of the […] total aesthetic situation, 
the […] meeting of the created object and the emerging potential object, with a perceiver, 
that is, a recipient”5.
Here, I would like to concentrate exclusively on the section of the aesthetic 
situation, i.e. on the situatedness of the perceiver towards the work of art. 
As Maria Gołaszewska, the successor of Ingardenian aesthetics, writes, 
„Dependently on what recipient perceives the artefact [...], the experiences are shaped 
differently, different qualities of the values are exposed, and even the whole aesthetic situation 
is shaped differently”6.
This specific perceiver subjects the artefact to “concretional acts” in the process 
of co-creating an aesthetic, intentional object (Cf. Ingarden 1976, 414). 
“Undefined places are removed in particular concretizations by more or less detailed specifying 
an appropriate object, which [...] ‘fulfills’ the place. However, this ‘fulfillment’ is not strictly 
framed by defined moments of the object, hence it can vary in different concretizations”7.
4  Roman Ingarden’s understanding of the act of reading, and his orientation on the active role 
of the reader, were pioneering in his times (Cf. Burzyńska, Markowski 2006, 95). As long as he studied 
the most abstract and formal features of works of art, his formulations on the aesthetic situation opened 
the field for culturally and existentially-oriented studies on literature. The term was later discussed and 
developed by Maria Gołaszewska (1984). 
5  Ibidem, 173.
6  (Gołaszewska 1984, 292). Quotation translated by author.
7  (Ingarden 1976, 21). Quotation translated by author. 
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As the aesthetic object needs to be actively maintained by the perceiver, 
the emerging potential aesthetic object is a result of acts of concretization, 
i.e. the co-creation undertaken by the perceiver. Therefore, there 
is no aesthetic object as such that anyone can approach. 
“Aesthetic objects, as distinct from existentially autonomous individual objects, are existentially 
heteronymous, i.e., derivative and existentially dependent on the acts constituting them — 
the creative acts of the artist and the receptive experience of a reader, listener, or spectator. 
Although an aesthetic object arises as the object of an aesthetic experience, it is at the same 
time an existentially separate object: it forms a complete whole transcendent of the acts” 
(Gniazdowski 2010, 167).
I argue that the term aesthetic situation, when limited to the perceiver’s 
perspective, can also be used to embrace two aspects of understanding 
the computer game.
The first one rises from within the game and reflects over the in-game 
position of the self-avatar, who realises their situatedness while perceiving 
the gameworld. Hence, I will propose a consideration of the in-game aesthetic 
situation as based and built on the gameplay situation.
However, two questions need to be answered here: the problem of what 
is concretised which involves the issue of the aesthetic object co-created by the 
concretional acts; while the second, of what makes this situation an aesthetic 
one, which refers to the aesthetic character of the in-game situation. 
The second question — which I will discuss at the beginning of the third 
part of the book — frames the game approached from the external perspective, 
when it is objectified and considered to be a text open for interpretation. 
Rising from within
The first difference between the aesthetic approach to a traditional work 
of art, which is the object of Ingardenian aesthetics, and a single player digital 
games with avatar as perceived from the in-game perspective, is the difference 
of the subjective position of the perceiver. The recipient’s stance; when they 
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reflect over themselves in relation to the literary work of art, is related to; but 
independent of the shape of the world depicted by the literary work of art. 
Hence, the acts of concretization can be performed over the object, while the 
position of the self-avatar is situated within the concretized gameworld, and 
her reflection over her own activities within the gameworld takes account 
of her influence on the actual shape of this world8.
Even if one is immersed in other media or works of art (Ryan 2001, 120-139), 
these artefacts do not provide the perceiver with the experiential structure 
that would make them situated within the artefact, as long as the situatedness 
assumes the possibility of changing it from inside. Moreover, they do not 
allow the perceiver to act within this experiential framework.
Daniel Vella pointed out the possibility of acting within the aesthetic form 
as a distinctive feature of digital games. He writes that:
“the direct result of their constituting an aesthetic form in which it is one’s own actions, and 
the ludic subjectivity they enact, that come to be inscribed in the externalised (and objectified) 
form of the aesthetic object, leading to a kind of self-presence within the aesthetic object that 
is of an entirely different order to the painting’s tacit acknowledgement of the viewer’s look” 
(Vella, 2016b). 
However, I believe that the sentence quoted above connects two perspectives 
I would like to analyze separately: the in-game perspective and the external 
perspective. The in-game aesthetic situation, which I am currently pointing 
out, embraces the self-avatar’s actions when they are reflected upon from 
within the gameworld. I argue that this situation needs to be differentiated 
from the moment when the subjective stance of the self-avatar is abandoned 
and the gameworld becomes objectified from the external perspective, which 
will be discussed in Chapter 3.1. 
What, then, are the consequences of such a distinction? Going back 
8  Wolfgang Iser’s concept of the moving viewpoint is defined as “the reader’s position within 
the text” (Iser, 1980, 114). However, the self-avatar’s perspective not only make her perceive, 
but also make decisions, can and act within the given circumstances; it is not just a viewpoint, but also 
an existential situatedness that enables her to exercise her agency and reflect over it.
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to Ingardenian terms, what is concretized by the self-avatar in this in-game 
aesthetic situation? And what is the result of this concretization?
I argue that in the in-game aesthetic situation the self-avatar reflectively addresses 
a form of her own subjectivity, and the actions she performs within it. She 
recognizes them as an aesthetic composition of phenomena; such as bad faith, 
spirit of seriousness, and adventure, perceived as elements of her situatedness 
within the anticipated wholeness of the gameworld, the worldliness of which 
is preserved, hence aestheticized by the act of reflection. 
The concretization is then focused on fulfilling the undefined places 
of perceptual structures of the self-avatar; e.g. a form of bad faith, and 
perceiving the gameworld, its current state and anticipated meaning 
of wholeness, from the point of view of the concretized self-avatar. 
In consequence, in the self-avatar’s reflection, their own situatedness within 
the gameworld becomes the aesthetic object. The self-avatar reflectively 
objectifies itself as the situated being in-the-gameworld; however, their 
situatedness as considered to be an aesthetic object cannot be equated 
with the game as a text considered from the external perspective, despite 
it constituting a basis for synthesis approached from the point of view external 
to the gameworld.
From the internal point of view, the self-avatar remains situated within 
the gameworld, analogically to the individual situated in the world, and 
“since he is situated in relation to the world in its entirety [he manifests] 
the world itself ” (Sartre 1988, 260). In consequence, from the point 
of view of existential philosophy, the gameworld does not need or even cannot 
be objectified, externalised, and transcended in order to capture its features. 
Oppositely, it can be realised as reflected in the individual’s situatedness. 
Therefore, the realisation of the self-avatar’s own situatedness within 
the gameworld is rather a case of reflective internalisation9 than externalization; 
9  This topic can be also discussed using the term incorporation coined by Gordon Calleja, defined 
as “the player incorporates (in the sense of internalizing or assimilating) the game environment into 
consciousness while simultaneously being incorporated through the avatar into that environment” 
(Calleja, 2011, 169).
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as Sartre writes, 
“In aesthetic joy the positional consciousness is an image-making consciousness of the world 
in its totality both as being and having to be, both as totally ours and totally foreign, and the 
more ours as it is the more foreign” (Sartre, 1988, 65).
This world is “discovered in a movement to transcend it” (Sartre, 1988, 65), 
however, this gesture of transcending – reflective or revolutionary – remains 
the gesture of the being situated within the world. 
In consequence, the in-game aesthetic situation is the appointment of the 
self-avatar and the gameworld, when the self-avatar recognises herself 
as a part of the anticipated, imaginative, and aesthetically valuable wholeness. 
On the other hand, the acts of concretization she performs, which actualise 
her situatedness, make the experience of the in-game existence very different 
to player’s external relation the character or to the artefact as it exists among 
other texts of culture. 
Thereby, the Ingardenian notion of the aesthetic situation is one of the founding 
assumptions of involved aesthetics concerning single player computer games 
with avatar I would like to introduce. Being based on the engagement of the 
self-avatar in the gameplay situation, and reflection over their situatedness 
within the gameworld undertaken from the in-game perspective, it needs 
to be distinguished from the aesthetics of disinterestedness (Cf. J.-P. Sartre 
1978, 575–76; J.-P. Sartre 1988). The aesthetics of disinterestedness considers 
the aesthetic stance as free, unrelated to any specific goal, and not interested 
in the existence or reality of the contemplated object considered to be separate 
from the perceiver; while Ingarden underlines the prevailingly active role 
of the perceiver in constituting the concretisation of the work of art, 
in co-creation of the way it can be perceived. Moreover, he writes that:
“We are able to aesthetically commune with the work of literature and perceive it in the flesh 
only in the form of one of its concretizations. In consequence, we deal with it exactly how 
it reveals or expresses itself in the particular concretization”10.
10  (Ingarden 1976, 415) . Quotation translated by author.
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Acts of concretisation are accompanied with the “desire of possession 
of sensible qualities that touch us, which are pursued by the subject who 
experience aesthetically”11. Development of the aesthetic experience is driven 
by “hectic pursue for qualities able to supply the quality that touched us”12.
Therefore, the involved aesthetics shifts emphasis in order to ascribe to the 
aesthetic perception character of creation and cognition; to grasp it in its 
purposefulness, multidimensionality and tangled character. 
This approach results in the departure from a traditional understanding 
of the aesthetic as founded exclusively on the special value of the contemplated 
object, experiences caused by features of the object, or unusual perceptual 
stance; to the aesthetics of experience that is oriented in the phenomenological 
constitution of the aesthetic object, which is contextual and situational.
The Involved Aesthetics Revisited
When arguing that the in-game reflection has the aesthetic character, I adhere 
to an understanding of the term borrowed from the existential aesthetics and 
its phenomenological precursors. In reflection of Roman Ingarden, Martin 
Heidegger, or Jean-Paul Sartre - just to name a few - the primary metaphysical 
function of the aesthetic is to reveal the human being’s place in the world, 
and express the human strife for synthesis: “the metaphysical demand for 
unity, the impossibility of capturing it, and the construction of a substitute 
universe” (Camus 1992).
I believe that the in-game aesthetic situation is the moment of realisation 
of the self-avatar’s position within the universe — as long as it is the gameworld 
they are situated in. It does not imply the awareness of a world beyond one’s 
situation; oppositely, it implies an awareness of the world as seen through 
one’s own situatedness. 
11 (Ingarden 1970, 78-79) . Quotation translated by author.
12 (Ingarden 1970, 78).
In consequence, the connection of these two spheres — existence and art 
— is crucial to my argument. In the gameworld, meaning is constituted 
by the interplay and reciprocal conditioning of the subjectivity of the self-avatar 
and gameworld, which includes an existential project of the self-avatar13. The 
situatedness towards the promise of the meaningful self and the meaningful 
world; the for-itself-in-itself that will satisfy the human desire of certainty; 
creates the point that needs to be fulfilled — or concretized. It therefore complies 
with an outline of an aesthetic situation in Roman Ingarden’s terms. 
For existentialists, the human being’s sole responsibility is the creation 
of meaning for herself and of herself in the world, as she maintains her own 
existential project, while:
“…the work of art is a concrete proposition of making the world meaningful, of marking it and 
implementing into it certain values that it never possessed or it was stripped of them”14.
In addition, Ingarden asserts that:
“The human being needs to crystallize something what is unfinished, what is just about to begin, 
because he is somehow convinced, that he is able to express himself in this object, to reveal and 
to externalise all the hidden, subjective processes that are not shaped yet”15.
In consequence, I would like to set a thesis that both art and falling into 
in-game the They can be fuelled by a drive for obtaining a certain shape of being, 
as opposed to continuously becoming (Cf. Vella 2016b). Sartre characterises 
bad faith as “the flee from anguish by attempting to apprehend ourselves from 
without as an Other or as a thing” (J.-P. Sartre 1978, 43), and defines a work 
of art as “this synthesis of self and not-self (the intimacy and translucency 
of thought on the one hand and the opacity and indifference of the in-itself on 
the other)” (J.-P. Sartre 1978, 577). The fullness of being that gains meaning and 
justification, that marks an individual and the world as existing in a particular 
way leads to the exposure of the truth of being as in Heidegger’s or Dufrenne’s 
13 I will unfold the understanding of appropriacy of the gameworld and the existential project 
of the self-avatar in Chapters 2.4 and 2.5.
14 (Mróz 1992). Quotation translated by author.
15 (Ingarden 1981, 183). Quotation translated by author.
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writings; or to a discovery of nothingness, as in Sartre (Cf. Dufrenne 1989; 
J.-P. Sartre 1978; Deranty 2015). 
***
Even though in the in-game aesthetic situation the subjective position is bound 
to the self-avatar’s position, it is conditioned differently than in the gameplay 
situation. In the latter, the self-avatar considers her stance as determined and 
meaningful, purposeful and functional; while in the former, she reflectively 
focuses on the perceptual form of her own being-in-the-gameworld, 
the aesthetic features of the environment perceived from the certain 
perspective, and on the distance that emerges towards the position 
occupied during the gameplay. However, neither does the reflection situate 
the self-avatar outside the game, nor outside the self-avatar’s perceptual stance. 
Therefore, the game is not approached as a system that can be played with, 
but as a way in which the self-avatar is situated. In the gameplay situation she 
experiences her in-game life, while in the aesthetic situation she can reflectively 
perceive the avatar as self and as the aesthetic object. While considering the 
avatar to be a self in the aesthetic situation, it appears to be a standpoint I can 
reflect upon, but cannot change or depart from. It is determined by the They 
one can tell apart from the existence, while: 
“…the existence is the way of being that relies on ‘reflective’ turn to itself; existing being 
is a being that relates to its own ‘to be’. However, this reflective orientation is not a matter 
of choice, as the existing being does not choose existence but is ‘thrown’ into it”16. 
From this point of view, I discover the way how my being-in-the-gameworld 
is conditioned in the context of wider possibilities offered by the gameworld. 
As long as the self-avatar becomes a part of the story, and participates 
in the aesthetical form of the gameworld she influences, she can consider 
the existential project outlined by the self-avatar to be the aesthetic project17. 
16 (Michalski 1998, 38). Quotation translated by author.
17 In games employing a third-person point of view, while reflecting over my position as the self-
avatar from the point of view of the aesthetic situation, I can perceive the protagonist as an aesthetical 
object being compound; not only of the perceptual perspective, biography, and a set of behaviours not 
controlled by the player; but also containing audiovisual form and movement.
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Therefore, it becomes a moment of capturing an emerging and co-created 
aesthetic form of the self-avatar and the gameworld experienced from inside, 
where the crucial element is the subjective position of the perceiver.
In order to summarize the two preceding chapters, in the following table 
I have delineated the key elements of previously disussed perspectives and 
situations:
Perspectives Internal Perspective  External Perspective
Situations Gameplay Situation Aesthetic Situation
Attitude  
to self-avatar
acting as self-avatar  
in the gameworld;  
looking through  
experiential and  
existential structure
reflecting over (my)
self-avatar within  
the gameworld;  
aesthetic form  
of subjectivity shaping 
experience  
of the gameworld
reflecting over  
the avatar as an element  
of composition  
of the artefact;  
objectified and  
looked at
Attitude  
to the game
gameworld; perceived 
as inhabited existential 
environment 
gameworld;  
reflected over in search 
of meaning from  
the perspective  
of the self-avatar
artefact;  
object in the world;  
text amongst other texts; 
specimen of a genre
Focus
acting; living  
an adventure within  
the gameworld
recognition of aesthetic 
form of bad faith and 
spirit of seriousness;  
reflecting over  
the appropriacy  
of the self-avatar 
and the gameworld 
perceived from their 
perspective
interpreting the game; 
comparing to other 
games
2.3. This Dark Area between the Doors
“For one instant you were the heaven-sent mediator between me and myself, 
you perceived that compact and solid entity which I was and wanted to be, 
in a just as simple and ordinary way as I perceived you. 
For after all, I exist, I am though I have no sense of being; 
and it is an exquisite torment to discover in oneself 
such utterly unfounded certainty, such unsubstantiated pride” 
(J. P. Sartre 2001, 2:343–44).
“Only I do hope it’s my dream, and not the Red King’s!”
(Carroll 2001, 233)
The moment of interplay between the gameplay situation and the aesthetic 
situation opens an opportunity for the cooperation of perception and imagination 
in the process of playing a game; the continuous establishing and re-establishing 
of the self-avatar’s situatedness within the gameworld, her position toward 
the current state of the gameworld and — self-reflectively — towards herself. 
I will explore the two situations outlined in the previous chapter while close 
playing The Beginner’s Guide (hereinafter as TBG). Due to the self-referential 
character of the game, the subjective position of the self-avatar within 
the complex gameworld of TBG is doubled. In consequence, this particular 
game is not only an example illustrating my arguments, but it also presents 
the multi-layered situation of the self-avatar towards the game on its own 
rights. In consequence, the reflective form of TBG allows the highlighting 
of not only the relationship between the gameplay situation and the in-game 
aesthetic situation, but also the difference between the internal and external 
perspectives, as it is problematized by the game itself.
I argue that in TBG the self-avatar is thrown into two parallel gameplay 
situations, i.e. it is related to a different, or even conflicted, system 
of interdependencies. As a result, I will delve into two levels of auto-reflection 
within the TBG that make explicit the interplay between the gameplay 
situation and the aesthetic situation by making both the topic of the Narrator’s 
comments. 
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The first one is revealed by the introduction, as well as the loading screens 
appearing between the chapters of the game; as TBG is introduced 
as a composition of chronologically ordered prototypes of games divided 
by loading screens, supplied with the Narrator’s comments that gives 
the game the form of a story within a story. The self-avatar is situated within 
the gameworld of the framing Narrator’s game; however, she is not situated 
within any particular prototype. In turn, prototypes become “objectified” 
or “textualized” by acts situating the self-avatar beyond them. I will exemplify 
this by studying the dark moments between particular chapters of the game. 
The second gameplay situation is grounded within prototypes; it is realised 
in the search for the aesthetic shape of the subjective stance towards 
the gameworld of the certain prototype, and as existential meaning of the 
self-avatar’s position towards the almost constant mentoring of the Narrator. 
I will focus on the case of the door puzzle revealing “this dark area between 
the doors” (Everything Unlimited Ltd. and Wreden 2015) that I will interpret 
as the area of aesthetic reflection on the gameplay situation within a particular 
prototype. However, the aesthetic self-reflection of the self-avatar is altered 
by comments of the Narrator. 
I argue that the first level mirrors the stance of the external point of view within 
a game itself (Cf. Chapter 2.1), while the second one plays with the self-avatar’s 
doubled subjective position that, in consequence, is experienced as stratified, 
dynamic, and highly dependent on the state of the explored gameworld. Due 
to the oscillation between these framings, the interdependencies between 
the gameplay situation and aesthetic situation, as well as the co-action 
of internal and external perspectives become especially interesting. 
I would like to underline that here I do not focus on a process of interpretation 
that takes place while the player turns back from playing the game to the 
distanced interpretation, but on a particular situatedness of subjectivity. 
In consequence, I will focus on the conditions of experience in particular 
situations, their interplay, and discontinuity.
I claim that the dualism of in-game situations does not replicate 
the differentiation between cybertext and text (Cf. Aarseth 1997), a game 
as a text subjected to two different hermeneutic circles while perceived from 
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the first- and third-person perspectives (Möring 2013; Karhulahti 2012a, 
2012b); or as self-concentrated play as opposed to presentation performed 
for the external spectator (Gadamer 2004); or even hermeneutic triad 
of understanding game as existence, text and struggle (Möring 2013). 
The crucial quality of the aesthetic situation is that it embraces the way 
the gameplay situation conditions the self-avatar’s subjectivity and reshapes 
this condition in self-reflective, cogito-like movement, which engages not only 
perception but also the imagination (Cf. J.-P. Sartre 2004).
The Dark Moments
When I enter The Beginner’s Guide, at first I find myself in a gameplay situation 
which I have been thrown into. Before I can see anything more than a white 
screen, I am welcomed by the Narrator:
“Hi there, thank you very much for playing The Beginner’s Guide. My name is Davey Wreden, 
I wrote The Stanley Parable” (Everything Unlimited Ltd. and Wreden 2015).
Prima facie, the player is welcomed as herself in a frame story that is presented 
to her, and it seems that at that moment the gameworld does not propose 
any special subjective stance to her. However, the situatedness she experiences 
now is immediately reflected upon by the Narrator. As Arsenault and Perron 
point out, the “experience with a game starts before the gameplay proper”, 
and it “often takes the form of an introductory cut-scene whose main 
function is to regulate, modulate, take in charge, or shape the gamer’s horizon 
of expectations” (Arsenault and Perron 2008, 119). As long as the self-avatar 
cannot see any cut-scene, she can literally hear the game’s “primordial speech” 
(Arsenault and Perron 2008, 119). She just listens to the voice that outlines 
the situation she is about to participate. From the introduction, she can learn 
a couple of biographical details about the relation of the Narrator to Coda, 
believed to be a designer of games encapsulated within TBG.
Nevertheless, before she actually begins to interact with the gameworld, 
her position as the self-avatar within TBG is already gaining shape; as from 
the point of view of the aesthetic situation she is gradually slipping into 
the perspective of a coactive confidante of the Narrator, while learning his 
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personal attitude to the game and to its author:
“Now these games mean a lot to me. I met Coda in early 2009 at a time when I was really 
struggling with some personal stuff, and his work pointed me in a very powerful direction” 
(Everything Unlimited Ltd. and Wreden 2015).
Right from the beginning, TBG shows the self-avatar that her subjective 
stance is not — as distinct from the majority of computer games — 
the straightforwardly central one. Nevertheless, at first it is the only position 
she is proposed to take. In order to play, she enters the gameplay situation, 
and her attitude towards the world is already pointed out; she is proposed 
to take a guided tour through the digital worlds of prototypes encapsulated 
in TBG. This situatedness needs to be experienced in order to establish 
a ground for any kind of reflection.
The Narrator elaborates on the obscurity of the prototypes, while at the same 
time he highlights their — declaratively present — deeper and consistent 
meaning hidden from the self-avatar. In fact, without the framing story, 
the prototypes and mini-games they consist of could be mistaken for 
the first steps of a fledgling programmer. Nevertheless, the prototypes 
are not the main attraction of the game, as the Narrator uses them in the 
construction of a more complex wholeness; he addresses and instructs 
the self-avatar, or advises Coda, the absent designer of prototypes; however, 
above all he presents his own interpretation of the current situation 
of the self-avatar within the prototype.
In consequence, even when the self-avatar is not situated within any particular 
prototype, she still participates in a frame story enacted by the Narrator’s 
comments and interpretations. I believe that during these dark moments 
between the prototypes; i.e. the situations experienced as being beyond 
the prototypes (Cf. J.-P. Sartre 1978, 549); the self-avatar is still situated 
within a gameworld as a subject being guided by the Narrator. Therefore, 
the situation outlined by the TBG mirrors the stance of external perspective 
within a game itself.
The self-avatar is repeatedly informed that the challenges she faces are 
made easier and more understandable for her, while those contained in the 
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original version of the game known only to the author and the Narrator 
were practically unsolvable. Davey modified Coda’s prototypes in order 
to remove unmanageable situations and make them playable. Before the 
improvement, prototypes were private, paradoxical, non-playable games, 
unknowable worlds designed for no-one. They present and repeat motives 
of prisons, towers, empty spaces and endless activities, stages and machines, 
and lanterns: lanterns that Davey introduces to the self-avatar at the beginning 
of the journey through prototypes, as a sign of consistent thought laying 
behind all prototypes designed by Coda:
“I can’t tell you quite why but for some reason Coda fixates on this lamppost, it’s going 
to appear at the end of every single one of his games from here on out. I’ll tell you what 
I think, I think up to this point he’s been making really strange and abstract games with 
no clear purpose, and maybe you can only float around in that headspace for so long. Because 
now he wants something to hold onto. He wants a reference point, he wants the work to be 
leading to something. He wants a destination! Which is what this lamppost is, it’s a destination” 
(Everything Unlimited Ltd. and Wreden 2015).
The same lanterns that, as Coda reveals while addressing Davey from within 
the prototype entitled Tower, are added by Davey: “Would you stop changing 
my games? Stop adding lampposts to them?” (Everything Unlimited Ltd. and 
Wreden 2015).
These Dark Areas
If the self-avatar wants to proceed, even if the only challenge is to move 
further, she needs to act within these complicated circumstances. When she 
enters a prototype, her situatedness towards the frame story is supplied with 
the spatiotemporal situatedness within it; for example, within circumstances 
outlined by the door puzzle. What is the self-avatar supposed to do here?
“Well this is new for Coda, it’s an actual puzzle! Go ahead and see if you can solve it. Alright, 
let me just walk you through it. You’re going to hit the switch on the outside to open the door, 
then hit the same switch and walk through the door before it closes. You’ll see a second switch 
on the inside, which will open the second door. Don’t forget that solution, because we’re going 
to see this puzzle again soon. We’re going to see it a lot. So that seems to be it, right? You walk 
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down a corridor, you solve a puzzle, you get to the end. Simple enough” (Everything Unlimited 
Ltd. and Wreden 2015).
When the self-avatar looks at the door puzzle from the point of view of the 
gameplay situation, it seems to be trivial; the doors are here to be opened, 
and the self-avatar has been instructed how to do it; therefore she can easily 
remove the obstacle that shows up in front of her.
However, this is not all that constitutes the gameplay situation at the 
moment. In TBG, the exploration of these simple, three-dimensional 
locations perceived from the first person point of view is just a first layer 
of my situatedness. It is not only the gameworld open of exploration and 
puzzle solving, but also a gameworld that uses the position of the Narrator 
to force a certain interpretation of the situation of the self-avatar (what in other 
games usually happens by means of obstacles and penalties, achievements 
and upgrades being a part of the gameworld). The situatedness of the self-
avatar becomes a part of the self-reflective game that problematizes not only 
the meaning of the self-avatar’s actions undertaken in order to solve the 
door puzzle, but also a relation between the Narrator and the self-avatar 
to the place and time of events (Cf. Ryan 2001). When the self-avatar acts 
within the certain prototype, her actions are ‘explained’ by the Narrator. 
Therefore, the self-avatar is relieved or rather deprived of her attempts 
of self-reflection and aesthetic approach to her own stance. Hence, 
the experience of falling — being guided by the situatedness and treated 
as an object within the world — is made explicit and analysed.
By doing so, this self-reflective game uncovers the relationship between 
the gameplay situation and the aesthetic situation. In games that do not 
delve into themselves, the difference between the two can be easily tracked 
as a difference between direct statements, for example: ‘the doors are 
in front of me’ in the gameplay situation; and ‘I need to open the door in order 
to go further and finish my quest’; or ‘I am the one opening the door’ in the 
aesthetic situation. In other words, the difference between them is analogical 
to the difference between pre-reflective and reflective observations in terms 
of outlining levels of consciousness (Cf. E.g. Husserl 1970). In consequence, 
the subjective stance of the self-avatar reflecting over herself is not abandoned, 
but realised — altogether with its falling condition and patterns of acting 
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that constitute the self-avatar. However, the regular self-reflection differs from 
the reflection over the position of the self-avatar, not only because the latter 
subjective position can be abandoned without any serious consequences; but 
primarily because it is a reflection over the compound, the self-avatar that 
is a concretization of subjectivity performed by the player and considered 
as herself-in-the-gameworld. 
In TBG, the situation is even more complicated due to the presence 
of the second layer of the gameplay situation, established by a relationship 
between two non-player characters, Coda and Davey, the Author and 
the Narrator — or perhaps between one, schizophrenically split character. The 
interplay between the two systems of interdependencies alters the self-avatar’s 
understanding of her situatedness by reflecting on what she has just done. 
The statement: ‘I am able to open the door’ has a certain meaning within 
a gameplay situation outlined by the prototype, but it also gains new meaning, 
and potentially consequences, within the Narrator’s game. In consequence, 
the self-avatar wonders ‘what does this opening mean within the framing 
story?’, and ‘how does it shape my current position and role?’ As the Narrator 
comments on the door riddle:
“At the end of this level we’re going to see the puzzle again, and here I’ll tell you what I think 
the puzzle means. Each of these games represents an idea that was on Coda’s mind at the 
time that he was making it. And the puzzle is a way of closing the door on a previous chapter 
of his life before moving onto the next one. In each of his games, after exploring a theme that 
he might find difficult, Coda can place this puzzle that he knows has a reliable solution, he 
understands exactly how it works, and so it gives him a simple mechanism for moving on. 
And because there’s this dark area between the doors, a space between spaces, before you move 
on you get to pause just for a moment a few seconds to reflect on and let go of the events that 
lead you here. To step back and connect the pieces together, to grasp at that elusive bigger 
picture. And then you face the next thing” (Everything Unlimited Ltd. and Wreden 2015).
Therefore, this dark area is presented as the isolated space designed for 
the self-avatar to ascertain her position. However, due to the double situatedness 
that I have already pointed out, it seems to work in an opposing manner. 
It reveals a lack of the subjective space for the self-avatar, as every spottable 
place is already occupied by the Narrator’s interpretation. The door puzzle 
is then not only a repeatable, trivial obstacle occurring while the self-avatar 
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moves through the prototype in the gameplay situation; an element of the 
aesthetic situation while the self-avatar reflects over herself as performing 
the actions; but is also one of the crucial moments of the framing story that 
reveals the self-avatar’s situatedness within the Narrator’s plan to present 
the prototypes as an expression of existential struggle of the Author. 
From the point of view of the aesthetic situation, “this dark area between 
the doors” is an example of altering the self-avatar’s situatedness towards 
the perceived environment by problematization and re-interpretation 
of the subjective position. The aesthetic situation reveals a dissonance within 
the self-avatar’s experiences, as she encounters messages in the prototypes 
in parallel to their conflicting interpretation enunciated by the Narrator, 
who — as a part of the gameplay situation — determines and limits 
the self-avatar’s subjective position within a gameworld when interfering with 
prototypes the self-avatar is situated in. 
Lost between Dreams
The “dark area between the doors, a space between spaces” is a standpoint 
that reveals an abyss: when the self-avatar reflectively realises that 
the gameworld she is situated in — as well as herself within this world — 
are her own concretizations. The act establishing a game already perceived 
from the perspective of the self-avatar as an aestheticized gameworld is then 
performed from inside this gameworld. 
This paradox cannot be answered from any point of view because it infinitely 
references back to the interplay between the two. To understand the self-avatar’s 
situatedness, one has to act within it. On the other hand, the conditioning 
and limitations of this subjective position are understandable only as reflected 
upon. Therefore, as Sartre argues, the mediator — the individual one, 
as the Narrator, or the non-individual one, as the They — is necessary 
to embrace this duality:
“This self with its a priori and historical content is the essence of man. Anguish as the 
manifestation of freedom in the face of self means that man is always separated by a nothingness 
from his essence. We should refer here to Hegel’s statement: ‘Wesen ist was gewesen ist’. Essence 
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is what has been. Essence is everything in the human being which we can indicate by the words 
— that is. Due to this fact it is the totality of characteristics which explain the act. But the act 
is always beyond that essence; it is a human act only in so far as it surpasses every explanation 
which we can give of it, precisely because the very application of the formula ‘that is’ to man 
causes all that is designated, to have-been. Man continually carries with him a pre-judicative 
comprehension of his essence, but due to this very fact he is separated from it by a nothingness” 
(J.-P. Sartre 1978, 35).
For the same reason, the reflective moment between the prototypes cannot 
be long, and the dark area between the doors cannot be inhabited. The Narrator 
in TBG comments on the situation with his customary authoritativeness: 
“Of course, it can’t last. The music stops, your companion is gone, it’s time to leave! The door 
at the top of the hill is now open as well. Again, you can’t stay in the dark space for too long. 
You just can’t, you have to keep moving, it’s how you stay alive. Which is the whole point 
of the puzzle doors, right? That sooner or later you have to pick up and move. I really thought 
that was the point of it” (Everything Unlimited Ltd. and Wreden 2015). 
***
The aesthetic situation — while revealing the conditions of experience 
of the gameplay situation — becomes the moment when the aesthetic form 
of the gameworld experienced from inside can be captured. Its crucial element 
is the subjective position of the perceiver, the self-avatar. The self-reflectiveness 
of TBG makes the aesthetic situation more complex. First of all, the game 
is composed of separate prototypes that are framed by the story, and dark 
areas, loading screens, when the self-avatar is nothing but a listener. Secondly, 
the comments of the Narrator that prevent the player from unaided acts 
of interpretation — as they do not leave space for agency — and from 
the self-reflection, by making the player “interpassive” (Žižek 2002). 
I believe that both layers of the aesthetic situation in TBG are governed 
by the “relationship of substitution”, as Žižek calls it when pointing out 
at the function of “canned laughter” in TV series: “This is what the Lacanian 
notion of ‘decentrement’, of the decentred subject, aims at: my most intimate 
feelings can be radically externalized, I can literally ‘laugh and cry through 
another’” (Žižek 2002). 
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Nevertheless, in TBG the decentralization is overwhelming. This is the Narrator 
who tells the self-avatar what she should think of the gameplay situation she 
is in. He also alters or doubles the in-game aesthetic situation, while co-shaping 
it and moving it to a different level. In consequence, the self-avatar is not 
reflecting over her own position as the self-avatar in the gameplay situation 
taking place within a prototype, but reflecting over the gameplay situation 
as mediated by the self-reflective comments of the Narrator. Therefore, 
the self-avatar’s reflection on situatedness in TBG is explicitly shaped 
by the They incorporated by the self-avatar and multiplied by the Narrator. 
TBG, while making this processes explicit, illustrates the function I will 
describe in the next chapter; namely the They inscribed into the game. 
This Heideggerian term designates a general structure of obligations and 
behaviours perceived by an individual as natural and — non-reflectively — 
obvious. In TBG, if the self-avatar is about to hesitate, the omniscient voice 
and gaze of the Narrator quickly supports her with explanations of what she 
is expected to think or to do. Paradoxically, this is the single-player game 
realised by somebody else’s agency. The self-avatar is brought into the relation 
between Davey and Coda, who surprisingly speaks up in one of the final 
prototypes. However, he does not comment on the self-avatar’s actions, but 
criticises the Narrator’s; moreover, he directly addresses the Narrator, not 
the self-avatar. The final moments of the game make it clear; in this gameworld, 
the self-avatar is not only bereaved of the central place, but is refused any 
meaningful position. 
2.4. Spirit of Seriousness and Bad Faith
“Perhaps there is no other choice; perhaps one has to choose:
 to be nothing, or to play oneself. It would be horrible:
 such a natural falsehood”1. 
A gameplay situation takes place when the game is perceived as a meaningful 
and autonomous world in which the player is situated2, and is opposed 
to the point of view external to the gameworld, which considers the game 
to be an artefact. Therefore, the process of meaning-making, and 
the experience of significance; which are the primary interests of the present 
chapter; are grounded in the point of view internal to the gameworld. 
The player’s perceptual perspective within this world is defined by an avatar 
experienced as self, i.e. the self-avatar, and its position within the gameworld. 
The gameplay situation includes the realisation of the existential project 
of the self-avatar, which acts within the gameworld and is subjected 
to in-game constraints. From this perspective, the player’s activities motivated 
by the events she encounters in the gameworld are perceived as meaningful 
through their relation to: a) the gameworld, or b) the self-avatar’s attitude 
towards them. Therefore, the gameplay situation is in many ways analogical 
to a life situation. The latter is a system of relationships between an individual, 
a world, and facticity; that is, according to Sartre (Sartre 1978, 512), 
the individual’s position in the world determining her point of view.
In the following pages, I argue that the meaning of in-game activities is rooted 
in bad faith (See: Sartre 1978, 44–45, 47–70, 628; Leino 2012a) and spirit 
of seriousness (Sartre 1978, 39, 580, 626–27, 633). Jean-Paul Sartre uses these 
terms in Being and Nothingness (Sartre 1978), to name two different defence 
strategies used by individuals to ease the tension of responsibility. They are 
described by Sartre as misleading and harmful beliefs about the individuals’ 
position in the world, and about the source of meaning of their actions. Bad 
faith is a form of intended self-deception that makes a person believe that 
their role in the world is determined; however, they are not able to completely 
1  (Sartre 2005, 140; Cf. Sartre 1992, 227). Quotation translated by author.
2  Therefore, in the gameplay situation the player does not relate to the game as an artefact or a text that 
can be misread, freely interpreted or compared to other games.
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forget about their projective nature. On the other hand, the spirit of seriousness 
is a conviction that meaning of the world is not dependent on an individual 
project, but inscribed into objects. Therefore, in a life situation, spirit 
of seriousness and bad faith conceal the fact that human beings are free and 
fully responsible for their existential project. However, when introduced into 
game analysis, I argue that they describe a perceptual framework provided 
by a self-avatar when experiencing a gameworld. In consequence, instead 
of being the characteristics of a morally flawed struggle with individual 
freedom, they become a part of the aesthetic form of the being-in-the-
gameworld approached in the aesthetic situation.
The argument is accompanied by an interpretation of particular moments 
in The Vanishing of Ethan Carter (hereinafter VoEC) which will be interwoven 
later in the text, after the theoretical exposition of the problem. The gameplay 
situation is here outlined by the gameworld, where the self-avatar is a detective 
with supernatural powers who tries to solve the mystery of a missing boy, 
Ethan. He considers actions that lead to this goal meaningful because he was 
called to decipher messages and clues hidden in the gameworld. 
How, then, do the meaning-making process and the experience of significance 
change in a gameplay situation when compared to a life situation? In order 
to answer these questions, I compare the meaning of bad faith and spirit 
of seriousness in situations of life and a game. Firstly, I need to mark 
a condition and features of an individual’s position in the world within 
the framework of Sartrean philosophy. I will outline how meaning is created 
in a life situation, and ways it depends on the overall existential project 
of the individual, and on her attitude to the world. Consequently, I will apply 
the underlying assumptions of Sartre’s ontology to a gameplay situation, 
in order to explore how such meaning relies on the position of a self-avatar 
and her attitude to the gameworld.
Free Human Beings in an Absurd World
What does the process of meaning-making entail for human beings? 
In the existential philosophy of Sartre, the world lacks meaning. Therefore, 
the world is not able to support meanings the individual gives to her life. 
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Not only is she completely free to start the process of meaning-making, but 
is also completely responsible for who she is and how she acts. Sartre presents 
freedom-oriented extremism claiming that the meaning of life is a matter 
of individual choice: “All these trivial passive expectations of the real, all 
these commonplace, everyday values, derive their meaning from an original 
projection of myself which stands as my choice of myself in the world” (Sartre 
1978, 512), he writes. It is a matter of the particular existential project, 
whereby every individual meaning-making is grounded in freedom.
The Sartrean understanding of freedom is far from the everyday use 
of the term. Here, freedom is not understood as a possibility of choosing 
from the options presented. For example, I decide to become an actress, 
a diver, or, a philosopher. Freedom is understood as “a relation to the given” 
(Sartre 1978, 486), namely as a possibility of negation - Sartrean freedom 
constitutes the fundamental characteristics of the human being in the world. 
This absolutisation of freedom makes every single decision and action 
a consequence of conscious decision one has to take responsibility for. It also 
justifies the Sartrean claim that the human being is nothingness, and cannot 
cease to be free (Sartre 1978, 485–86). 
Therefore, a human being might not have essence, but has experience 
of never-ending longing for something it was in the past or wants to become. 
While an individual is nothingness; a chasm in being which, because of its 
otherness, is able to freely interact with the world; the world is indifferent 
to fullness and being. Therefore, it is not possible to answer the question 
“what is the meaning of a tree” without reference to the individual human 
being. The particular tree can be considered as a source of inspiration 
or as firewood — its meaning is dependent on the project one connects with 
the tree. It is therefore freedom which constitutes meaning of the world: 
intentions, actions, and their interpretation.
Nevertheless, human beings always find themselves within the indifferent 
world as being thrown (Sartre 1978, 39) into a particular situation they are 
facing from a particular point of view. Sartre adds that:
“Each man finds himself in the presence of meanings which do not come into the world 
through him. He arises in a world which is given to him as already looked-at, furrowed, 
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explored, worked over in all its meanings, and whose very contexture is already defined 
by these investigations” (Sartre 1978, 520).
This involvement of consciousness is facticity:
“Without facticity consciousness could choose its attachments to the world in the same way 
as the souls in Plato’s Republic choose their condition. I could determine myself to ‘be born 
a worker’ or to ‘be born a bourgeois’. But on the other hand facticity cannot constitute me 
as being a bourgeois or being a worker. It is not even strictly speaking a resistance of fact […]. 
Facticity is only one indication which I give myself of the being to which I must reunite myself 
in order to be what I am” (Sartre 1978, 83).
By establishing an individual’s relationship to the world, facticity does not 
take away the burden of freedom. Even if the conventional deed is experienced 
as motivated or imposed upon by demands of the particular situation, it needs 
to be freely chosen by the individual as her own way of acting. Therefore, any 
act becomes justified by itself; it does not become better, worse, innocent, 
or meaningless. Moreover, the individual cannot cease to take full responsibility 
for this act.
In Sartre, an understanding of the individual’s own, unconditioned 
nothingness and inescapable freedom is then the only source of deep and 
authentic sense of meaning. Additionally, being aware of this freedom causes 
anguish as nobody and nothing is given as just meaningful (Sartre 1978, 
29–34). Sartrean existentialism is the philosophy of difficult freedom since 
it considers an individual as absolutely responsible (See, e.g. Sartre 1978, 
509; Dilman 2013, 199). In consequence, as he writes in Roads to Freedom, 
“Everyone! Everyone! Everyone runs away: Schwartz veers away, Nippert 
sleeps, and Pinnete goes mad […]. Each of them quickly doctored for himself 
an attitude that will help him to survive” (Sartre 2005, 585). All of these 
“life-giving” meanings derive from bad faith; they are believed in for their 
calming effect. The hardship of bearing responsibility for freedom is the 
reason for a common presence of defence mechanisms: bad faith and spirit 
of seriousness. They conceal freedom and anguish, and help individuals 
to perceive their actions — as well as the surrounding world — as justified 
and meaningful (Sartre 1978, 556). 
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Sartre argues that “[f ]or the spirit of seriousness, for example, bread 
is desirable because it is necessary to live (a value written in an intelligible 
heaven) and because bread is nourishing” (Sartre 1978, 626). I think that 
a clue to this attitude can be exemplified by two forms of sentences. A man, 
in spirit of seriousness, will express his experiences by the features of objects 
and say: “It is understandable, edible, perceivable”; while the one conscious 
of his freedom will articulate his attitude towards the world in active form, 
“I can understand, eat, perceive”. As a serious individual objectifies meanings 
and values, he believes that everything demands a particular handling and 
should be approached only in this “proper” way that suits its nature.
The bad faith, in turn, is an answer for a desire to be determined by and 
limited to a performed role. It is a false, but convincing, answer the individual 
gives herself for longing for one’s proper and unchangeable place in the world. 
Bad faith is a special form of self-deception when a person performs a role she 
knows, recognises or even considers to be her real nature, and at the same time 
she tries to conceal her own conviction that it is just one of possible relations 
to the given. “It is in my nature, I always do that”, or “I’d love to help you, 
but it transgresses my eligibility” are two examples of utterances formulated 
from the point of view of bad faith3.
The two strategies, bad faith and spirit of seriousness, will be explained more 
comprehensively with appropriate examples from The Vanishing of Ethan 
Carter.
There is no Place for the Absurd in Spirit of Seriousness
 “My freedom? It hangs over me: I am free for so many years
 and nothing comes from it. I am dying with desire to exchange
 this freedom for doubtlessness, just once”
(Sartre 2005, 99).
Do the defence mechanisms of bad faith and spirit of seriousness work 
3  The term bad faith has been applied to games by Olli T. Leino. It will be discussed later on 
in the text.
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in a gameplay situation as they do in a life situation? If they do, how are they 
manifested? Building on the Sartrean ontology of the human condition, I will 
make an attempt to outline the situation of the self-avatar in the gameworlds 
of adventure games, characterized by an absence of the condition of losing 
a game. In other words, the players’ experience of this type of game can 
be more or less extensive due to their activity within the gameworld, but there 
is no possibility of failing. 
I would like to limit the application of the Sartrean ontology to this genre, 
as narrowing the field will allow me to explore it in more detail. Consequently, 
I will focus on VoEC, the adventure game with a “singular embodied ludic 
subject-position, […] where the player is given a single playable figure, 
with her relation to the gameworld being structured entirely through her 
engagement with this figure” (Vella 2016, 5). The gameworld is perceived from 
a first-person perspective, and is realised as a three-dimensional environment. 
Firstly, I would like to highlight the differences between the Sartrean world, 
into which human beings are thrown, and the gameworld they voluntarily 
and willingly throw themselves into. 
The game, before I run it, is for me an artefact, or an object in the world 
(Cf. Aarseth 2011, 59–60; Leino 2010, 273). I am free in relation to it: I can 
turn it on and enter a gameplay situation, or choose not to. When I make 
a decision and enter the gameplay situation, I feel that an adventure begins: 
the adventure desired so badly by Roquentin, a protagonist of The Nausea 
(Sartre 2007). According to Sartre, an adventure is “a way of happening” 
where “life” and “story”, “living” and “telling” are intertwined (Sartre 2007, 
36–37). While having an adventure, a person experiences her life as if she 
were the protagonist of a fascinating story. She takes part in the events, but 
is not the creator of them – everything just falls into place, but actions do not 
cause the adventure, nor determine its course. 
Sartre writes that longing for an adventure can never be fulfilled in life, 
as the world lacks meaning; it is absurd and excessively complicated. However, 
since the gameworlds of the games in discussion do not share with reality 
the quality of “having too much content” (Sartre 2007, 107); i.e. offering more 
possibilities than can be ever experienced; they are potentially reconcilable 
with human consciousness. Moreover, the gameworlds of adventure games 
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usually offer self-avatars central roles4. 
Therefore, despite the place I find myself in as I start VoEC looks pretty 
realistic, I expect the moment to be the real beginning that can never take 
place in life — as “[r]eal beginnings are like a fanfare of trumpets, like 
the first notes of a jazz tune, cutting short tedium, making for continuity” 
(Sartre 2007, 37). When the self-avatar turns back, he notices an entrance 
to the tunnel. Led by curiosity, he runs inside — what will he find 
on the opposite side of the tunnel that he just, apparently, left? He runs 
in the darkness to find himself back in the same place. He can hear his own 
voice explaining that he is in Red Creek Valley in the world where Ethan 
Carter had vanished. From these first moments of the game, he learns 
that unknown evil gathers here. There are portals connecting different 
worlds: a realistic, sensual one; and a second, mysterious and dark one. 
Due to the detective’s paranormal powers, he is able to reconstruct 
the occurrence of past events by touching significant items encountered 
in the woods, houses, and graveyards. The self-avatar’s inner speech informs 
that “to find Ethan, I had to figure out what this place is trying to hide 
from me” (The Astronauts 2014). Therefore, the game introduces the player 
to a different facticity: a new facticity in the world where abandoned buildings 
are inhabited by dark forces and murder weapons, which when arranged 
in proper places, have the power of turning back time, and allowing the player 
to witness crucial stop-motion scenes from the crime.
If it were a life situation, I would have to make a free decision concerning 
what to do, but I think that a gameplay situation provides an escape from 
the necessity of taking responsibility for an individual’s actions and choices. 
To participate in a gameplay situation I need to follow clues hidden 
in the gameworld. The meanings are already here. As a result, I think that 
adventure games could fulfil the longing for doubtlessness, which is one 
of the basic human needs from the point of view of Sartrean existentialism. 
In a gameplay situation,
“Each of my choices, every act of intentional direction toward the world is morally and 
4  I will discuss games that play with this central position in the Part 3.
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ontologically well-grounded, it has vital justification coming from outside. Therefore, 
all the relationships (self-world, self-things), meanings, values, senses are not created by my 
freedom […], but are given to me as already established order”5. 
This is how Piotr Mróz described the spirit of seriousness, which supports 
an individual’s belief that the meaning of life can be derived from, or even 
inscribed into the world. It leads to the conclusion that rules and meanings 
observed and experienced in the world, only because of their presence, define 
and justify individual endeavours. In the spirit of seriousness,
“Man pursues being blindly by hiding from himself the free project which is this pursuit. 
He makes himself such that he is waited for by all the tasks placed along his way. Objects are 
mute demands, and he is nothing in himself but the passive obedience to these demands” 
(Sartre 1978, 626). 
The meaning of an individual’s actions are then perceived by this individual 
as given by the features of the world - as being derived straight from the 
facticity.
In a life situation, according to Sartre, the individual and a world are 
on opposite poles: they are the two kinds of being which are as different 
as possible. Consciousness, or human freedom, undertakes endeavours 
to conceal this fact. In order to feel safer, she tries to humanise the world, 
to make it both understandable and meaningful. This is why everything, 
that which is given, such as socially and culturally set meanings, are usually 
perceived as “natural things” (Sartre 1978, 427).
I think that a gameplay situation does not constitute such poles: there 
is nothing absurd and there is no freedom, as they stay behind the scope of the 
gameplay situation. The moment I make the decision to turn the game on, 
then becomes the moment I enter the self-avatar’s facticity in the gameworld6. 
Every player will find themselves in this facticity, and their situation will 
be determined by it. They will find the set of in-game meanings with 
5  (Mróz 2007, 783). Quotation translated by author.
6  For the notion of an extended facticity see: Leino 2010, 11,187, 220-1, 282.
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no relation to their individual freedom, but related to the self-avatar instead. 
As long as the self-avatar is inextricably bound to the experiential structures 
of bad faith and spirit of seriousness, it exists as a project realised within the 
gameplay situation. Hence, it is not simply experienced as the player’s self, 
but as an emergent entity. In consequence, as the self-avatar is defined by her 
situatedness within the gameworld, the player’s freedom cannot simply be 
transferred to her new situatedness.
The self-avatar, just like a human being in spirit of seriousness; “is waited 
for by all the tasks placed along his way” (Sartre 1978, 626). However, there 
is a major difference between the two; a free individual deceives themselves 
not to be the authoring meanings they ascribe to the world, while 
the self-avatar reflectively realises that the meaning of the gameworld is a part 
of her project within it — its aesthetic form. The gameworld supports a sense 
of meaning and purpose of actions the gamer takes, as it affirms and rewards 
proper performance. Moreover, it sustains a conviction that the obstacles 
offered by a gameworld are “mute demands” (Sartre 1978, 626) designed 
to mirror the abilities of the self-avatar7. In actual fact, they are.
At this point I would like to refer to Olli T. Leino’s assumption that 
games exercise the existential freedom of the player8 by imposing on her 
the “gameplay condition” (Leino 2009; Leino 2010; Leino 2012b) defined 
as follows: 
“The condition of the player, who by definition desires to play, is characterized by a duality 
of freedom and responsibility: the game gives her a freedom of choice while simultaneously 
making her responsible for this freedom by resisting her project of playing” (Leino 2012a).
I believe that games open new areas for the player to exercise freedom in, 
but only when they are considered from the external perspective; i.e. when 
7  For the notion of hybrid intentionality, where “The hybrid intentionality originating 
in the symbiosis of the game artefact and the player is directed at the extended facticity”, Leino 2010, 
187, 277; See also: Vella 2014.
8  The freedom is here understood differently than; for e.g. in Caillois, as it is not as much 
connected with action, but with the relisation of the existential project within given circumstances, 
Callois 2001, 6.
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the subjective position within the gameworld is bracketed. From the point 
of view internal to the gameworld, games create obstacles as well. However, 
not the kind of obstacles against which my own freedom can be exercised (See: 
Leino 2010, 130–31). It would be the case if the gameworld were an absurd 
world, where human endeavours are unjustified. However, when approached 
from the in-game point of view of the gameplay situation and subsequent 
reflection on it, the gameworld offers the human different situatedness. 
As a human being I never cease to be free; albeit, while acting 
as a self-avatar I reject my existential freedom to act within the situation 
outlined by the gameworld. The gameplay situation creates an opportunity 
to conceal the player’s freedom, as it sets the limit for her own meaning-making. 
This is the consequence of the kernel of the gameplay situation, where the absurd 
gameworld is not hidden beneath the spirit of seriousness of the player: there 
is no absurd and indifferent world in the game.
The gameworld, as perceived from the perspective of the gameplay situation, 
is not absurd, but purposeful. Its meaning is experienced as inscribed 
into it; hence it can be perceived as factual while adopting the position 
of the self-avatar. Even if meaning experienced at a particular moment 
is limited to some kind of expectation or atmosphere, all the gameworld exists 
to create this ambiance. From the point of view of the aesthetic situation, 
the spirit of seriousness is reflectively discovered to be a part of the experiential 
structure of the self-avatar, which is an aesthetic form of her situatedness 
within the gameworld.
While playing VoEC, every single interactive item effectively contributes 
to the meaning of the gameworld. The self-avatar follows paths that lead 
him to places he should visit in order to reconstruct the turn of events; to 
recount memories of past events hidden in the gameworld. There are no 
dead-ends, but also no hints. The game warns the player in the very beginning: 
“The game is a narrative experience that does not hold your hand” 
(The Astronauts 2014); but even a sheet of paper lying on the table 
of the abandoned house, filled with childish hand-writing, tells a short 
story illustrating the mystery the player attempts to understand. Within 
this gameworld, the self-avatar can be sure that every piece of half-burned 
newspaper found in the forest contains some information crucial to his 
mission or contributes to the meaning of the gameworld, and his actual task 
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is to find the way to all the meaningful places and arrange all the elements 
in the proper order. Letters and voices, spells, and mysterious portals are all 
building logically and narratively-consistent wholeness around the self-avatar. 
Moreover, VoEC also makes use of several innovative ways to support my 
spirit of seriousness. Instead of being informed about actions I should perform 
to fulfil expectations of the gameworld, I am led by suggestions in a form 
of cloud-based question tags. While getting closer to any important object, 
I can choose to investigate it. For example, when approaching a railway car 
I can see questions – “Blood… Human? Animal? Murder? Used recently?” 
(The Astronauts 2014 ); The representation makes an impression that 
the questions the detective should ask himself were already present 
in the gameworld, and awaited him hidden in the investigated object. 
Therefore, they do not refer to a story which happened in the past, 
but to the self-avatar’s current position towards this object, and signs of the crime 
the player can perceive. When I look around, the cloud of questions is getting denser 
as I get closer to the meaningful point at which I will find an answer. However, 
when I look in the wrong direction, the cloud of questions spreads itself out. 
(The Astronauts 2014. Screenshot taken by the author)
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(The Astronauts  2014. Screenshot taken by the author)
Last but not least, the most interesting facet of the VoEC world are flashbacks 
from the past. When I manage to collect and put together all the objects 
necessary to reconstruct the scene of the crime, and “touch” the body 
of the victim, I will be given the stop-motion moments of the crime. When 
I set the events in the right order, the special gift of the self-avatar that uncovers 
mysterious meanings hidden in the objects within the gameworld will allow 
me to see the cut-scene with dialogues revealing a part of the mystery of the 
vanishing of Ethan Carter. 
The gameplay situation, as opposed to a life situation, provides an explanation 
of actions I need to take. It imposes a meaning of the situation into which 
I am thrown as self-avatar. Who, then, is the actor of the in-game endeavours, 
on whom are these meanings imposed, and whose actions are justified?
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I, Self-Avatar: Acting in Bad Faith
 “I was assailed by memories of a life that wasn’t mine anymore,
 but one in which I’d found the simplest and most lasting joys”
(Camus 1988, 104). 
In the life situation, a source of meaning of an existential project is always 
a human being. Individual meaning-making is then performed “from inside”, 
even if the justification of one’s actions is erroneously ascribed to the world. 
In the framework of Sartre’s philosophy, the need for meaning and personal 
destiny can never be satisfied without concealing freedom. The human 
being in the world is always in statu nascendi; due to her ontological status, 
she never achieves final shape, and cannot aptly attribute to herself a kind 
of meaning that non-human objects and others have. This causes an anguish; 
a feeling of groundlessness that needs to be helped.
“This desire, to act like a mechanism driven by external causes, to become only and solely one’s 
single function, a trait, a role, is one of the forms of bad faith, or in other words, one of the 
ways the human being escapes its freedom” (Mitoraj 2005, 768). 
The term bad faith designates here a conviction that one is determined 
by and limited to a performed role, and intentionally forgetting that it is 
not true. Bad faith is a form of false and powerful self-identification of free 
human beings; when they lie to themselves about their own condition, and 
are victims of this lie at the same time (Cf.: Sartre 1978, 49). People acting 
in bad faith are best illustrated by characters in Sartre’s Roads of Freedom: 
Brunet, who has “joined up, he had renounced his freedom, he was nothing but 
a soldier” (Sartre 1992, 155), the bartender who “was rather too much 
the bartender” (Sartre 1992, 227). Therefore, it takes place when a human comes 
to believe that she is her role, an object or mechanism that cannot be changed 
nor modified. “Perhaps there is no other choice; perhaps one has to choose: 
to be nothing, or to play oneself. It would be horrible: such a natural 
falsehood”9, wonders Mathieu Delarue who is obsessed with freedom.
9 (Sartre 2005, 140; Cf. Sartre 1992, 227). Quotation translated by author.
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I argue that when approaching a gameplay situation one has a choice; namely, 
not to enter an unfolding gameplay situation, or to self-constrain and act 
as a self-avatar, that is, to play somebody one is not. Therefore, bad faith 
can be explained not only as a description of a misperception of the human 
condition. In a gameplay situation, bad faith characterises the self-avatar’s 
condition as such. As a result it is unavoidable, as long as the player wants 
to participate in the gameplay situation. When the player accepts the 
self-avatar’s position as herself, she perceives it in a “subjective relation 
of self ” (Vella 2014), and is able to reflectively realise the self-avatar’s 
condition. This way, the point of view of the self-avatar participating in the 
gameplay situation; i.e. her situatedness within the gameworld; constitutes 
a basis for meaning-making in a game.
At this moment a question arises; can this existential frame still be called ‘bad 
faith’, if the self-avatar actually cannot be anyone else, as there is no place for 
freedom and authenticity within the non-absurd gameworld as approached 
by the situated self-avatar? I believe that it is, as it is not a matter of any 
particular choice made within the gameworld. The reason is a construction 
of the self-avatar; a composition of the object and subject, aesthetic form and 
existence, that is bound to the proposed form as it concretises the gameworld 
through its agency.
The self-avatar cannot become “anybody else”; however, she can cease to be 
“herself ”. Moreover, it happens continuously, as the player shuffles between 
internal and external position towards the gameworld, and between gameplay 
and the aesthetic situation. The self-avatar can leave her current situatedness, 
which makes her herself in relation to the gameworld, by abandoning her 
position towards the gameworld and ending the gameplay situation.
Moreover, reflection over the self-avatar from the point of view of the 
aesthetic situation is not just a reflection over self, which takes the position 
of avatar, undertaken by the player addressing the game. The self-avatar, 
as long as it is a compound of the avatar and existence, is in bad faith, because 
when acting in the gameplay situation, the subjective position they take 
limits and frames their subjectivity. However, due to the interplay between 
the gameplay situation and the aesthetic situation, when reflecting over their 
position from within the gameworld, they approach it as the aesthetic form 
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of the self-avatar. In turn, when the self-avatar and its bad faith is approached 
from the external perspective, the player’s existence abandons its in-game 
situatedness and refers to their freedom, authenticity and situation in the 
‘actual’ world. In the gameworld there is no place for nothingness outside 
the frames drawn for existence by the self-avatar. It fulfils the desire of being 
self-object: to become for-itself-in-itself and suspend their freedom, that cannot 
be fulfilled in life.
Therefore, the notion of bad faith supplies a framework of the gameplay situation 
with the characteristics of an actor. As long as the player acts as a self-avatar, 
she does not experience a game as related to her own freedom. In consequence, 
the process of in-game meaning-making does not take place between 
an in-game facticity and freedom of the player, but refers to the objectified role 
of the self-avatar the player identifies with.
A different use of the Sartrean concept of bad faith was proposed by Olli 
T. Leino (2010, 161–63; 2012a). However, Leino applies the notion 
to a situation external to the gameworld, and constructs thought experiment 
to depict a specific situatedness of the player towards the artefact: 
“If I was the reluctant player held at a gunpoint, and excluded the possibility of choosing not 
to play, and begun playing just because ‘I had no other option’, I would be engaging in what 
Sartre […] calls bad faith. […] If held at gunpoint most of us would probably resort to any 
available escape. However, closing one’s eyes when faced with a problem would not be good if we, 
[…] accepted authenticity as a challenge common to humans” (Leino 2010, 161–62). 
He also proposes another side to bad faith, where it is not connected with 
the situation completely independent of the addressed game, but relates to the 
moment of ceasing the activity of play:
“Play, not unlike any other activity, can be ended at will. However, we can, and often do play 
in bad faith — that is, as if we had no option to stop. “I have gotten this far, I cannot stop now” 
or “I have to help my guild members, I cannot stop now” can both imply an attitude of bad faith” 
(Leino 2010, 162, footnote).
The first two examples provided by Leino outline conditions independent 
of situatedness within the gameworld, while the third addresses the situation 
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within the gameworld as interpreted from the external point of view. However, 
none of them refer to the situation of the self-avatar within the gameworld 
I concentrate on. Moreover, I believe that the first quotation rather refers 
to the spirit of seriousness described above, and that the second one contains 
two different cases. Therefore, I will exemplify the differences between the 
forms of bad faith with four sentences:
1. Leino’s “reluctant player held at a gunpoint”: “I play, because I am forced 
to play” — The meaning of the situation is ascribed to the state of the world, 
i.e. being held at a gunpoint, and not to the self-perception of an individual. 
“I” refers to the player, and a constraint is external and independent from 
the gameworld.
2. Leino’s player who conceals that she can end the game at will:
a) “I have to play, but I should have already finished” — “I” refers 
to the player, and the sentence refers to her inner struggle. However, 
her willingness to play and her limitations are rooted in life situation.
b) “I feel obliged to play because of my duties within the gameworld” — 
A conflict arises between the player and the self-avatar, as “I” refers 
to the player, while “my duties” are the self-avatar’s duties.
3. The perspective outlined in the presented text — “I am Paul Prospero, 
hence I have to find Ethan Carter” — A limitation inscribed into 
the self-avatar. As the constraint stands within the gameworld and does not 
reach the player’s life situation, it is unavoidable as long as the gameplay 
situation lasts. Even if the player is not particularly interested in searching 
for the boy, all the decisions taken in the gameworld are situated towards this 
quest.
To sum up, one can observe that the concept of bad faith can be applied 
not only to the situations outlined by Leino, but also — accompanied 
by the concept of spirit of seriousness — to the in-game gameplay situation. 
Moreover, from the in-game point of view there is no escape from them, 
as they are built-in features of the self-avatar.
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Let me use an example from the VoEC. What does it mean that within 
the gameworld I am in bad faith? I perceive the gameworld from a first 
person perspective. At the beginning of the adventure, the self-avatar is then 
almost carte blanche - just a point of consciousness. During the gameplay, 
I develop an understanding of a self-avatar also as a character and embodiment. 
As self-avatar, I find myself in the woods of an uncanny Red Creek Valley. 
At first, I become a listener of my inner monologue that outlines my situatedness 
and shapes my perspective10. The voice of the narrator — that is, my thoughts 
— create a synchronic commentary for the situation I am in; it unfolds my 
in-game situatedness. As an experienced private eye investigating dark cases, 
the self-avatar – Paul Prospero experienced as self – is the detective who has 
solved many cases from the border of criminal and mystery. I answer a call 
from a missing boy, Ethan. I take the role which is proposed to me. Until now, 
in relation to the gameplay, I will be — as the self-avatar — just a detective 
looking for Ethan Carter, no matter how successful I am in my endeavours. 
Even if I cease to fulfil my duties within the gameworld, the self-avatar will still 
be addressed as Paul Prospero. I will keep my supernatural powers of seeing 
the past enclosed in the objects’ memory. Even if I do not want to follow 
the gameplay and prefer to concentrate on an appreciation of the environment’s 
aesthetic, I perceive it as and through the self-avatar. No matter how hard I try 
to avoid portals leading to the mysterious parallel world, I cannot cease seeing 
them as Paul Prospero does.
At the beginning of the game, I encounter a trap that from the point 
of view of the self-avatar, seems to be set especially for the visitor curious about 
the mysteries of this place. I become more careful and start to search for the 
next dangers hidden among the trees. After a while, I find a faded bonfire. 
As a detective I immediately notice a scrap of paper that provides me with 
a snippet of information about the crime I am tracking. If the self-avatar were 
a forester, not a detective, she would probably think of poachers trying 
to capture a big animal when encountering a trap. She would check if the 
bonfire is cold and does not pose the danger of fire, and perhaps try to track 
down people who lit it in order to fine them.
10 For the model of player-figure relation, including inner dualism of an avatar figure, see: Vella 2014.
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(The Astronauts 2014. Screenshot taken by the author)
(The Astronauts 2014. Screenshot taken by the author)
Therefore, the self-avatar provides me with an existential precondition for 
understanding my situatedness within the gameworld. Bad faith constitutes 
its shape and makes me maintain and develop an understanding of my own 
position. As I gather information about the self-avatar and learn to act within 
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it, I gradually realise that there is no other subjective stance proposed to me 
within the gameworld.
The importance of bad faith can also be illustrated by contrasting two persons 
entering a crowded café. The detective will take a seat that enables him 
to cast surreptitious glances at the suspect he is following, while the barman 
will notice the contents of the glasses held by the customers. The barman from 
the Sartrean example, who is “overly a barman” (Sartre 2005, 140), makes every 
gesture a barman’s gesture, referring to his conviction of himself as a barman. 
His behaviour is led by his bad faith, its appropriateness is set by the facticity 
of being a barman. Analogically, the player thinking of herself as a self-avatar 
and acting as one is looking at the gameworld in bad faith; searching for what 
“just a detective” would search. Therefore, in a gameplay situation my actions 
are performed in the context of a mission I execute; that is, in a context of their 
relevance to the project of the self-avatar, my adventure, and destiny.
In a life situation, the meaning of a barman’s gesture is falsified by his bad 
faith. He can at any moment gain the awareness that he is a free human being. 
He can potentially quit his job, cease connecting the meaning of his actions 
with his role, and keep living his life.
In opposition to life, taking on this particular project of the self-avatar is justified 
by the gameworld which is composed around her facticity. When a player 
enters a gameplay situation, her self-avatar always appears in the gameworld 
at a perfect moment and in an ideal place. She keeps playing a central role in the 
gameworld11, as the gameplay becomes a fulfilment of this particular project, 
and its changing facticity continuously supports its justification.
To experience an adventure, I act in bad faith as a self-avatar. I act in the spirit 
of seriousness while looking for justification of my acts in the gameworld. 
Therefore, in a gameplay situation in adventure games, “I am not ‘making 
myself ’ against the artifact as it exists, but assuming that there is a ‘plan for 
my existence’” (Leino 2012a). Leino calls this approach a “utilitarian mode 
of interpretation”:
11  For the central role of the player in cybertexts, see Aarseth 1997; for philosophical commentary 
on the central role of a player in a gameworld in the form of a game, see Gualeni 2013.
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“While the utilitarian inauthentic attitude certainly is useful for me as a player, it distorts my 
interpretation, as it in fact implies a version of the “authorial intent fallacy” (Leino 2012a). 
As long as I consider an experience of a gameplay situation, I do not interpret 
the game as an artefact, but as a world that is expected to be meaningful. 
However, I do not think that it requires any further assumptions on a designer’s 
intentions; they can be expressed only in the gameworld the player interacts 
with, as long as she holds the position inside the gameworld. Moreover, while 
the distortion of my interpretation can be harmful for research of an artefact, 
it seems to be crucial not only for playing a game, but also for describing 
the player-avatar’s perceptual position inside the gameworld, and for 
examining a gameplay situation. 
When the player quits the position of bad faith, the gameplay situation 
is disturbed. The avatar is not perceived as self anymore as the player jumps 
off her avatar and assumes a different attitude towards a game: she perceives 
it as an artefact, not as a world. She henceforth addresses a different situation. 
The game is not experienced as a field of living and acting, and becomes 
an artefact perceived from an external perspective. The adventure disappears 
and is reduced to a simple story; something that happened once upon a time 
and exists as having already been told, the unreachable memory (Sartre 2007, 
36–38). Therefore, the proposed application of Sartrean ontology is limited 
to a gameplay situation, when the player objectifies herself in the avatar 
acting in bad faith, while perceiving herself as being “just an avatar”. As long 
as I perceive the unfolding gameplay as my own adventure, my gaze is merged 
with the gaze and agency of my avatar; I can act as the avatar, and think 
of myself as the avatar. The gameplay situation remains a personal experience 
of the different meaning of in-game life - the different self in the extended 
facticity.
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On the Appropriateness of the Gameworld and the Project 
of the Avatar
In a life situation, human beings are able to reject bad faith and spirit of seriousness 
and authentically take responsibility for their freedom. On the other hand, 
in a gameplay situation of an adventure game they are not; as long as bad 
faith and spirit of seriousness provide a perceptual frame for the player, and she 
consistently follows the gameplay. The meaning of in-game life is experienced 
in the bad faith when the player acts as a self-avatar; and in spirit of seriousness, 
as one perceives meaning as being given to them. Therefore, in a gameplay 
situation, the player is able to experience suspension of freedom, and take 
delight in the lack of responsibility. When I assume the position of the 
self-avatar in bad faith, the gameworld becomes meaningful to me in light 
of the project of my avatar. The facticity of this world and appropriateness 
of the avatar’s project causes the world to be experienced in the spirit of seriousness 
as meaningful, fulfilling expectations, and justifying my endeavours.
2.5. The Adventure
“That nostalgia for unity, that appetite for the absolute 
illustrates the essential impulse of the human drama. 
But the fact of that nostalgia’s existence does not imply
 that it is to be immediately satisfied”
(Camus 1991, 17).
“I do not know whether the whole world has suddenly shrunk 
or whether I am the one who unifies all sounds and shapes: 
I cannot even conceive of anything around me being other than what it is”
(J.-P. Sartre 2007b, 54).
Jean-Paul Sartre, in a philosophical novel entitled Nausea, describes an adventure 
as the “way of happening” where “living” and “telling” are intertwined (J.-P. 
Sartre 2007b, 36–37). While having an adventure, a person experiences her 
life as if she were the protagonist of a fascinating story. However, according 
to Sartre, longing for an adventure can never be fulfilled in life. 
However, I believe that the adventure becomes possible when an individual 
gets involved in situations such as those discussed in the preceding chapters. 
In order to explore the idea of adventure, I examine Dear Esther (The Chinese 
Room 2012) and The Path (Tale of Tales 2009); two games that from 
the external perspective can be classified somewhere between the walking 
simulator, the adventure game, and notgame genres. In both games, 
the player’s agency is limited to choosing a direction of the exploration, and 
the gameworld unfolds in front of them with minimal effort. 
Freedom for Sartre is a basic characteristics of human being, and a synonym 
for an attitude of consciousness referring to an absurd world, which 
constitutes a basis for individual sensemaking. Therefore, sensemaking is not a 
privilege but a necessity, as nothing can be taken for granted. In consequence, 
an experience of suspension of existential freedom remains unachievable, but 
the most desirable escape from a responsibility caused by the lack of any 
metaphysical anchorage inscribed into the human condition.
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I make an argument that the gameplay situation can be considered 
a real-time, prereflective adventure happening in a limited world 
and experienced as the self-avatar. The ontic situation of the 
being-in-the-gameworld (Vella 2015, 55) enables the special “way of 
happening”, and, in consequence, the player’s freedom is experienced 
as suspended when she acts within the gameworld; however, it does not 
limit the self-avatar’s ability of taking choices and acting within the gameworld. 
Nevertheless, from the perspective of the aesthetic situation, the adventure 
is recognised as a moment of suspension of freedom when the self-avatar 
— acting consensually with the They, in bad faith and spirit of seriousness — 
follows the promise of meaning she recognised within the gameworld.
Nausea: Live or Tell
The protagonist of Nausea, Roquentin, wanders aimlessly through the streets 
of Bouville, where little is happening. He witnesses normal, everyday life: 
there are no special emotions, no perceivable meaning, no spectators nor 
listeners. From the first-person perspective, Roquentin experiences a chaotic 
set of sensations and mundane activities. His life has “too much content”, 
but there is nothing special in it, it is never named nor interpreted in real 
time. While trying to write a biography of Marquis de Rollebon, Roquentin 
gradually realises that life cannot be aptly described (J.-P. Sartre 2007b, 
12–13, 39).
While reminiscing on his past, Roquentin dreams of an adventure, speculating 
on how it might begin: 
“The beginnings would have had to be real beginnings. Alas! Now I see so clearly what 
I wanted. Real beginnings are like a fanfare of trumpets, like the first notes of a jazz tune, 
cutting short tedium, making for continuity” (J.-P. Sartre 2007b, 36).
When the adventure begins, life becomes infused with meaning; it engages 
the listener just like a melody. An adventure surprises Roquentin with 
unexpected situations; it offers him a major role in a well-composed 
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wholeness1. When the adventure happens, it provides the feeling of acting 
in a stream of meaningful events, instead of struggling to make sense 
of an absurd world. The human takes part in these events, but is not 
the creator of them – everything falls into place, but actions do not cause 
the adventure, nor determine its course.
Roquentin laments that the adventures he remembers from the past cannot 
be repeated:
“Following this gold spot with my eyes I think I would accept-even if I had to risk death, 
lose a fortune, a friend-to live it all over again, in the same circumstances, from end to end. 
But an adventure never returns nor is prolonged” (J.-P. Sartre 2007b, 37). 
Adventures, then, cannot be relived; but he hopes that new ones could 
happen. Roquentin can only wait for them to take away the burden 
of needless freedom.
For Roquentin, the experienced string of life events is not the adventure, 
because life causes nausea, as there is always more happening than he needs. 
Roquentin suddenly realizes that the adventure emerges only when we 
perceive life from the distance of time, but in reminiscence;
“…we forget that the future was not yet there; the man was walking in a night without 
forethought, a night which offered him a choice of dull rich prizes, and he did not make his 
choice” (J.-P. Sartre 2007b, 37).
The adventure is a special quality of happening that seems to make life 
meaningful and fascinating. Unfortunately, it becomes available only 
as a recollection; and even then, the adventure lacks immersion and feels 
somewhat falsified:
“This is what I thought: for the most banal event to become an adventure, you must 
(and this is enough) begin to recount it. This is what fools people: a man is always a teller of tales, 
he lives surrounded by his stories and the stories of others, he sees everything that happens 
1 Sartre follows the Aristotelian definition of the wholeness in drama: “A whole is that which has 
a beginning, a middle, and an end” (Aristotle 2008, vii; Cf. Laurel 1993).
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to him through them; and he tries to live his own life as if he were telling a story” (J.-P. Sartre 
2007b, 38).
He tries “to live his own life as if he were telling a story”, but never succeeds 
because life takes place in an absurd world; any choice is more justified than 
others, and, the worst of all, there is no need for a protagonist. All the meaning 
he can find is of his own creation, and any meaningful order of events is 
just reminiscence. Therefore, an actor cannot say what will be important for 
a future story in a certain moment: while the action takes place, everything 
is equally important. 
Moreover, the man living in an absurd world is also “condemned to freedom” 
(J.-P. Sartre 1978, 485). On one hand, one cannot cease to be free by their 
own will, as freedom cannot dispose itself. Therefore, they are absolutely 
responsible for every choice they make, a choice that cannot be justified 
by anybody else’s decision, any event, any external system of values; while 
on the other hand, the human being is always situated and is not able 
to abstract itself from the world he was born into. Freedom then, 
is unbearable and necessary: it is synonymous with the human condition, 
consciousness, nothingness and non-identity (J.-P. Sartre 1978, 78–79, 85, 
95, 102, 125, 181, 201). Freedom can only be ostensibly escaped from in 
the They, bad faith, spirit of seriousness, as discussed in Chapter 2.4; and in 
the arts and storytelling, which mount certain propositions “of making the 
world meaningful, of marking it and implementing into it certain values that 
it never possessed or it was stripped of them”2.
Storytelling gives some relief from the burden of freedom. Events, when 
narrated, gain special meaning; they gain reason. As opposed to life 
events, they become interesting and promising, they are understandable. 
Literature therefore saves the reader from the absurdity of Sartre’s world, 
and the condition of necessity of making sense of it. Literature, the Arts, 
the imagination and memory provide an escape to the irreality zone where 
everything is meaningful; where there is no room for existential dilemmas 
induced by the external situatedness of the perceiver, and requiring choice and 
2 (Mróz 1992). Quotation translated by author.
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decision, which suspend freedom. Nevertheless, the seemingly perfect world 
of irreality and storytelling also has its faults: it fails to give an opportunity 
for first-hand experience. The major fault of the story is the lack of agency 
and real-time dimension3. Furthermore, the beginning is dependent on the 
ending, as Roquentin explains:
“In reality you have started at the end. It was there, invisible and present, it is the one which 
gives to words the pomp and value of a beginning (J.-P. Sartre 2007b, 38).
According to Roquentin, adventures happen in books, where even mundane 
activities seem to be happening in this special way; but in books they cannot 
be participated. Adventures are parts of biography, not life, but nevertheless, 
Roquentin still wants this “way of happening” – the meaningfulness built 
into events, not imposed on them post factum:
“I had imagined that at certain times my life could take on a rare and precious quality. […] 
I have suddenly learned, without any apparent reason, that I have been lying to myself for ten 
years. And naturally, everything they tell about in books can happen in real life, but not in the 
same way. It is to this way of happening that I clung so tightly (J.-P. Sartre 2007b, 36).
He also wants to preserve the interactivity and chronology of events that 
make them surprising, and to make motivated and justified choices.
The Insider’s Point of View
Now I will examine two games; Dear Esther by The Chinese Room (2012), 
and The Path by Tale of Tales (2009); in search of Roquentin’s adventure. 
I limit my argument to single player games, mainly because in the early work 
of Sartre, the meaning of the world and particular events do not stem from 
the interaction between human beings, but from the individual consciousness 
3  Marie-Laure Ryan claims that immersion in literature excludes interactivity and vice versa. 
However, I think that good examples of interactive literature could be provided by postmodernist 
novels that play with the position of the reader; and examples of immersive texts could be found 
amongst XIX century novels (Cf. Ryan 1999). I also identify a problem with interactivity 
in Chapter 2.3.
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intentionally - and potentially creatively - directed towards the world 
(Cf. J.-P. Sartre 2007b, 75; 1978, 79–84). Both examined games take place 
in explorable, three-dimensional environments characterised by limited 
interactivity and lack of hard challenges, while the protagonist wanders 
in search of her adventure.
The interpreted titles do not include the condition of losing that would 
expel the player from the game. The real-time dimension; so important for 
the adventure; is not disturbed by the necessity of replaying any difficult 
moments. On the contrary, it is supported by discovering the narrated 
events hidden in the world, one by one, where the impression of living 
in the unfolding tale is very strong. Therefore, the player’s choices do not 
make them responsible for the continuation of the game.
Nevertheless, there is an opening and closing of the process, and consequently, 
a beginning and ending of conditions that distinguish Dear Esther and 
The Path from toys or simulations. The ending determined by the narrative 
outlines the course of the gameplay, but reaching it is not dependent on the 
player’s choices. Therefore, I argue that this kind of gameplay is structured 
as an aesthetically designed Sartrean “way of happening”, which can 
be experienced as real-time adventure.
As long as I consider the adventure to be aesthetically valuable way 
of happening, when the events create a meaningful process arranged around 
the central character, I need to concentrate on the gameplay situation and 
its characteristics from the point of view of the aesthetic situation. I will 
outline how the three elements — the gameworld, the self-avatar, and 
their relationship — enable an adventure to begin and make it possible 
to be experienced from the perspective internal to the gameworld. 
Hereby I start a philosophical experiment to examine the ways the player 
could “risk death, lose a fortune” or “a friend”, and fulfil his longing for 
reproducible adventure. I hand a gamepad to a desperate existentialist and 
ask her to play. The gameplay situation the self-avatar finds herself in when 
she becomes involved with the gameworld and acts within it will then 
be interpreted from the reflective point of view of in-game aesthetic situation. 
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Dear Esther: The Infection
The protagonist of Dear Esther, the Nameless, wanders through one 
of the deserted islands in the Hebrides archipelago. The self-avatar starts 
her adventure by surfacing from the sea. From time to time, she encounters 
a random part of the monologue, and the island is imbued with meaning. 
Not much is happening here, but she begins to live her life in a meaningful 
environment. It encourages the self-avatar to follow a well-composed string 
of events. Therefore, the opening of the game is the beginning of an adventure 
that becomes an exploration of the lonely island.
The self-avatar is able to act and change the state of the in-game environment. 
Therefore, it cannot be characterised as an unreachable Sartrean irreality 
(J.-P. Sartre 2004, 183–85), but rather as a different kind of world. 
Additionally, the situation of being an “exile in the midst of indifference” 
(J.-P. Sartre 1978, 508; Cf. Leino 2010, 130–32), as Sartre characterises 
the human being’s situatedness within the world, is changed in the game; 
as the existential project of the self-avatar within the gameworld is perceived 
as meaningful from within the gameplay situation.
The self-avatar expects some kind of destination of the journey; a quest that 
will make it purposeful. However, this craving for synthesis encapsulated 
in an unknown ending does not determine her understanding of the 
ongoing adventure, the overall meaning of the exploration. In Dear Esther, 
events are experienced in the chronological order of life, and accompanied 
by monologues which contain fragments of streams of memories - lacking 
internal temporal order -and detached comments on the explored island. 
The ending is also unable to determine the choices of the self-avatar because 
the only choices she can make define the direction of the exploration; there are 
no winning conditions, just exploration “enabling players to move through 
narratively compelling spaces” (Jenkins 2004, 121). The only way to quit 
the existential project of the self-avatar outlined by the gameplay situation 
is to terminate or finish the game.
But what makes the lonely island in Dear Esther the “narratively compelling” 
space experienced as supporting “this way of happening”? In Sartre’s 
philosophy, the world contains no stories, it is absurd. It means that 
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it interrupts people in acting freely by creating resistance in a meaningless 
and indifferent way. In the gameplay situation, the resistance is experienced 
differently; i.e. as meaningfully shaping the experience of the player. 
In consequence, the characteristics of the gameworld differ from the everyday 
world, and the being-in-the-gameworld is different from being-in-the-world. 
I find that these differences bridge a gap, and enable the interrelation of the 
poles of the dichotomy of “live” and “tell”.
The island in Dear Esther is the map, rather than a territory, a signifier rather 
than the signified (Cf. Saussure 2011; Aarseth 1997), because memories 
of the protagonist are inscribed into the island, in the exploration of its space, 
which is the adventure area. In one of the opening monologues, the Nameless 
says: “I sometimes feel as if I’ve given birth to this island” (The Chinese 
Room 2012). The island is the signifier that gradually becomes one with the 
self-avatar’s body; and in the following monologues the body is confused with 
the island, the internal story with the explored territory. In consequence,
“[T]o explore here is to become passive, to internalise the journey and not to attempt to break 
the confines” (The Chinese Room 2012).
The internalisation becomes clearly visible from the external perspective, 
as the game is a composition of four chapters; and every consecutive one 
shows a more clearly depicted internalisation of the self-avatar’s pilgrimage. 
The scenery gradually becomes less realistic, suggesting the multidimensional 
character of the exploration. Events are influenced by the perspective 
of the end.
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(The Chinese Room 2012. Screenshot source: dear-esther.com)
(The Chinese Room 2012. Screenshot source: dear-esther.com)
In this case, three realities are interwoven by the insistent topic of infection 
killing the self-avatar. The voice acknowledges that “the infection is not 
simply of the flesh” (The Chinese Room 2012), it spreads through all 
the levels, connecting the exploration with the biography of the protagonist, 
and opening the adventure area. 
The first level is the narrated memory of the car accident; with motifs 
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of the city, road lamps, a drunk driver, and the corpse of Esther. It is the 
“mental infection” caused by the car accident: “I have become an infected 
leg, whose tracking lines form a perfect map of the junctions of the M5” 
(The Chinese Room 2012).
The second level that can be tracked here is the monologue about embodiment 
and illness, which connects memories with the present moment: kidney 
stones, and the infection of the leg reaching his heart. 
The third infected level is an exploration of the lonely landscape of the island: 
“I am travelling through my own body, following the line of infection from 
the shattered femur towards the heart” (The Chinese Room 2012). All the 
contaminated layers of the game are interwoven, and their internal complexity 
is discovered through the spatial exploration and constant movement between 
the subjective positions.
The biography of the protagonist is inscribed into the island, and the 
self-avatar experiences it as her own monologues suggesting that she is talking 
to herself, not knowing what she is going to say next, as memories come from 
outside the self-avatar’s own experiences. There is no clear and visible analogy 
between the exploration and the meaning of the encountered story, no causal 
relationship showing the aim of the self-avatar’s actions, or the way they lead 
to the conclusion. The end is not visible yet, they can experience the lifelike 
events in the space of the biographical story (Leino 2010, 287; Calleja 2007, 
124); it is a surprising adventure, as its meaning is not created, but discovered 
in the gameworld. 
The Suspension of Freedom
I believe that the gameworld can be considered an improved reality on Sartre’s 
absurd world; providing the self-avatar with a feeling of meaning. Making 
in-game life meaningful is profoundly connected with spatial exploration, 
which enables the self-avatar to collect scraps of the story and contextualize 
them. Nevertheless, elements of the narrative are not necessarily established 
within the place or time that is actually explored. In consequence, 
the meaning of the adventure is not created by the actions of the explorer, 
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but is inscribed into the world. Sartre describes this type of meaning not 
created by the individual’s consciousness, but present in the world as “human 
transcendence”:
“As soon as I avail myself of the opening marked ‘Exit’ and go out through it, I am not using 
it in the absolute freedom of my personal projects. I am not constituting a tool by means 
of invention; I do not surpass the pure materiality of the thing toward my possibles. But 
between the object and me there has already slipped in a human transcendence which guides 
my transcendence. The object is already humanised; it signifies ‘human control’” (J.-P. Sartre 
1978, 427).
The gameworld contains only human transcendence; it is always under 
human control or humanised, because it does not have an underlying layer 
of meaningless objects. Therefore, for the same reasons, considering 
the Sartrean paradoxes of freedom, the game environment can be interpreted 
as limited reality. If the constitutive feature of the everyday world is absurd; 
and there is always more happening than human beings need and are able 
to understand; the never-ending challenge for the individual is making 
sense of something. However, when the gameworld is encountered 
as already meaningful, not just generally humanised, but also composed around 
the particular self-avatar, it becomes a sphere of narrated biography with 
a subjective place for the self-avatar: the living protagonist.
The ontic dimension of freedom in the everyday world is founded on the 
constant conflict between consciousness and the world that lacks any internal 
order or meaning (J.-P. Sartre 1978, 508). Moreover, freedom is realised 
by making sense of the world by undertaking the individual’s own 
existential project. However, the gameworld already contains the project for 
the self-avatar’s existence, and it does not lack the internal order; 
in consequence, the freedom of the player is experienced as suspended, 
as long as she acts as the self-avatar within the gameworld.
Consequently, I argue that the self-avatar’s freedom must be suspended 
in order to experience the adventure within the gameworld; in the gameplay 
situation, in order to find this “way of happening” sharing some features with 
“live”, which is experienced as a stream of accidental, personal impressions 
gained by exploration; and some with “tell”, the closed way of happening 
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of narrated events. His in-game life then becomes an alterbiography, defined 
as “the story generated by the individual player as she takes action in the 
game”, as opposed to “scripted narrative, referring to the pre-scripted story 
events written into the game (Calleja 2011, 115).
What, or who, is the self-avatar during the gameplay in the non-absurd world?
The Path: This is my Adventure, this is not my Story
Both examined games encourage exploration accompanied by a mood 
of anticipation. The reward would be the moment when events “arrange 
themselves around you like a bouquet of flowers, without your taking 
the slightest trouble to do anything” (J.-P. Sartre 2007b, 148). When 
interpreting Dear Esther, I have focused on the meaning of the gameworld; 
while close playing The Path I am going to concentrate on the perspective 
of the self-avatar.
The Path begins by asking the player to pick one of six characters to start 
the journey. The game is based on the classical fairy tale, Little Red Riding 
Hood. The little girl’s goal is then - easy to guess - to reach her grandmother’s 
house. The one sentence sets the only rule and goal of the game: “Go 
to grandmother’s house and STAY ON THE PATH” (Tale of Tales 2009).
The promise of the adventure emerges, revealing the end goal that gives meaning 
to the whole experience. Following the rule however leads to disappointment, 
as Little Red Riding Hood arrives safely at the grandmother’s place just 
to find herself back in the room that she originally left. The gameplay situation 
turns out to be very different to how it seemed at the start. Little Red Riding 
Hood is expected to disobey the rule to meet her adventure, and encounter 
her wolf in the woods.
The full extent of the adventure offered by The Path is not limited to the 
gameplay situation experienced from the point of view of one character, 
nor single completion of the game. Therefore, the experience embraces not 
only the subjective position of Little Red Riding Hood inside the gameworld, 
but also the moment when the player chooses one of the girls in the room 
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as her self-avatar to explore the woods; because in order to experience 
the whole adventure, the player needs to walk all six Little Red Riding Hoods 
through the forest. 
The journey through the forest is re-playable with different self-avatars, and 
for each of them the exploration reveals different meanings. All of them share 
the mood of horror: winning the game, and unlocking the secret rooms 
are connected with painful memories of the self-avatar. If she is successful 
in her endeavours, the prize is encountering the wolf — the creature 
or person embodying her fears. What happens to the self-avatar is not explicit, 
but after the cutscene showing Little Red Riding Hood with the wolf, 
the screen darkens. The self-avatar is transported back to the path, and wakes 
up lying in front of the grandmother’s house. Moreover, the better result 
is obtained in collecting the self-avatar’s personal fears in the woods; 
the worse nightmare will be encountered in the grandmother’s house. Inside 
the house, the perspective changes — the self-avatar is transmogrified into a form 
of disembodied gaze wandering among surreal, dark images; different for 
each of the Little Red Riding Hoods.
The agency of the self-avatar in The Path is not strictly connected with 
control over the figure. When the interactive object appears in sight and 
the self-avatar approaches close to it, the only way to interact with the object 
is by doing nothing, as the rule is as tricky as the command to stay on the 
path. When the player lets Little Red Riding Hood act as she should according 
to the They, she will place in her basket an item-mark of the adventure, which 
will appear in the grandmother’s house in the final scenes of the game.
The control over the self-avatar’s agency also temporarily takes the Girl 
in White, the ghost-like character encountered sometimes in the forest. 
She approaches Little Red Riding Hood and starts playing a hand-clapping 
game. When the self-avatar continues the game and does not interrupt the 
hand-clapping, the Girl in White assumes control; she takes the self-avatar by 
the hand, and guides her back to the path, which leads to the grandmother’s 
house.
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(Tale of Tales 2009. Screenshot taken by the author)
 (Tale of Tales 2009. Screenshot taken by the author)
The game plays with the self-avatar: following the rules makes it impossible 
to start the game, active interaction with the environment has no effect, and 
in crucial moments the control over the self-avatar is taken by the in-game 
the They (Cf. Chapter 3.3). In consequence, the game makes an impression 
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of a double mediation. The self-avatar becomes interpassive, as she feels that 
“the object itself […] ‘enjoys the show’ instead of me, relieving me of the 
superego duty to enjoy myself ” (Žižek 2002). In consequence, the self-avatar 
is relieved from the necessity of taking voluntary action, as the default action 
is performed as it should be performed when she withdraws.
The self-avatar then has limited agency; the game allows her to act to some 
extent, but a great part of activity is displaced onto the They, the perceptual 
structure incorporated into her subjectivity (Cf. Chapter 3.3). The player 
departs from her external situatedness and realisation of her own existential 
project, in order to take part in the in-game adventure. Choices made in the 
gameworld are valid only in this particular gameworld, and do not make her 
responsible in a wider, existential context.
***
Roquentin, just like anyone, can find his adventure within the gameworlds 
of single-player games. He can wander purposefully through the deserted 
island, or through the dark forest while experiencing his adventure. Roquentin 
can also experience the life-like events in the space of the biographical story 
of somebody else; he discovers the meaning of this surprising adventure 
by acting within the framework of the gameplay situation.
The in-game adventure shares some features with “living”, which is experienced 
as a stream of accidental impressions, and some with “telling”, the closed way 
of happening of narrated events. The examined games promise meaningful 
endings that determine their course, but reaching it is not dependent on the 
self-avatar’s choices. Therefore, they can be considered to be an aesthetically 
shaped way of happening that suspends freedom of the self-avatar. I think that 
experience of this way of happening constitutes a Sartrean adventure.
Roquentin experiences the gameworld as an improved reality, providing him 
with a meaningful environment; or limited reality, when it suspends his freedom 
of creating meaning of the world. The connection of the object, the avatar, 
with the Roquentin’s freedom creates the self-avatar. Therefore, the perceptual 
perspective of the adventurer is limited, but the position he takes relieves him 
from uncertainty.
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I think that “this way of happening”, the adventure, is possible when 
the relationship between subjectivity and reality changes in the gameplay 
situation. The experience of the gameplay situation would constitute 
a real-time adventure lived in a designed world that is not absurd. 
The adventure is experienced by the self-avatar, whose situatedness and 
existential project is encountered as already established within the gameworld. 
In consequence, the player’s freedom in its existential dimension is suspended; 
when she acts as the self-avatar, her responsibility is limited to the gameworld, 
as she is choosing from the designed set of possibilities. The self-avatar can 
proclaim; just like Brunet, one of the characters of The Age of Reason, who 
believes that one performed role can fulfil his life: “Nothing can now deprive 
my life of its meaning, nothing can prevent its being a destiny” (J.-P. Sartre 
1992, 1:155).
Part 3. Uncomfortable Situations
3.1. An Awkward Perspective1
“If you name the behaviour of an individual, you reveal it to him; he sees himself ”
(Sartre 1988, 36).
“As long as you move forward, you’ll be walking someone else’s path.
 Stop now, and it will be your only true choice”
(Galactic Cafe and Wreden 2013).
Games can evoke an uncomfortable feeling by suggesting that it is not 
the self-avatar who is the agent in the gameplay situation. I will interpret 
such a game, Davey Wreden’s The Stanley Parable (Galactic Cafe and Wreden 
2013), and focus on the way it instructs and evaluates the self-avatar’s actions. 
The Stanley Parable does not use the assessment to award the player with 
points, hail her performance, or prompt the next step she needs to perform 
in order to win the game. On the other hand, the evaluation presented 
in the form of the Narrator’s comments in The Stanley Parable, makes 
the subjective position of the self-avatar within a game problematic. 
In consequence, the game makes her self-consciously focus on the limits 
of her agency within the gameworld, usually by questioning her choices and 
manipulating her into strange positions.
In The Stanley Parable, the self-avatar wanders through a panopticon of office 
corridors. She tries out multiple variants of Stanley’s story, while choices 
she makes are described as “obedience” or “disobedience” to the Narrator 
of the game.
I would like to take a closer look at the discomfort caused by an impression 
of being continuously observed and corrected by the game. Is the game 
here still enclosed within the frame of the gameplay situation? Or does 
it auto-reflectively displace itself to become a game of reinterpretation of the 
self-avatar’s position within the gameworld, towards the character of Stanley, 
and the omnipresent narrator?
1 Some parts of this chapter were previously published in Polish as Kania 2017b.
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In order to answer these questions, I will focus on the process of breaking 
the fourth wall in The Stanley Parable. While not only addressing 
the self-avatar but the player herself, it breaks the safety barrier of the magic 
circle of the gameworld (Huizinga 1980, 10, 77; Salen and Zimmerman 
2003, 95). 
How does the gameworld experienced from the point of view of the gameplay 
situation bring about questions concerning the game itself, or the ground 
the game takes place in? Is it limited to the self-avatar’s interactions with 
the gameworld, or does it extend beyond it? Then, spanning outside the 
gameworld, it depends on constant reinterpretations of the player’s position; 
towards the avatar, the character, the narrator, or even the gameworld 
as a whole. Therefore, it is interpreted not only as the game taking place 
in the gameworld, but also as the game taking place between the self-avatar 
situated within the gameworld, the Narrator, and the player interpreting 
it from the external perspective as a critical text; despite being reached 
from inside the gameworld. I will therefore focus on the multiplication 
of the subjective positions of the player in The Stanley Parable.
Being inauthentic
As outlined in the previous chapters, within the gameplay situation 
the self-avatar pre-reflectively perceives herself as being-in-the-gameworld. 
She experiences an adventure that makes her actions meaningful, 
independently whether the self-avatar is a virtual body seen from the 
third-person perspective, or the first-person “point of agency” (Vella 2016).
When the player accepts the subjective perspective proposed by the game, 
the spectrum of their choices is usually outlined by an already designed 
set of possibilities. From the phenomenological point of view, their 
being-in-the-gameworld can then be characterised by the Heideggerian 
notion of inauthenticity:
“‘Inauthenticity’ does not mean anything like Being-no-longer-in-the-world, but amounts 
rather to a quite distinctive kind of Being-in-the-world; the kind which is completely fascinated 
by the ‘world’ and by the Dasein with of Others in the ‘they’. Not-Being-its-self [Das Nicht-
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es-selbst-sein] functions as a positive possibility of that entity which, in its essential concern, 
is absorbed in a world. This kind of not-Being has to be conceived as that kind of Being which 
is closest to Dasein and in which Dasein maintains itself for the most part. So neither must 
we take the fallenness of Dasein as a ‘fall’ from a purer and higher ‘primal status’” (Heidegger 
2001, 220 [176]).
Inauthenticity is then a mode of being, when a person — or a self-avatar 
— entirely engages in fulfilling supposed expectations of the world. 
It is neither secondary nor incorrect, and when applied to the situatedness 
within the gameworld, is based on engagement in the gameplay. Therefore, 
the self-avatar’s experiential position while in the gameplay situation 
is characterised by bad faith, as argued in the second part of this book. 
The bad faith is possible as far as it is simultaneously an experience 
of falsification and double play. The player “knows just a little” that her 
endeavours are only a game, but plays it seriously. 
The dissonance within the self-avatar can be revealed by errors of the artefact 
that alter the gameplay situation or close it; when the player consciously sets 
their own goals; or they do not follow the goals set within the gameworld 
in order to undertake analysis of the gameworld or text of the game 
(Cf. Aarseth 2007). It can also be revealed by the self-referential character 
of the game that appeals to their freedom by pointing out at interplay between 
the internal and the external perspectives (Cf. Sartre 1988). 
These appeals are similarly formulated by Sartre and the Narrator of The 
Stanley Parable, when they dictate: “Whatever you do, choose it!” (Galactic 
Cafe and Wreden 2013; Cf. Sartre 1988, 54). In other words, you and only 
you are responsible for your actions, even if the decision was suggested 
or even forced by somebody else, or they seem to be justified by the situation 
itself.
Anyhow, you do not have a choice…
Stanley, a modern anti-hero, is introduced to the player in the first minutes 
of The Stanley Parable, a game created by The Galactic Cafe. The word 
“introduced” borders on exaggeration, as Stanley seems to lack any specific 
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qualities. The Narrator focuses on the characteristics of Stanley’s workplace 
and description of his job. He was employed to push buttons he was ordered 
to push; nothing less, nothing more. The Narrator suggests that others could 
find his job “soul rending” (Galactic Cafe and Wreden 2013), but Stanley 
finds himself happy, and is convinced that he was destined to have this job.
The problem arises when, one day, the orders cease to show on a screen of his 
computer. This is the moment when the player takes control over confused 
Stanley. From now, as the self-avatar, she can explore the corridors and open 
the doors from the first-person perspective.
Nevertheless, the narrator’s voice does not quieten when the introduction 
ends, and the self-avatar quickly realises that — as the self-avatar — 
“he knows that he is seen at the moment he sees himself ” (Sartre 1988, 37). 
While alternately addressing the player external to the gameworld, and 
Stanley the self-avatar, the Narrator comments on the current positions 
of both. He also talks about himself as the Narrator — the omniscient, having 
control over the gameworld where the self-avatar is just a novice.
Stanley, as seen by the Narrator, is afraid of making any decisions; he is afraid 
of responsibility:
“What if he had to make a decision? What if a crucial outcome fell under his responsibility? 
He had never been trained for that!” (Galactic Cafe and Wreden 2013). 
The narrator guides the self-avatar by advising her what she shall do 
by commenting on the future events, on Stanley’s movements before they are 
actually performed, and even on Stanley’s thoughts. The self-avatar feels and 
seems to be obliged just to bring them into existence by pushing buttons she 
is ordered to push, and press them long enough. Stanley “got up from his 
desk and stepped out of his office”, and “Stanley decided to go to the meeting 
room” (Galactic Cafe and Wreden 2013). 
The gameplay situation disturbingly resembles Stanley’s job, as described 
by the Narrator in the primordial speech of the game (Arsenault and Perron 
2008, 119). As the player observes her own interactions with the game from 
the point of view external to the gameworld, she is doing nothing different 
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than pushing — good or wrong — buttons. The outlined situation also 
bears a striking resemblance to the inauthentic modus of being, as described 
by Heidegger. Furthermore, the Narrator makes it explicit while loudly 
stating the requirements it sets for the self-avatar.
The experience of being controlled by the watchful Narrator is legitimised 
by his obnoxious, never-ending comments, and the self-avatar’s observations 
unveiling the fact that Stanley’s life took place in panopticon. Their most 
obvious verification is a hall featuring a Mind Controlling Device composed 
of screens displaying the offices of all the employees, which directly references 
the construction of the panopticon designed by Jeremy Bentham in the 
eighteenth century (Cf. Foucault 1995, 195–230).
(Galactic Cafe and Wreden 2013. Screenshot source: thestanleyparable.wikia.com)
The feeling of alienation caused by the constant presence of the self-reflective 
level of the game are visible from the first decisions taken within The Stanley 
Parable; such as when the self-avatar stands in front of two doors, and 
the Narrator hints that Stanley has already chosen the one on the left. 
If the self-avatar turns right, she immediately hears the irritating sentence: 
“This was not the correct way to the meeting room, and Stanley knew 
it perfectly well” (Galactic Cafe and Wreden 2013). As Stanley, the self-avatar 
is expected to know how to get to the meeting room, hence the Narrator 
takes her behaviour for insubordination against his plan. The game is playing 
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subversively by constantly hinting at the knowledge the self-avatar should 
possess, but actually does not; and constantly persuading her that she 
should interpret her choices in terms of fulfilling her duties. As her choices 
are continuously evaluated within the framework of expectations prepared for 
Stanley, she is therefore expected to act in bad faith; being just Stanley. 
The Multiplied Gameplay
The next source of the player’s discomfort is the multiplication of gameplay. 
The self-avatar begins her adventure many times, and she explores (and 
re-explores) office corridors while the Narrator stridently encourages her to 
try one more time.
What will happen when the self-avatar disobeys the Narrator this time? Her 
decisions, despite not resulting in the choice of one of the narrated paths, 
do not change the self-avatar’s situatedness within the world of The Stanley 
Parable. Choices are reduced to signalling the directions of exploration 
of corporate corridors, and following one of the scenarios already known 
to the Narrator - who continuously sneers at Stanley. He comments on the 
emancipatory struggles of the self-avatar: 
“He imagined that he came to two open doors and that he could go through either. At last! 
Choice! It barely even mattered what lay behind each door. The mere thought that his decisions 
would mean something was almost too wonderful to behold!” (Galactic Cafe and Wreden 
2013). 
Regardless of this decision taken by the self-avatar, the Narrator’s comments 
come in torrents. A story of the self-avatar’s endeavours is led in past tense, 
as if it had happened millions of times before, and covers any place she 
chooses to visit. 
How should she play, when the game actively destroys the gameplay situation, 
and makes the self-avatar’s position closely resemble a mouse trapped 
in a labyrinth observed by the taunting Minotaur of a Narrator?
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“What exactly did the Narrator think he was going to accomplish? When every path you 
can walk has been created for you long in advance, death becomes meaningless, making life 
the same. Do you see now? Do you see that Stanley was already dead from the moment he hit 
start?” (Galactic Cafe and Wreden 2013).
The Narrator addresses the player directly with the name of Stanley, and talks 
about himself in the third person. This ploy not only breaks the fourth wall, 
but also foresees frustration caused by the depreciation and understatement 
of choices made by the self-avatar within the gameplay situation. 
Another way to announce imprisonment within the gameworld of The 
Stanley Parable is by the use of subtitles displayed while the game is loading; 
rolling from one side of the screen to the other: “THE END IS NEVER 
THE END IS NEVER…” (Galactic Cafe and Wreden 2013). When one 
of the endings is reached by the self-avatar; and in each of them Stanley 
is somehow annihilated; the game reloads. 
The Narrator raises the ante: “Press ‘escape,’ and press ‘quit’. There’s no other 
way to beat this game” (Galactic Cafe and Wreden 2013). While saying 
this, the Narrator bluffs– but the self-avatar is not able to know it at the 
moment she is listening to the Narrator’s voice. The game can be “beaten” 
by experiencing all of its endings; hence the player can gain this knowledge 
only by finishing the game, and ipso facto perceiving the gameworld from 
the external perspective. 
The self-avatar, I-Stanley, can stand for a while, hesitating, not disturbed 
by the Narrator’s comments. However, this way she will not discover any 
different, unrestrained area. Everything is already governed by the all-seeing 
gaze (Cf. Foucault 1995, 195–230), everything is polluted by an impression 
of being vigilantly observed. In consequence, the gameplay situation 
is repeatedly disturbed by doubts — who plays with whom? Is the self-avatar 
just a puppet, whose strings are in the Narrator’s hands, swinging from one 
perspective to another?
***
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In The Stanley Parable, the self-avatar is treated instrumentally. The Narrator 
plays with the gameworld, with the self-avatar locked inside, somewhere 
between the office corridors and the narrative dimension of the game. 
It internalises the interplay between the internal and external points of view 
by addressing the player’s relation to the protagonist, calling both of them 
by the name of Stanley: “And yet, it would be just a few minutes before 
Stanley would restart the game, back in his office, as alive as ever” (Galactic 
Cafe and Wreden 2013). 
A considerable role is also played by autoreferentiality, and the self-reflective 
dealing with conventions and player’s expectations. Stefano Gualeni proposes 
the “understanding of self-reflexive video games as playable forms of critical 
thought” (Gualeni 2013). If the game can be interpreted as the critical 
statement, this particular one employs and skilfully ridicules mechanisms 
common in commercial games. The Stanley Parable concentrates on critically 
referring to the way games evaluate the player’s actions.
The gameplay situation opens and convolutes; not so as to offer the player 
more interpretative possibilities, but to problematise her subjective position, 
role, and salience within this gameworld. At the same time, it underlines 
the impossibility of transgression or subversive playing — the overcoming 
of the inauthentic mode of being internalised as the self-avatar within 
the gameworld. In The Stanley Parable “the alternative is impossible” (Cox 
2011), as all the paths and solutions are already commented upon, and 
therefore concretised, by the Narrator, and the player is left with the feeling 
of futility and meaninglessness. 
3.2. Sisyphean Consciousness
“All in all you’re just another brick in the wall”
(Pink Floyd, The Wall).
“They had thought with some reason that there is no more dreadful punishment
 than futile and hopeless labor”
(Camus 1991, 119).
“It was so ridiculous to have people stuck in one place all day,
 just using their senses, then a reflex, using their senses,
 then a reflex, and not really thinking at all”
(Vonnegut 1999, 14).
The situatedness of the self-avatar within a gameworld as such cannot 
be absurd. On the contrary, it is characterised by complementarity rather 
than incongruity1. However, the feeling of the absurd can be encountered 
as an aesthetic feature elicited by particular games that consistently deprive 
the self-avatar of gratification, and purposefully evoke the experience 
of futility. In the following pages, I will trace this in gameworlds which evoke 
disturbingly familiar places — offices, houses, customs departments — and 
frame them as dystopias as perceived by ordinary people. 
The absurdity of situations; which are frustrating, frightening and exitless; 
can be a theme of particular games, which reveals its potential in the interplay 
between the internal and the external perspectives. It can also emerge 
as a result of a specific subjective relation between a self-avatar and a gameworld 
discovered as the aesthetic feature, or as a result of the self-avatar’s decisions 
leading to “this divorce between man and this life” (Camus 1991, 6).
While having a closer look at the aesthetics of the absurd, I will undertake 
a close playing of Everyday the Same Dream (molleindustria 2009), is it time? 
(Fraina 2010), and Papers, Please (Pope 2013). My analysis will be interwoven 
with examples of dwellers of dystopian worlds taken from literature. 
1 As argued in Chapters 2.4 and 2.5.
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All of them are patronised by Sisyphus — the mythological incarnation 
of hopeless efforts, and the hero of Albert Camus’s essay (Camus 1991, 1–138). 
According to the existentialist, absurdity is an ineffaceable characteristic 
of the relation between the individual, and a world she is situated in. However, 
while encountered in a gameworld, I will argue that the absurd is evoked 
as a theme or atmosphere, but does not characterise the ontology 
of situatedness.
While analysing the gameplay situation in games where the self-avatar 
is expected to perform meaningless, routine, but necessary tasks, I would like 
to highlight the way they condition her position. 
From the point of view of an aesthetic situation, the absurd is uncovered 
by the self-avatar’s discovery that her subjective position within the gameworld 
renders her goal unreachable; or that the goal — transcending the level 
of micro-involvement (Calleja 2011) — does not exist. According to Albert 
Camus, “the feeling of absurdity can strike any man in the face” (Camus 
1991, 10); and this is the moment the strike occurs within a gameworld.
From the external perspective, the most promising aspects of games to reveal 
Sisyphean situatedness are the themes and mechanics of futile work, lostness, 
and inability. This includes the way they correspond with the gameplay 
and reflective situations as experienced from the perspective internal 
to the gameworld, while creating distance and dissonance between the player 
and the avatar.
The Fate of Sisyphus
The gameplay situations of the interpreted games share their theme with 
the myth of Sisyphus, as it is reinterpreted by Albert Camus. His “whole 
being is exerted toward accomplishing nothing” (Camus 1991, 120), while 
rolling a useless rock to the top of the mountain, without any hope for the 
end of his meaningless struggle. As the existentialist points out, “this divorce 
between […] the actor and his setting, is properly the feeling of absurdity” 
(Camus 1991, 6). 
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“Crushing truths perish from being acknowledged” (Camus 1991, 122), 
Camus writes. The consciousness that every attempt to run from his fate will 
fail, makes the hero tragic and — paradoxically — happy. Happy: because 
he is conscious of his humanity and shares with others the paradox of his 
existence. As Jerzy Kossak puts it: 
“Taking a position of absurd gives a human being real freedom, unconfined illusion of hope, 
passion of life not limited by concerns about future”2. 
Sisyphus is condemned and powerless; he will always remain an absurd hero. 
He was punished for his love of life and disobedience to the gods. Now, scorn 
is his only weapon. His revolt against human situatedness in the world and 
escape from death make him feel that he did everything he possibly could. 
He gained deep knowledge of his condition, its limitations, and its horizons. 
Therefore, he knows that the absurd is ineffaceable. 
“Conquest or play-acting, multiple loves, absurd revolt are tributes that man pays to his dignity 
in a campaign in which he is defeated in advance” (Camus 1991, 93).
Sisyphean happiness is based on the clearness of his vision. From the moment 
he gains understanding that life is the final and only goal of human existence, 
the efforts invested in everyday iterations turn out to be his source of joy.
Despite the situation’s apparent exitlessness, an absurd victory is possible. 
According to Camus, from the moment one’s situatedness is realised, 
it becomes the individual’s own fate. Sisyphus chooses his destiny when 
he descends the mountain he will climb again to roll his burden. Can this 
moment be experienced within the gameworld?
Repetitiveness, Repetitiveness, Repetitiveness…
The protagonist of the minimalist, two-dimensional side-scroller game 
entitled Everyday the Same Dream is a regular Joe; completely reduced to his 
2 (Kossak 1974, 21). Quotation translated by author.
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role as a worker. Interactions with the gameworld are limited to moving left 
or right, the activation of simple dialogues, and changing the state of chosen 
items by use of the spacebar. 
The Nameless wakes up in the morning as the alarm clock rings. He dresses 
up. He greets his wife standing in the kitchen and rushes to his office, where 
— being customarily late — he listens to his bosses’ reprimands. Weaving 
between identical desks, he takes his place in his cubicle - and suddenly, 
he wakes up in his own bed. 
As long as the self-avatar adapts to the routine of the gameplay situation 
limited to the workday, anything is subject to change. The game can 
be replayed ad infinitum in unaltered form.
From the perspective of the reflective situation, the position of the self-avatar 
seems to be comfortable enough to be desirable. However, at the same time, 
it is uncomfortable enough to fill her with awe. The in-game life of the 
Nameless is an incorporation of the existential absurd; endlessly repeating 
indistinguishable days that give neither any satisfaction, nor enable fulfilment.
The life of the corporate worker is here experienced through the repetitiveness 
of the sequences of banal events; in the representation of the everyday world 
in shades of grey; by the interactivity of common, useful items — an alarm 
clock, a wardrobe, a car — as well as the gradually discovered, but equally 
limited, interactivity of unusual items that questions an ordinary schedule of 
the day. Their presence make the in-game world even more empty, futile, and 
pointless; since they suggest that there is — or was — another rhythm of life, 
they promise some meaning. The setting of the gameplay situations is work, 
a necessity that organises the in-game life. However, it becomes more and 
more inconsequential, when the self-avatar starts following the unusual items.
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(molleindustria 2009. Screenshot taken by the author)
(molleindustria 2009. Screenshot taken by the author)
The external perspective opens the field for intertextual reference; the life 
of Guy Montag, the protagonist of Fahrenheit 451 (Bradbury 2012), consisted 
of similarly repeatable days. The breakthrough was caused by the moment 
he met Clarisse McClellan - the girl who showed him that the world can 
be perceived from a different perspective. He realised that, 
“he wore his happiness like a mask and the girl had run off across the lawn with the mask and 
there was no way of going to knock on her door and ask for it back” (Bradbury 2012, 9). 
The major change in his approach; one which affected many others; was the 
change of consciousness: the self-reflective turn that changed his situatedness.
At first, in Everyday the Same Dream, the only indication of such a change 
is an enigmatic sentence articulated by an elderly woman who the self-avatar 
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meets in a lift. She prophesies: “five more steps and you will be a new person” 
(molleindustria 2009). This promise - hidden in the gameworld - gives some 
hope to break free from the dystopia. But can I manage with the consciousness 
of absurdity of my in-game situation as a new person? Will the well-known 
order implode if I refuse to follow my everyday route?
The only way to check this is to take note of the background rather than 
foreground of the self-avatar’s recognised situatedness. I acquire consciousness 
of the authored environment I am surrounded by; the woman in a lift, 
the homeless man, a cow on a pasture, the last leaf hanging on a tree growing 
in a car park in front of the office. This way the possibility of changing the 
routine appears on the horizon. Despite nothing changing in the gameworld, 
the specific existential project of the self-avatar emerges from the background. 
Interaction with each of the unusual elements mentioned above shows some 
aspects of life absent from the initial, typical scenario of the Nameless’ workday. 
However, they do not broaden the field of actions in the gameplay situation. 
Nevertheless, these “absurd discoveries” (Camus 1991, 16), gradually alter 
the meaning of the gameplay situation. Despite not changing the extent 
of the self-avatar’s interactions with the gameworld, she can observe how 
the world changes while the Nameless takes consecutive steps to becoming 
a “new person”. 
These discoveries make the gameworld gradually deserted. The Homeless, 
who offered: “I can take you to a quiet place” (molleindustria 2009), shows 
the self-avatar a graveyard. The Nameless will never meet him again. After 
taking the last of the five steps — losing his job — despite following the 
well-known path, the world seems to be irretrievably changed. The wife, 
the boss, all the colleagues, and even the traffic jam disappear. At this 
moment, the game proposes — literally — an emergency exit. The self-avatar 
climbs up to the roof of the skyscraper to see a non-player character, identical 
to the player character, jumping from the edge. After you lose your job, there 
is nothing more to lose. 
Due to simplicity of the aesthetic form of Everyday the Same Dream, and 
the repetitiveness of in-game days — as long as the self-avatar does not 
bother to search for something unusual, or does not manage to find it — each 
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day of my in-game life will be lost in oblivion, just the same as any other. 
The self-avatar will take her place in the cubicle, and will wake in the morning. 
However, if she chooses to search for change, she will be equally disappointed 
when discovering, that the fate she wanted to transform was the only one 
available.
Waiting in the Dark House3
The kind of joy Sisyphus can feel when realising that life is human being’s 
only and final goal, is as unreachable for the protagonist of is it time? (Fraina 
2010) as it was for the Nameless. The self-avatar — condemned to her flat, 
body, and senility — is depicted in the context of living in the past. Moreover, 
the constant pressure of satisfying her own simple needs makes her unable 
to enjoy any moment of the in-game life. In consequence, the self-avatar’s 
situatedness closely resembles the protagonist of an essay The Wrong Side 
and the Right Side written by Camus (1968, 58–62). The essay is a sombre 
portrait of a religious fanatic, who turned her life into waiting for death, 
as she spends her days cultivating the shrine she bought for herself; while 
in the game designed by Fraina, the main challenge is dealing with everyday 
chores as old age sets in. 
The gameplay situation is set in an ordinary day of an elderly woman 
living alone and suffering from depression after her husband’s death. 
In the gameworld of is it time? (Fraina 2010), each day makes the old avatar 
less self-reliant. Ryszard Przybylski, Polish researcher and essayist, writes 
about a bond between an elderly person and her flat as follows:
“The old age makes the flat; which used to be just a customary, domesticated place; in one 
moment transform into a grave. The man is buried while still alive. And it is not a prison. 
It is a grave. […] Everything is sinking in abandonment, in oblivion; in immemorial signs 
of old age. And nothing is going to be finished here. Only the host can be finished here”4.
3 Some parts of this chapter were previously published in Polish as Kania 2016a.
4 (Przybylski 2008, 24–25). Quotation translated by author.
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The aesthetics of the absurd in this game is visible in two planes from 
the point of view of the aesthetic situation. On the one hand, it is dominant 
in the dissonance between the gameworld and possibilities of the self-avatar, 
with every consecutive day deepening the impression of impotence and useless 
struggle; while on the other, it is evoked by the auto-reflective mechanisms 
of framing screens that makes each day a closed chapter, and changes 
the player’s situatedness towards the gameworld by reflecting over its state. 
Initially, a condition of the self-avatar is indicated just by her appearance, 
slow movement, and limited number of activities. However, the world of the 
old woman after her husband’s death is getting darker every day; the light 
is dimming. The gameworld becomes increasingly strange and impenetrable. 
Her faltering sight, hearing, and comprehension make every single day harder 
and harder to outlast. The goal of the game sounds trivial: “Live as long 
as you want to live” (Fraina 2010). In is it time?, “to live” means to perform 
your routine tasks slowly until you ultimately get frustrated, or until you are 
unable to get the object fulfilling your current need on time.
In the course of a day, the self-avatar’s state and needs are indicated by status 
bars well-known from adventure games and virtual pets. Here, the interface 
contains information about hunger, which can be appeased by a sequence 
of dull activities performed in the same repeatable order; take the food 
out of the fridge, reheat, and eat. The second factor is fatigue that can 
be lessened by going to bed and ending the day. The third; and crucial 
to the atmosphere of the game; is the state of boredom. In order to prevent 
it from getting higher, the self-avatar can turn on the television, or go outside 
to talk to a neighbour of the same age, sitting on the bench in front of the 
house. If the player lets the bar get close to the zero value, the self-avatar’s 
movements get even slower. The commentary informs that “depression affects 
your ability to move” (Fraina 2010). Beside the standard ways of interacting 
with the gameworld — movement and manipulation of objects — there 
is the possibility to emotionally react to events, as the self-avatar is able to cry 
by — as she is instructed — pressing “Down to cry” (Fraina 2010).
The game is a collection of days separated by nights. When the self-avatar 
goes to sleep; exhausted by her Sisyphean efforts that lead to nothing but 
its own sustaining; the player is offered a different subjective stance. Instead 
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of struggling with an increasingly difficult environment, she is assigned 
the role of judge, subconsciousness, nature or god. The absurd is made 
explicit. While ending each day, she needs to answer the titular question: 
is it time? Being faced with taking the decision whether the elderly woman 
will live or die, the player needs to answer the existential question; which 
is — according to Camus — the only fundamental philosophical issue. Just 
like every person who recognises the absurd as a fundamental characteristic 
of the human being’s situation in the world, she needs to decide “whether 
life is or is not worth living” (Camus 1991, 3). The author of the game, 
Jamie Fraina, formulates the question in a different, more general perspective: 
“When is life not worth living?” (2010). 
(Fraina 2010. Screenshot taken by the author)
(Fraina 2010. Screenshot taken by the author)
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The absurd is additionally exposed by the fact that the in-game life of the 
self-avatar turns out to be dependent on the decision taken from the external 
point of view; and this is not the self-avatar — the old lady — who answers 
the titular question. In consequence, the duality of the relationship between 
the player and the avatar makes the question cover both suicide and euthanasia. 
The points of view get polarised: I, the old self-avatar during the day, and 
the character perceived from the point of view of the framing screen, which 
can be left or told to die during the night. The death of the avatar is hers, not 
mine. The Sisyphean task is over. 
However, in is it time? death of the self-avatar can occur not only as a result 
of the player’s decision. It can also be a result of negligence. In this case, 
it becomes a failure. The self-avatar’s life is limited to preparation of food — 
quickly enough to not faint from hunger. Lying down on the bed — quickly 
enough to not faint from enfeeblement. The third faint ends the game; 
it is fatal and makes the in-game life “an enterprise which is lacking” (Sartre 
1978, 536), as Sartre describes an abruptly-ended existence.
The Fatal Service
In Papers, please (Pope 2013), the self-avatar is a newly-hired employee at the 
Customs Hall in Grestin, the fictional state of Arstotzka. From the primordial 
speech of the game (Cf. Arsenault and Perron 2008) in the story mode, I can 
learn that self-avatar’s name was pulled in The October Labor Lottery, and 
this way he started to work as an immigration inspector. His thrownness 
(Cf. Heidegger 2001, 220 [175]) constitutes his primary characteristic. 
From now on, his duties, obligations, and even his value as an individual are 
determined by this random event. 
The self-avatar is assigned a flat and a tedious job as an officer, characterised 
by the piling up of tasks, continuously raising expectations, and additional 
rules every single day. His duty is to check the documents of the visitors and 
immigrants entering Arstotzka, as well as taking decisions on who can enter 
the country, and who will be turned away or arrested. The general atmosphere 
of the totalitarian country resembling the regimes of the twentieth century 
is depicted by retro graphics in shades of grey and brown; fonts mirroring old 
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typing machines; and a soundtrack playing the rhythms of a military march. 
The description of the self-avatar’s situatedness is minimal, but emotionally 
repelling.
The visual layer of Papers, please (Pope 2013) comprises of two boards. 
The first presents the passport control desk and the controlled person, with 
a background view on the long queue formed along the wall that halved 
the town of Grestin. The second board depicts everyday changes in the state 
of the self-avatar’s personal budget. This way, during breaks between workdays, 
the self-avatar learns that she has a family of wife, son and parents-in-law. 
Therefore, she needs to decide how to allocate the money she earns. Will she 
pay for heating, food, or medicines? Whose needs are the most urgent?
(Pope 2013. Screenshot taken by the author)
(Pope 2013. Screenshot taken by the author)
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The self-avatar’s tasks during the workday is apparently easy: to learn 
the recommendations of the Ministry of Admission, which changes every 
day; to call the next person using the loudspeaker as quick as the current one 
is customs-cleared; to apply appropriate rules to the documents presented 
by a potential visitor approaching the desk. If everything is correct — 
the passport is valid and used by its owner; the owner holds a visa or permit 
of residence — the self-avatar will let the person enter the Arstotzkian territory. 
However, there are also obstacles: the time pressure is growing, as outside 
the office a crowd is getting denser. Moreover, official recommendations for 
the procedure of entrance changes daily; visas and permissions come and go, 
rules have more and more exceptions, and the atmosphere is getting hectic 
due to the threat of terrorism.
The feeling of imprisonment, and the impression of being reduced to the 
role of a machine, sources from actions taken in the gameplay situation. 
They are so absorbing that they do not leave much time for reflection over 
the self-avatar’s situatedness. The position voluntarily accepted by the player 
approaching the game turns out to be overwhelming and oppressive when 
experienced from the point of view within the gameworld. Camus writes 
that “[T]he workman of today works every day in his life at the same tasks, 
and this fate is no less absurd [than Sisyphus’]” (Camus 1991, 122). Minute 
by minute, the self-avatar’s situatedness also displays a greater resemblance 
to Sisyphus’ absurd fate. Papers, please makes the self-avatar a cog in the 
bureaucratic machine — the contractor of rules coming from on high; 
while the rules will, in turn, constitute the basis for evaluating and judging 
the performance of their contractor. Moreover, it demands to be very 
thorough, as after two warnings — each following a mistake or choice not 
in line with the guidelines — costs a certain amount of money which 
is deducted from the self-avatar’s salary. The tedium of work and the necessity 
to act automatically, to control the increasing number of parameters as quickly 
and precisely as possible, are interwoven with short breaks at the end of the 
day; just long enough to contemplate the absurdity of these useless efforts.
The interplay between the gameplay situation and the reflective situation 
starts when at the self-avatar’s desk, characters appear – characters which 
the self-avatar would like to admit despite the rules. There is a woman who 
has parted with her husband; an obdurate old smuggler placing on the desk 
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of the immigration inspector a hand-made passport; and a girl afraid that 
her prospective employer standing in the queue after her, Dari Ludum, 
will force her and her sister to work in the brothel. The self-avatar is able 
to approve or deny any person’s entry, despite the game penalising violation 
of its rules. However, it also penalises acting in line with the rules by making 
the self-avatar responsible for the decisions taken within the gameworld, 
e.g. if the self-avatar admit Dari Ludum to enter Arstotzka, the next day 
morning press will report “Dancers At Grestin Club Found Dead! Newly 
Immigrated Girls Victims of Human Trafficking” (Pope 2013). These situations, 
by highlighting discrepancies between the expectations of the gameworld and 
the self-avatar’s abilities, make the absurd even more tangible in the sinister 
atmosphere of this gameworld.
***
I believe that the atmosphere of the absurd, which accompanies unpleasant 
and repetitive activities serving their own precarious sake, is what constitutes 
the major characteristics of the aesthetics of all three games.
The situation of Sisyphus is tragic because he was able to find his own personal 
meaning of his endless struggle. “One must imagine Sisyphus happy”, because 
he is conscious of his situatedness and chooses his fate, Camus writes (1991, 
123). This choice is unavailable for the self-avatars condemned to their digital 
hells, which can be turned off at any moment. They are not heroic but limited 
to their wasted efforts.
The three games highlight different aspects of the absurd devoid of its dramatic 
nature, and convey in divergent ways the “absurd sensitivity” (Camus 1991, 
2).
In Everyday the Same Dream, the Sisyphean efforts of the protagonist are 
perceivable only in the audio-visual layer. The self-avatar enters the workplace, 
but she does not do the job. However, the work is depicted as absolutely 
futile, and the time is perfectly circular, just like in Sisyphus’ hell. If the 
self-avatar does not step out of the path, everything will be repeated 
in identical sentence, over and over again.
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Is it time? points at the meaning of performed tasks. Are they worth the effort, 
even if they are only intended to maintain this hopeless life? Is life without 
satisfaction worth living anymore?
The experience of tedious work that brings forward ethical dilemmas can 
be found in Papers, please. Performing tiresome tasks and the exitlessness 
of the situation; when the self-avatar can choose between bad and worse 
solutions; is narratively motivated by his will to support his family, and 
emotionally by the curiosity of the limits of this experience. But it remains 
absurd, as no justification can be proposed for this fruitless effort.
3.3. The They speak inside me1
“In terms of the ‘they’, and as the ‘they’, I am ‘given’ proximally to ‘myself ’ […].
Proximally Dasein is ‘they’, and for the most part it remains so”
(Heidegger 2001, 167 [129]). 
The theme of everyday chores is continued in the following pages, as the 
present chapter undertakes a close playing of Sunset (Tale of Tales 2015), 
where the self-avatar performs the role of housekeeper. However, the 
main point of interest is the relation between a player perceiving an avatar 
as herself, and reflecting over this relation from the internal perspective; and 
a soliloquising protagonist, as perceived from the point of view external to the 
gameworld. I will approach these issues while interpreting Sunset, the game 
that — also because of its flaws — reveals the split between the player and 
the avatar; between in-game duties and the pleasure of gameplay.
For the purpose of studying the compound of the self-avatar, I will make use 
of two Heideggerian terms: the They and distantiality.
While the player approaches limitations inscribed in her in-game position 
from the point of view of the aesthetic situation, it can be described 
as the They. From this perspective, the monologues render an expression 
of depersonalised opinion and a form of pressurising.
In turn, the distantiality emerging between the player and the protagonist 
becomes visible in the moments of interplay between the player’s experiences 
as the self-avatar, and her external approach to the protagonist; soliloquising 
and defining herself with her own gaze.
Angela Burnes
The seventies have just begun. Angela Burnes, a black American woman, has 
tried to escape the fate of the female residents of Baltimore; run from the 
1 An earlier version of this chapter was published in Polish (Kania 2017).
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They determining the congruence of the social position and expected role. 
The They shaping her fate. However, because of a military takeover, she 
gets stuck in Anchuria — the country located in Latin America. Here, 
in this unfamiliar country where people speak in a foreign language, she has 
to undertake the same role she wanted to escape. She complains:
“Five years at Harrison College, living on tips and whatever my Aunt Anita could save up. 
Five years to get a piece of paper that says I’m an engineer. Also I can clean this man’s house” 
(Tale of Tales 2015).
While entering the gameplay situation of Sunset I-Angela wend my way 
to a lift. My duties and role within the gameworld becomes clear while I learn 
to experience Angela as myself. While performing tasks specified on the list 
pinned inside the lift, I become Angela Burnes2; and her position determines 
my duties, her tasks — completed, awaiting, or neglected — situate me within 
the gameworld3. The monologues and comments concern my performance, 
pointing out how it should be done. The They judge my performance, and 
make it comparable to some system of rules incorporated in the self-avatar; 
the structure I learn and internalise make the They speak inside me.
The inner monologues are what shape the gameplay situation, and my 
reflective understanding of aesthetics of the avatar as my own situatedness 
within the gameworld. I am here, but “proximally, it is not ‘I’, in the sense 
of my own Self, that ‘am’; but rather the Others, whose way is that of the 
‘they’” (Heidegger 2001, 167 [129]).
Angela Burnes observes herself in the mirror. Her image is reflected by the 
surface of the glass doors in Gabriel Ortega’s penthouse. Her words make her 
situatedness within the gameworld more precise; they reflect over it and make 
it meaningful:
“I’m alone in the apartment. It’s not my home, but the walls and the windows don’t care. 
And no one else is here to see me. I can do what I want, yet I restrain myself. Sitting at Señor 
2 The moment of bad faith, cf. chapter 2.4.
3 The moment of spirit of seriousness, cf. chapter 2.4.
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Ortega’s desk, touching his things, I feel ambivalent” (Tale of Tales 2015).
In a while the sun will set. It means that the time for fulfilling the tasks 
commissioned to the self-avatar by the mysterious principal is at an end. 
However, listening to Angela’s monologues makes me reflect over the 
self-avatar, as she is situated within the gameworld. As opposed to Angela’s 
words, the self-avatar didn’t intend to sit at Gabriel Ortega’s desk, and while 
being in his apartment the self-avatar does not restrain herself from anything 
she can do here. Who did, then? The self-avatar unpacks some bibelots from 
cardboard boxes, and arranges them without permission; she leaves a tap 
turned on. In order to exercise the limits of her agency in the gameworld, she 
neglects her duties and leaves the apartment.
How, then, from the in-game point of view, while playing a game (Leino 
2009, 10; Leino 2010, 133–34), can I reflectively understand the relation 
between the act of soliloquising and the self-avatar? And how is it to be 
understood from the point of view external to the game?
Testing the Distance
The first point I would like to shed light on is the distance that emerges 
between the self-avatar and the protagonist. The self-avatar reflects over 
herself from the point of view of the in-game aesthetic situation. While 
the soliloquising protagonist – when she is presented as reflecting over her 
own self or looking in the mirror – is observed by the player from the external 
point of view. Therefore, her distinctiveness is perceived as individuality 
of the character (Cf. Vella 2014).
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(Tale of Tales 2015. Screenshot taken by the author)
Heidegger writes about the concept of distanced being-with-one-another, 
which, I think, can be considered as the basis of this relation:
“In one’s concern with what one has taken hold of, whether with, for, or against, the Others, 
there is constant care as to the way one differs from them, whether that difference is merely 
one that is to be evened out, whether one’s own Dasein has lagged behind the Others and 
wants to catch up in relationship to them, or whether one’s Dasein already has some priority 
over them and sets out to keep them suppressed. The care about this distance between them 
is disturbing to Being-with-one-another, though this disturbance is one that is hidden 
from it. If we may express this existentially, such Being-with-one-another has the character 
of distantiality [Abstandigkeit]” (Heidegger 2001, 163–164 [126–127]).
I believe that the common being of the player and the avatar — mine and 
Angela Burnes’ — spreads between the poles of deepening the distance 
and nullifying it; between acting as the self-avatar and observing her.
Sunset is a game lacking an evaluation system; consisting of exploration, 
looking for the places where the scheduled task/s need to be performed, and 
making decisions concerning the emotional response to the in-game events. 
In this gameworld, the reflective interplay develops in the rhythm of dialectics 
of splits between the contents of monologues and the gameworld available 
to the player; in the audio-visual signs of the character’s separateness from 
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the player; and in the mechanics of control over the avatar.
The Territory
The space of exploration open to the self-avatar is limited to Gabriel Ortega’s 
apartment. It is available once a week of the in-game time, just for an hour 
preceding sunset.
Angela Burnes, considered to be the protagonist, spends all her remaining 
hours “living” in the gameworld. In her monologues, she informs the player 
about events and details crucial to the gameplay. She broadly comments 
on them at the beginning of every workday, informing about the political 
situation and disturbances on the streets, as threat and her own concerns 
increase.
She says that the apartment is a hidden place where she “can pretend for a little 
while that none of this is happening” (Tale of Tales 2015). The inaccessibility 
of the gameworld for the self-avatar becomes increasingly disturbing, while 
its presence — or even over-presence — provides Angela with constantly 
ingoing topics for new monologues.
It is not easy for Angela to get to the apartment she attends. The civil war 
makes her plead repeatedly — half for the player and half for herself — 
“I’m late! There were so many checkpoints on my way up here. Let’s get 
to work” (Tale of Tales 2015), and “Late again. It’s hectic out there. There are 
soldiers everywhere” (Tale of Tales 2015) — almost like the rabbit in Alice’s 
Adventures in Wonderland, who exclaimed: “Oh dear! Oh dear! I shall be too 
late!” (Carroll 2001, 11). I can meet her only inside the building, in the lift. 
I will not see any of the “outside” in the game, any guardian of the military 
regime.
I will be reminded on this specific “narrowing” of the world by the panoramic 
view from the terrace of Gabriel Ortega’s penthouse. It is also exposed 
by the changing span of the gameplay situation. At first, it embraces a whole, 
yet unfurnished apartment. In the course of time, as consecutive weeks 
of furnishing and domesticating pass, access to certain areas of the penthouse 
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becomes limited. Angela can enter only these rooms, where there is some task 
to fulfil. In the third, final phase of the game, she will be able to explore only 
the main hall and one room chosen by the employer.
In parallel to circles of spatial limits, the topics of Angela’s everyday soliloquies 
gradually alter. Although this is not linear change, accents in the protagonist’s 
“thoughts” in the lift are constantly getting more personal. At the beginning 
of the game, her comments are concentrated on the political situation 
of Anchuria, and her opinions concerning the role she thinks she should 
perform in these events. Later on, she elaborates on her family and brother, 
revolutionist — on their shared childhood and his current lot. Finally, 
the player can observe Angela’s concerns on developing — partially as a result 
of the self-avatar’s choices — an ambivalent, potentially romantic relationship, 
between the protagonist and her employer.
Undoubtedly, Angela Burnes preferably speaks about her feelings. While 
she refers to a moment when she found out that her principal is involved 
in cooperation with the regime, she confesses:
“I couldn’t even move after I read through the papers that Ortega brought home to sign. 
I stood there with my heart pounding and my face burning.[…] At first I felt bad, snooping, 
but after I read through it all, I knew my brother and his revolutionary friends needed to know 
about this” (Tale of Tales 2015).
However, when she engages in the resistance movement, she says: 
“I feel strange exhilaration. It’s not my homeland, but I’m doing something 
meaningful” (Tale of Tales 2015).
In every sentence articulated by Angela, the player feels a dominant overtone 
of confession. Due to this, the character takes its shape and concentrates 
the gameworld around her. Angela Burnes talks about herself, reflects 
in mirrors, casts shadows; she is present as a protagonist in the strong sense, 
and she echoes this presence in her monologues. Her soliloquies have, then, 
two functions. From the external point of view, they are decreasing the distance 
between the player and the protagonist by introducing her into secrets of the 
‘soul of the avatar’; they enable the player to better understand the character, 
and perhaps to empathise with her. However, from the internal perspective 
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of the aesthetic situation, the monologues create the distance, as they enable 
the self-avatar to hear the They predominantly speaking inside her, and 
making her agency and mere reflection secondary.
Mirror, Mirror… Tell me
The distanced otherness of Angela Burnes gains its full character with 
the support of possibilities to look at herself specific for the medium. 
In the gameplay situation, the self-avatar is given from the first person 
perspective, and becomes visible in reflections, shadows, mirrors. This visual 
dimension of reflectivity is supported by the modernist architecture of the 
apartment in which the game takes place. Inspired by Yves Saint-Laurent’s 
penthouse, it is full of shiny surfaces and huge sheets of glass (Samyn 2015). 
The avatar, if left for a while and observed from the external perspective, 
starts to act in her own way —a mutual characteristic of various Tale of Tales’ 
creations (2005; 2009; 2009b). In these strange moments, when the character 
is not controlled by the player, she approaches the mirror and starts to exercise 
her gestures — lifts her arms, looks approvingly at herself — which expose 
the distance between the player and the protagonist.
Where are the They?
The dialectics of distantiality is fully exposed when the self-avatar needs 
to decide about the emotional — tender or operational — approach to chores 
she was commissioned. As long as the monologues are articulated in the first 
person; when the utterances concern actions that need to be performed; 
the form changes. In consequence, acts of communication between the They 
and the self-avatar take a form of orders formulated in third person, and 
directed toward the self-avatar. The sole linguistic form creates an inner split 
within the self-avatar, when she addresses herself this way.
The reference of the self-avatar to the gameworld is a moment of exposure 
of the existential meaning of the in-game the They, that the player gradually 
internalises during the exploration of the gameworld in the gameplay 
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situation. The They is a way of being determined by tasks, gazes, engagements 
piling up around me, that are consolidated by “the inconspicuous domination 
by Others which has already been taken over unaware from Dasein 
as Being-with” (Heidegger 2001, 164 [126]). The situatedness within the 
gameworld is always related to these determinants, as it becomes lucid 
from the perspective of the in-game aesthetic situation. The self-avatar can 
follow the emerging requirements by employing bad faith (Cf.: Sartre 1978, 
44–45, 47–70, 628; Leino 2012), or deepen the distance by not following 
the gameplay situation and approaching the game form the external 
perspective.
While experiencing Angela as myself, as the self-avatar from the point of view 
of the in-game aesthetic situation, I interpret her voice not as a sign of an 
individual distinct from myself, but as an exponent of the super-individual 
order. It is experienced as a pressure or a form of impersonal force, that 
is present when “We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they [man] take 
pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and 
judge” (Heidegger 2001, 164 [126-127]).
Angela Burnes’ comments, as interpreted from this perspective — both 
those self-reflective and others outlining the existential situatedness within 
the gameworld — highlight the meaning of the gameworld as already shaped, 
but simultaneously different from the meaning of the everyday world the player 
lives in. Here one can recognise the existential the They as duties, common 
knowledge of obvious facts, and widely-accepted rules, that determine my 
understanding of the in-game situatedness. Heidegger asks about the They 
in search of its existential meaning: “Who is it, then, who has taken over 
Being as everyday Being-with-one-another?” (Heidegger 2001, 163 [125]). 
Following his question, I will also ask from the in-game point of view: 
how does the relationship between self-avatar and everything that precedes 
individual self-making within the gameworld look like; how does the They 
co-create my self within the gameworld by outlining the gameplay situation?
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Duties
From the list stuck in the lift, the player learns about duties that build her 
character; the same duties frames the self-avatar’s being within the game — 
the gameplay situation. The routine of the housewife is depicted in game 
mechanics, which becomes as boring as chores, as soon as the self-avatar gets 
acquainted with her simple tasks, e.g. the quest for the place where dusting 
should be performed. Either way, the decision; if there is a need or interest 
to perform the certain task; is not left to the self-avatar as the task is clearly 
specified but its execution is not evaluated. Moreover, the monologues 
provide an explanation of why am I fulfilling my duties, and who I am in the 
gameworld for others.
While following the They, the self-avatar acts in bad faith; she behaves 
as if she was determined by the role she had once undertaken, and is unable 
to abandon it from then on. This is analogical to a bartender who narrows 
his perception of himself down to being just a bartender. In consequence, 
he becomes even too much a bartender in order to conform to everything that 
a bartender should be, as described in Being and Nothingness (Sartre 1978, 
59). The measure of bad faith is not acting within given circumstances, but 
looking at the gameworld exclusively through the given role, despite being 
aware of the insufficiency and reductive character of this approach to self. 
During this moment in Sunset, I am just a housekeeper who perceives her 
own actions as determined by the rules: the state of bibelots, interior design, 
and the needs of others. I am the performer of duties specified on the list 
by my principal, and the rhythm of my actions is measured by minutes before 
the sun sets.
Mechanics of interactions with objects in Sunset resembles dialogue systems. 
Sometimes the player is able to decide if she wants to interact with an object 
(she presses “E” — “execute” — to take an action). She can neglect her task, 
the unchecked box on her list. However, usually this is the way how the chore 
is performed which is important here. The choice between two different 
behaviours it connected with “Y” and “N” buttons, it is the choice between 
“yes” and “no”, that often is also evaluated in Angela’s terms as “good” and 
“bad”, as per the following phrases:
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“Y: Tenderly polish the silver with your own breath”
“N: Polish silver with standard chemicals” (Tale of Tales 2015)
or,
“Y: Prepare a tender, homey dish of macaroni and cheese”
“N: Prepare sophisticated meal with oysters and caviar” (Tale of Tales 2015).
What is the question the self-avatar answers while performing her chores? 
The solution of this problem is suggested by the representational convention 
of Angela’s tasks. The self-avatar’s quest is limited to finding the place in which 
the given action needs to be executed; and choosing the emotional atmosphere 
of making dinner, unclogging a pipe, or arranging books on shelves. While 
the animation of Angela doing declared tasks is repeatedly replaced by a scene 
of the sunset over the city, accompanied by the face of the clock showing 
the acceleration of time and the sound of Angela’s whistling. This is a clear 
reference to convention common in films of the ‘70s; where erotic scenes 
were replaced with landscape scenes, flowers or natural phenomena.
This dialogical mechanics is repeated in interactions with absent owner 
of the apartment. Comments, which the self-avatar can add to Gabriel’s notes 
attached to important items — the music system, chessboard, works of art — 
are also connected with an emotional response, “Y” or “N”, “yes” or “not”. 
Even the button on the keyboard the player needs to press is evaluating her 
choice with regard to Angela’s system of values; and an evaluation of Angela’s 
demeanour towards Gabriel, and towards the task itself.
The Sunset 
The dissonance that breaks the subtle harmony between being the self-avatar, 
reflecting over her, and observing the character from the external point 
of view, becomes visible at every sunset that encapsulates the self-avatar’s 
workday. The sun sets in San Bavon, and in its light the short clash takes 
place: the clash for agency within the gameworld. Is the They not only able to 
speak, but also to act inside me?
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Exactly at 17:59 of the official Anchurian time, Angela Burnes sighs: 
“it’s time to go home” (Tale of Tales 2015). If the self-avatar does not respond 
to her suggestion, the doors of the lift will obliterate her view, independently 
of neither her actions, nor the place she occupies at the moment. Is this 
the They who decided that she will promptly go home?
Only in the last evening, the decision to stay in the penthouse after sunset 
is left to the self-avatar. It seems that this is the self-avatar who is responsible 
for making a decision. Today on her list are just two points. The first task 
is to prepare the dinner — she can decide if she prepares the dinner for one 
or for two. The second is to stay and wait for Ortega. Can the self-avatar reject 
performing this job, as she has done with many others, and just leave?
This day, the They also remind the self-avatar to go home; however, today 
it is not their decision to take. If she stays, she wakes up in Gabriel Ortega’s 
bedroom; but if she decides to leave the apartment before the sunset… she 
will also wake up in his bed.
Revolutionary Cinderella
The soliloquies of Angela Burnes, when listened to from the external 
perspective, present a pretty straightforwardly sketched back-story; and, 
in consequence, a rather flat character. The protagonist of Sunset is connected 
with the trope of Cinderella, who cleans the flat dreaming about love of the 
prince; with some features of the political activist.
She spies Gabriel Ortega and steals information concerning the military 
operations of the regime, in order to pass it to her brother and “his 
revolutionary friends” (Tale of Tales 2015). The tone of her monologues 
is contaminated with revolutionary slogans and sweet but naive manifestos:
“Inaction would be worse than impotence. My only regret is for the innocent blood being 
shed; the deaths of those who only wanted to live their lives” (Tale of Tales 2015).
Or, in a later part of the game: 
Perspectives of the Avatar158
“Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable” (Tale 
of Tales 2015).
Angela comments on the works of art collected by Gabriel Ortega; she talks 
about paintings, sculptures and chessboard, while drawing comparisons 
between the value of art and the value of human life.
Especially in the third part of the game, the stereotypisation of the character 
becomes predominant. Therefore, the initial interest in the character 
of Angela Burnes quickly transforms into impatience as a result of idle talk, 
truisms, and emptiness of character.
However, this aspect of the game also highlights nuances of the process 
of shaping the perspective within the gameworld. In the gameplay situation, 
the self-avatar is determined by the They. While in the aesthetic situation, 
the They is realised as the limits of the self-avatar’s situatedness within 
the gameworld. The player perceives the interplay of the two positions from 
the perspective external to the gameworld, as interplay of the agency of the 
stereotypical character and the self-avatar’s influence on the gameworld.
***
Sunset frustratingly confronts the player with Angela Burnes who impersonates 
the They; i.e. a set of rules, constraints and obligations; and presents the 
character’s individuality. The protagonist’s monologues enable the self-avatar 
to perceive her situatedness (as a self-avatar) from the point of view of the 
in-game aesthetic situation. This situatedness is composed of the self-avatar’s 
determination by the role, adopted by the player as her own; and the process 
of distancing that is finalised by the moment of perceiving Angela from 
the perspective external to the game; that is, distanced, articulated, and 
ultimately objectified.
Summary
In the gameplay situation, the They limits and guides the character experienced 
in bad faith; as well as imposes rules and hints on the meaning of the gameworld 
as one should read it, when it is approached in the spirit of seriousness.
The in-game aesthetic situation enables the self-avatar to reflect over herself from 
within her situatedness towards the gameworld. It opens the interpretative 
field that does not make claims of the artefact as functioning within 
the external world, but offers insight into the gameworld as experienced from 
inside; as an aesthetic anticipated wholeness experienced from the situated 
point of view. In consequence, it enables the revelation of phenomena that 
condition the self-avatar’s experience.
The internalisation of the others; their incarnation in the in-game subjectivity 
in the form of the They; makes the self-avatar the only position available 
for perceiving and acting within the gameworld. Despite the reflective 
distantiality, the experience of suspension of the existential freedom 
of the player is the major characteristic of her condition as the self-avatar. 
It allows her to live through adventure within the non-absurd gameworld. 
As long as she wants to concretise her subjective position within this 
world, she also cannot escape the They. However, she can recognise it from 
the perspective of the in-game aesthetic situation, and enjoy the interplay 
between the internal and external points of view, that contribute to the overall 
meaning and aesthetic value of the game. This is the external perspective 
which opens the field for an intertextual reading of the game amongst other 
games, and due to the player’s literacy, also makes their playing situated 
in the cultural landscape.
***
Building on many existing solutions within the philosophy of computer 
games (as proposed by Espen Aarseth, Olli T. Leino, and Daniel Vella, 
to name just a few), and existential philosophy (that of Jean-Paul Sartre, 
Martin Heidegger, and Albert Camus), the open-ended character of the 
proposed existential aesthetics introduces a perspective for the development 
of description, and aesthetic interpretation, of the individual’s situatedness 
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towards the digital game.
The presented attempt to the sketch of the existential aesthetics considers 
points of view adapted by creators, as well as the situatedness of players 
of computer games. This dual endeavour shows how perspective switches 
when - apparently - the same research area is approached from differing 
points of view; through analysis of discourse of authors of computer games, 
and through phenomenological reflection over the player’s experiences with 
game considered to be world and text. This second passage; from the in-game 
situatedness of the self-avatar, to the textual analysis of the game artefact 
undertaken from the external perspective; reopens the field for considering 
discourses digital games participates in.
In conseqence, the proposed theoretical approach does not try to conceal 
the situatedness of the researcher. On the contrary, it argues that the proposed 
types of situatedness towards the researched phenomena supplement each 
other; and passages between them, not always easy to conceptualise, make the 
area dynamic and even more interesting.
These theoretical difficulties caused some moments to be explored in more 
detail than the others. Moreover, the choice of games interpreted in the 
course of the book was motivated by the need of exposition of existentially 
vital issues and structures. Hence, the selection could be accused of assigning 
privilege to games that foreground or subvert expected aesthetic features 
in unusual or unexpected ways. Nevertheless, I think that the presented model 
can also be useful in analysis of more mainstream or typical single player 
digital games with avatars. Undoubtedly, its shape and focal points could 
be modified by close playing of games that provide experiences that are more 
often connected with playing games. I therefore believe that research of the 
most representative games is the appropriate direction for future application 
of the proposed theoretical model.
In addition, I reckon that widening the research area will confirm that the 
aesthetics of involvement; which fulfils itself in the moment of interplay 
between the agency of the researcher and the text, as well as of the self-
avatar, i.e. in-game subjectivity, and the concretization of the gameworld she 
finds herself in; will underline the value and importance of not separating 
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the subject and object of experience.
While initiating an experience of the AAA single player digital game 
with avatar, can the They also be discovered to be the aesthetic form 
of the self-avatar, when looked at through the gameplay situation?
Streszczenie
Perspektywy awatara. Szkic egzystencjalnej estetyki gier cyfrowych
Szkic egzystencjalnej estetyki gier cyfrowych, który zawarłam w książce, 
powstał z potrzeby zgłębienia zagadnienia usytuowania jednostki – autora 
i gracza – względem jednoosobowej gry cyfrowej z awatarem.
Skupiając się na analizie tytułów autorskich, niezależnych i artystycznych, 
koncentruję się na tym, jak różnie jawią się gry w zależności od perspektywy, 
z jakiej są postrzegane. Prezentowany sposób interpretacji opiera się na 
założeniu zaczerpniętym z filozofii egzystencjalnej; mianowicie, że to 
indywidualna ludzka egzystencja jest centralnym problemem filozoficznym. 
W takim horyzoncie teoretycznym, splot wydarzeń towarzyszący powstawaniu 
gry komputerowej czy graniu w nią, staje się znaczący jedynie z perspektywy 
konkretnej sytuacji.
W ramach egzystencjalnej estetyki gra funkcjonująca w rozmaitych 
dyskursach może być interpretowana jako część codziennego świata – cyfrowy 
artefakt, który jest projektowany i sprzedawany, rozgrywany i porównywany 
do innych.
W pierwszej części książki skupiłam się na więzi łączącej egzystencjalny projekt 
autora z tworzonym artefaktem z perspektywy twórcy – tak, jak przedstawiana 
jest ona w paratekstach towarzyszących powstawaniu gier cyfrowych. 
W trzech rozdziałach skoncentrowałam się na wyodrębnieniu dyskursów 
autorskiego projektowania: w pierwszym autorzy, cyfrowi rzemieślnicy, lokują 
swą pracę w ramach dyskursu rękodzielnictwa. W kolejnym, dotyczącym 
dyskursu poetyckiego, projektant staje się strażnikiem wizji. Natomiast 
w rozdziale dotyczącym dyskuru oratorskiego, autorzy biorą na siebie zadanie 
formułowania proceduralnych argumentów.
Perspektywę graczki i jej wielowymiarowego bycia w sytuacji względem gry 
prezentuje druga część monografii. To zarys inspirowanej głównie filozofią Jean-
Paul Sartre’a egzystencjalnej fenomenologii usytuowania jednostki w świecie 
gry, wewnątrzgrowego życia mnie-awatara oraz jego wymiaru estetycznego. 
Omawiam w niej sposoby usytuowania graczki względem grywalnego 
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artefaktu oraz ich współgranie: sytuację rozgrywki i sytuację estetyczną, 
które składają się na perspektywę wewnątrzgrową; oraz zewnętrzną perspektywę, 
która dopełnia estetyczne rozumienie gry. Jest to autorska propozycja 
estetyki sytuacyjnej gier komputerowych, wsparta analizą egzystencjalnych 
fenomenów takich jak zła wiara, duch powagi, znaczenie, wolność i przygoda 
w kontekście gier komputerowych.
Bliskie odczytania cyfrowych gier, wykorzystujące teoretyczne rozstrzygnięcia 
części drugiej, składają się na ostatnią część książki. Odczytanie pierwsze 
koncentruje się na awatarach, których sprawczość jest w trakcie rozgrywki 
podawana w wątpliwość; drugie na cyfrowych Syzyfach, zamkniętych w 
światach przesiąkniętych atmosferą absurdu; trzecie zaś – na ekspozycji 
wcielonego w awatara Heideggerowskiego Się.
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